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This thesis is comprised of three independent chapters on topics in spatial, labour
and development economics. I focus on South Africa for which there is a rich and
under-exploited set of micro-data and where the peculiar history of the country -
including restricted migration and separate development along race lines - makes for
a particularly interesting setting.
The first chapter provides some of the first evidence on the labour market impacts
of female internal migration. Merging detailed migration data from censuses and
labour market data from labour force surveys, I exploit substantial time-variation
in female migrant inflows into over 200 districts. To identify causal effects, I make
use of the unique history of South Africa to construct a plausibly exogenous shift-
share instrument for female migrant concentration based on earlier male migration
flows from reserves during the Apartheid period. I find that this migration increases
the employment and hours worked of high-skilled women (due to substitution in
household work) and leads to a reduction in the employment of low-skilled female
non-migrants (due to increased competition).
The second chapter examines how minimum wage legislation influences the labour
market impacts of productivity shocks. Merging district-level high resolution weather
data with high frequency data from South Africa’s labour force survey, I examine how
the introduction of an agricultural minimum wage affects resilience to weather shocks
in the short term using a difference-in-differences approach. I find strong evidence
that the substantially increased (and inflexible) wage bill after the minimum wage
law leads agricultural employers to retrench formally employed workers in the wake of
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negative shocks (whereas agricultural employment was more resilient in the pre-law
period).
In the third and final chapter, I estimate the magnitude of agglomeration extern-
alities in South Africa using a unique geo-coded panel micro-dataset where workers
are tracked as they move across the country. The few studies on developing coun-
tries to date have estimated much higher agglomeration elasticities than those found
in developed countries, but these studies have generally been unable to control for
sorting on unobservables or to work with the ideal geographic units. Employing indi-
vidual fixed effects and an instrumental variable constructed from a novel dataset on
historical population settlements, my preferred estimate for regional wage elasticity




I.I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I.II Overview of the thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1 The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evid-
ence from the end of Apartheid 6
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.1 Unit of geography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.3.2 Migration & regional controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3 Labour market outcomes & individual characteristics . . . . . 18
1.3.4 Summary statistics & discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.1 Baseline estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.4.2 IV approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.6 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6.1 Province-year fixed effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6.2 Controlling for male migrant share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6.3 Using different data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.6.4 Potential serial correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6.5 Potential relocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2 How does minimum wage legislation influence the labour market
impacts of productivity shocks? 45
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
vi
2.2 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2.1 The agricultural sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2.2 Drought trends & impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.3 The 2003 agricultural minimum wage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3.1 Labour market data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.3.2 Weather measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3.3 Minimum wage data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.7 Heterogeneous effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.A Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3 Agglomeration economies in a developing country: Evidence from
geo-coded micro-panel data in South Africa 96
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.2 Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.3 Data & econometric approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3.2 Econometric approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.4.1 Baseline results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
3.4.2 Individual fixed effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3.4.3 2SLS results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.4.4 2SLS and individual fixed effects combined . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.4.5 Further heterogeneous effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.4.6 Human capital externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.A Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
TABLE OF CONTENTS vii
List of Tables
1.1 Summary statistics for recent migrants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2 Female and male migrant occupations in 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3 First stage regression: impact of historical male migration on con-
temporary female migrant shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 The effects of female internal migration on the labour market out-
comes of all non-migrants (male & female) in receiving areas: OLS
& 2SLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.5 The effects of female internal migration on the labour market out-
comes of male & female non-migrants in receiving areas: OLS &
2SLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.6 The effects of female internal migration on the labour market out-
comes of female non-migrants of different skill groups in receiving
areas: OLS & 2SLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.7 The effects of female internal migration on the labour market out-
comes of female non-migrants of different skill groups in receiving
areas: robustness checks for 2SLS estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.8 The effects of female migration on the size of the non-migrant labour
force: OLS & 2SLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.9 The effects of female internal migration on the labour market out-
comes of high-skilled male non-migrants in receiving areas: OLS &
2SLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.10 The effects of female migration on the hourly wages of female do-
mestic workers relative to female workers in other industries: OLS
& 2SLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.1 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.2 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
viii
2.3 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours
worked and wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
employment after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the
size of the wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.5 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
employment after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the
size of the wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.6 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours
worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law consider-
ing the size of the wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.7 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours
worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law consider-
ing the size of the wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.8 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
wage employment and wage employment with a contract after vs.
before the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage gap . 72
2.9 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
wage employment and wage employment with a contract after vs.
before the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage gap . 76
2.A.1 Definitions of dependent variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2.A.2 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
employment after vs. before the minimum wage law . . . . . . . . . 85
2.A.3 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
employment after vs. before the minimum wage law . . . . . . . . . 85
2.A.4 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours
worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law . . . . . 86
2.A.5 The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours
worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law . . . . . 86
2.A.6 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.A.7 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on monthly
hours worked and wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.A.8 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of employment after vs. before the minimum wage law . . . 88
LIST OF TABLES ix
2.A.9 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.A.10 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on monthly
hours worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law . . 89
2.A.11 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on monthly
hours worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law . . 89
2.A.12 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of employment after vs. before the minimum wage law con-
sidering the size of the wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.A.13 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of employment after vs. before the minimum wage law con-
sidering the size of the wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
2.A.14 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on hours
worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law consider-
ing the size of the wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.A.15 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on hours
worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law consider-
ing the size of the wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.A.16 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of wage employment and wage employment with a contract
after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size of the
wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
2.A.17 The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of wage employment and wage employment with a contract
after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size of the
wage gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.1 Descriptive statistics for base sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.2 The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: Pooled OLS . . 113
3.3 The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: Individual fixed
effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
3.4 The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: 2SLS . . . . . . 116
3.5 The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: 2SLS and indi-
vidual fixed effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.A.1 Summary statistics for municipalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.A.2 Descriptive statistics for movers in base sample . . . . . . . . . . . 128
LIST OF TABLES x
3.A.3 Descriptive statistics for base sample excluding districts where no
historical population information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
3.A.4 The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: 2SLS and indi-
vidual fixed effects with interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
3.A.5 The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages of workers: 2SLS
with individual fixed effects including a control for share of popula-
tion with tertiary education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.A.6 The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages of workers: 2SLS
with individual fixed effects including a control for share of popula-
tion with at least Grade 10 education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
3.A.7 The effects of human capital externalities on wages of workers: 2SLS
with individual fixed effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
LIST OF TABLES xi
List of Figures
1.1 South African homelands and magisterial districts . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Variation of Rainy Season SPEI Deviation and variation of Negative
Rainy Season SPEI Deviation across district municipalities . . . . . 55
2.2 Variation of Rainy Season SPEI Deviation and variation of Negative
Rainy Season SPEI Deviation across district municipalities during
a drought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3 Distribution of (log) agricultural wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.1 Variation of urban employment population and market potential





The broad focus of this thesis is spatial and labour economics in developing countries.
I examine topics which are of particular relevance to the development trajectories of
these countries - the functioning of labour markets; the characteristics and impacts
of internal migration; the resilience of agricultural employment to weather shocks;
and the productivity benefits of cities.
While China and India - and to a lesser extent, Brazil, Indonesia and Colombia -
have received attention in the burgeoning spatial economics literature focusing on
developing countries, South Africa has been relatively neglected. This is despite the
fact that the country is a particularly interesting case given its peculiar history of
separate development along race lines and restricted internal migration. The first
and third chapters of this thesis make use of the quasi-experimental setting created
by Apartheid policies.
The work that has gone into this thesis has been very data-intensive. South Africa
has a wealth of rich micro-datasets - although they often require a considerable
amount of cleaning - that remain under-exploited. It is one of the very few develop-
ing countries which carries out a panel household survey. There are also numerous
recently-digitised censuses from the Apartheid era.1 The labour force surveys - avail-
1It does however require some work to match districts over time especially in the absence of shape-
files for some of the older censuses.
1
able since 1993 annually, bi-annually or quarterly depending on the period - are a
very useful resource (and have been consolidated into the Post-Apartheid Labour
Market Series with consistent cross-entropy weights).2 I also make use of hard cop-
ies of historical censuses and high resolution satellite weather data.
I.II Overview of the thesis
Chapter 1: ‘The labour market impacts of female internal
migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid’
The first chapter studies the labour market impacts of female internal migration
in South Africa, examining the heterogeneous effects on non-migrants of different
skill groups. With a dramatic increase in the rate of urbanisation in the last sev-
eral decades, policy-makers in South Africa, as in many other developing countries
experiencing rapid urbanisation, have expressed concerns that cities have been un-
able to cope with the influx of migrants. There is a particular concern that rural
migrants may undercut low-skilled non-migrants in the labour market. Despite its
importance, there have been few studies of the labour market impacts of internal
migration in developing countries. No published studies have specifically examined
the economic impacts of female internal migration. This is despite the fact that fe-
male migrants in developing countries tend to be very differently distributed across
sectors as compared to men, and thus their arrival in receiving regions would be
expected to have different effects on the non-migrant population.
Whereas many migration papers focused on developing countries are limited by data
availability, I merge large sample migration data from South African censuses with
detailed labour force survey data, and exploit substantial time-variation in female
migrant inflows into over 200 districts. To identify the causal effects of migration on
labour market outcomes, I make use of the unique history of South Africa to con-
2An important discovery of my PhD was that it is possible to determine lower levels of geography
in labour force surveys from unique identification codes by comparing them against lists of district
codes from the national statistics agency. These can then be matched with census data.
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struct a plausibly exogenous shift-share instrument for female migrant concentration
based on earlier male migration flows from reserves during the Apartheid period. In
reference to recent literature on migration shift-share instruments, I argue that South
Africa - due to the natural experimental setting created by Apartheid era policies - is
one of the very few settings where an instrument using historical migration pathways
can plausibly capture exogenous variation in migration flows.
I show that female internal migration in South Africa increased the employment
and hours worked of highly-educated women (but not men) in the post-Apartheid
period. I demonstrate that this was due to the fact that female migrants found
employment as domestic workers, particularly in well-educated households, thereby
freeing women from household labour and allowing them to pursue employment or
increase their work hours. However, it was not the case that all subsections of the
non-migrant population benefited from this female in-migration and I show evidence
that low-skilled women experienced reduced employment. This suggests that female
migrants, who were relatively well-educated though lacking in experience, substituted
for low-skilled non-migrants in production.
Chapter 2: ‘How does minimum wage legislation influence
the labour market impacts of productivity shocks?’
My second chapter studies how reducing labour market flexibility by introducing a
sectoral minimum wage influences the effects of productivity shocks on labour market
outcomes. I focus on agricultural productivity shocks driven by weather variation.
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in weather affecting
agricultural productivity, due to a large share of their labour forces working in this
sector and the important role that agricultural production plays for the economic
lives of the poor. There is also much recent interest in the impacts of minimum
wage laws in developing countries. However, there is a missing perspective on how
minimum wage legislation could affect resilience to productivity shocks.
I merge district-level high resolution weather data with high frequency data from
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South Africa’s labour force survey to form a panel database covering the period 2001-
2007. I focus on an agricultural minimum wage introduced in 2003, which resulted
in a substantial increase in the median wage (it was set at the 70th percentile of the
prevailing wage distribution). I examine the influence of this law on the effects of
weather shocks on labour market outcomes, exploiting variation in the gap between
minimum wage levels and pre-law agricultural median wages across districts in a
difference-in-differences approach.
Whereas weather shocks have no significant effect on agricultural employment in the
pre-law period, in the post-law period, holding the pre-law wage gap at its mean level,
a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in rainy season soil moisture relative
to the local mean results in a 7.1% increase (decrease) in agricultural employment
among the total labour force relative to its mean level within six months. When
I focus only on the effects of below-average soil moisture (recoding above-average
soil moisture values as zero) on agricultural employment, it is clear that the effects
of negative weather shocks are driving the effects I find when I look at the inter-
action between my continuous weather measure and the minimum wage law. This
shows that the minimum wage substantially weakens the resilience of agricultural
employment to reduced rainy season moisture in the short term. I find evidence that
after negative shocks occur, some of the displaced agricultural workers transition
into unemployment while others transition into employment in other industries.
Chapter 3: ‘Agglomeration economies in a developing coun-
try: Evidence from geo-coded micro-panel data in South Africa’
My third chapter examines the magnitude of agglomeration externalities in South
Africa - that is, the effect of the agglomeration of workers or people on the pro-
ductivity of workers proxied by their wages. The few studies on agglomeration in
developing countries have found agglomeration elasticities often of 8% to 20%, con-
siderably higher than the elasticities averaging 3% estimated in rigorous developed
country studies. In theory, underdeveloped factor markets in developing countries
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may enhance the productivity benefits of cities relative to those in advanced coun-
tries. However, due to data constraints, agglomeration studies focused on developing
countries are not able to include all the endogeneity controls used in the developed
country papers and are often forced to work with geographical units that are far
removed from local labour markets.
I examine the relationship between urban population and nominal wages in South
Africa for the period 2008 - 2016 using all five rounds of the National Income Dynam-
ics Survey, a nationally-representative panel study. I map individuals to a geographic
level that approximates local labour markets as closely as possible. Since I have ac-
cess to an individual-level panel of workers, my paper is able to go further than the
other developing country papers in controlling for unobserved characteristics that
may be correlated with location choices - a critical feature of the state-of-the-art
empirical research on agglomeration effects. To control for simultaneity bias (or
omitted variable bias), I construct an instrument from historical population data
(specifically, from a hard copy of the 1960 census) that have not been used before in
the South African literature. Owing to South Africa’s unique history of controlled
migration and forced reallocation of the population across space, there is a strong
case to be made for the exclusion restriction for this instrument.
In my preferred specification including both individual fixed effects and a histor-
ical population instrument, I estimate an elasticity of wages to city population of
approximately 3%, which is robust to a large number of tests. I find that using
individual effects to control for sorting on unobservables reduces the estimated ag-
glomeration elasticity for South Africa by 18-37% (depending on the specification) -
in line with effect sizes in the developed country literature. I argue that these results
provide suggestive evidence that the very high agglomeration elasticities found for
other developing countries may in part be due to mismeasurement. I also examine
the comparative effects of human capital externalities and agglomeration external-




The labour market impacts of fe-
male internal migration: Evidence
from the end of Apartheid
1.1 Introduction
Most studies in the economics literature on international and internal migration,
and their impacts, focus on male migrants and effects on male natives/non-migrants
(Dustmann et al., 2016). However, a gendered focus on migration is important (Pfeif-
fer et al., 2007). Women may migrate for different reasons to men and the effects
of migrant networks may be gender-specific (Davis and Winters, 2001; Enchautegui,
1997). Since women tend to be distributed differently across economic sectors as
compared to men, their arrival in receiving regions would be expected to have differ-
ent effects on the non-migrant population. For the same reason, female non-migrants
are likely to be affected by in-migration differently to men. This paper focuses on
measuring the labour market impacts of female internal migration in South Africa,
examining the heterogeneous effects on non-migrants of different skill groups.
South Africa presents a particularly interesting case for the study of internal migra-
tion in developing countries. For over 80 years the mobility of South Africa’s black
population was strictly controlled and many were forced to live in native reserves
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in rural areas called ‘homelands’. This reflected the needs of the white-controlled
government for cheap - predominantly male - migrant labour to support mining and
industrial development but also political anxiety about permanent rural-to-urban
migration of this disenfranchised population (Turok, 2012). After the Second World
War, political considerations dominated and increasingly draconian controls were im-
posed to limit black urbanisation in order to sustain political domination. While the
Apartheid regime officially ended in 1991 (with the first democratic national elec-
tion in 1994), the most important migration restrictions were withdrawn in 1986.
This constituted a large shock to the system, resulting in a spike in the rate of in-
ternal migration. Since women had very few opportunities to leave homelands during
Apartheid, the female migrant supply shock was particularly large.
With the dramatic increase in the rate of urbanisation, policy-makers in South Africa,
as in many other developing countries experiencing rapid urbanisation, have ex-
pressed concerns that cities have been unable to cope with the influx of migrants.
There is a particular concern that rural migrants may undercut low-skilled non-
migrants in the labour market. Despite its importance, there have been few studies
of the labour market impacts of internal migration. No published studies have spe-
cifically examined the economic impacts of female internal migration.
I examine the changing nature of female migration and impacts thereof on the labour
market outcomes of non-migrants in over 200 receiving districts in South Africa
after Apartheid. Internal migration in South Africa has a strong gender dimension.
Historically, the Apartheid-era migrant labour system meant that predominantly
black African men moved to urban areas without their families. After the abolition
of influx controls, many women relocated to join their male partners (Von Fintel
and Moses, 2017). The share of women in the total migrant population grew at the
same time as female participation in the labour market increased. I first document
the surge of female migration that occurred after the end of migration restrictions
and examine the characteristics of the migration population. I show that while
female migrants had very little work experience, they were relatively well-educated
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as compared to the population in receiving districts. I then look at the impacts of
migration on the non-migrant population in receiving districts between 1996 to 2001,
a period during which there was considerable variation in district-level migration
inflows. I use an empirical specification that includes district and time fixed effects
and examine heterogeneous effects across gender and skill groups.
To identify the causal impact of migration flows, I exploit historical migration path-
ways - particularly between areas that were native reserves and receiving areas - to
predict contemporary migration. I employ a shift-share ‘past settlement instrument’
that makes use of the tendency for female migrants to settle in places where earlier
male migrants from the same sending region already reside. Crucially, given South
Africa’s peculiar history - including centrally-determined migrant allocation during
the Apartheid era and dramatic changes in the spatial economic landscape after the
end of Apartheid - there is a strong case to be made that the historical distribution
of (black) migrants across geographical areas is unrelated to contemporary economic
shocks in the same areas.
Overall, in line with much of the migration impacts literature, I find that female
migration has a non-significant effect on the employment and wages of non-migrants.
However, dividing the population into skill groups, I find that female migration
results in an increase in the employment (and hours worked) of highly educated
women and a reduction in the employment of low-skilled female non-migrants. I
provide evidence that migrant women supply services that are close substitutes with
housework thereby freeing up the labour of high-skilled women. On the other hand,
female migrants seem to compete for low-skilled jobs with female non-migrants in
receiving economies.
My paper contributes to the literature on internal migration in developing countries
(Lall et al., 2006). Following on from work on the impacts of international migration
in developed countries, several recent studies (Combes et al., 2015; Kleemans and
Magruder, 2018; Strobl and Valfort, 2015) have looked at the economic impacts of
internal migration in developing countries using spatial variation of migrant inflows
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for identification. None of these papers have tried to separate the effects of male
and female migration nor have they examined in any detail differential effects on
male and female non-migrants. Whereas all of these papers have had to make use of
small sample migration data or census data for labour market outcomes, I combine
large sample migration data with detailed labour force survey data on labour market
outcomes. Only Kleemans and Magruder (2018) have have more than a single cross-
section of labour market data to work with. Past studies have found mixed results.
Some have found negative economic impacts of internal migration on wages and
employment (Kleemans and Magruder, 2018; Strobl and Valfort, 2015) in line with
basic theory (Borgas, 1999; Card, 2001). Others, however, have found positive effects,
which have been attributed to complementarities in the production function and
agglomeration economies (Combes et al., 2015).
A well-known challenge in the migration impact literature is overcoming the endo-
geneity of migration flows: the fact that migration is likely to be correlated with
economic conditions in receiving regions, which will bias estimates of migration ef-
fects. Since Card (2001), past settlement instruments (otherwise known as ‘enclave-’
or ‘network instruments’) using the lagged geographic distribution of migrants have
been employed extensively in the immigration literature, and also in the internal
migration literature, albeit to a lesser extent. An important difficulty with this type
of instrument is that it can only address the endogeneity of migrant location choices
if local economic shocks that attracted the earlier migrants are not also at work
during the contemporary period (Borgas, 1999). In recent years, this assumption
has been increasingly questioned. Most papers do not even attempt to tell a story of
why migration determinants should have changed, merely relying on significant time
passing between the contemporary and lagged periods. In situations where migra-
tion pathways are highly stable over time (which is very often the case), historical
migration pathway instruments may predict current migration flows well but it is
highly unlikely that the exclusion restriction holds (Jaeger et al., 2018). In this pa-
per, I make use of the fact that dramatic changes in South African government policy
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created a substantial shift in the area-of-origin composition of internal migrants in
South African regions between the Apartheid and post-Apartheid periods.
My paper also adds to the growing literature that tries to exploit exogenous variation
resulting from Apartheid to study the development of South Africa (Bakker et al.,
2020; Biavaschi et al., 2018; Mariotti, 2015). One shortcoming of most of these
papers is that they have assumed that all Apartheid era policies ended abruptly in
1994 with the first democratic elections. A more careful appraisal of the historical
record shows that the Apartheid regime was gradually dismantled from the mid-
1980s to 1991. In the case of migration restrictions (which also applied for a time
to black immigrants from other countries), the most important of these actually
ended with the repeal of the Pass Laws Act in 1986 - and not with democratision
in 1994 - following which black people were free to move to cities (Ogura, 1996).
A few recent papers have tried to measure the effects of international migration on
labour market outcomes in South Africa (Biavaschi et al., 2018; Broussard, 2017).
These papers have used data from the 1996 census to construct historical migration
paths. They have also used census data for native labour outcomes, which may not
be ideal for this purpose (Ardington et al., 2006), and have used larger geographical
units, often containing several labour markets. These papers have found negative
impacts of immigration on the employment and incomes of natives. There have
been no nationally representative studies of internal migration in South Africa,1 nor
has there been any previous attempt to measure the economic impacts of internal
migration in South Africa.
Lastly, my study contributes to the emerging literature on gender differences in local
labour markets. Most studies just assume away gender. To date there have been a
few studies examining the impacts of female immigration from low-income countries
on native labour market outcomes in advanced countries (Barone and Mocetti, 2011;
Cortes and Tessada, 2011). These studies have generally found that this immigra-
1Several limited studies (Naidoo et al., 2008; Oosthuizen and Naidoo, 2004; Rogan et al., 2008) have
focused on profiling internal migration to particular metropolitan areas (usually Cape Town or
Gauteng) in South Africa and on trying to analyse push and pull factors contributing to migration.
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tion has increased the hours worked of high-skilled/high-income women and have
highlighted the channel of substitution in household work. There are several reasons
why the impacts of female internal migration in a developing country context may
be different. First, labour markets in developing countries are structurally quite dif-
ferent from those in developed countries. There are typically much higher rates of
informality and unemployment/underemployment, and the median worker is much
less skilled. Second, the demographics of the internal migrant population may be
different from those of the immigrant population given that it is much cheaper to
move and migration drivers may be different. Thirdly, labour markets may be thin-
ner in developing countries, which might result in larger labour market responses
(Kleemans and Magruder, 2018). My paper also differs from the papers mentioned
above in that it not only focuses on the effects of migration on the labour supply of
high-skilled/high-income women but also considers the labour market effects on low-
skilled non-migrants. I also consider a broader range of non-migrant labour market
outcomes including employment and wages.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I describe the historical background.
In Section 3, I present the data. I detail my estimation strategy in Section 4. In
Section 5, I report my results. In Section 6, I present various robustness checks and
in Section 7, I turn to an examination of channels. Section 8 concludes.
1.2 Historical background
The philosophy underlying separate development in South Africa can be traced back
to the early days of its colonial history. Segregationist policies began in 1913, three
years after the formation of the Union of South Africa, when the Natives Land Act
was passed. This was designed to counter the flow of blacks to urban areas after the
devastation caused by the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and demarcated black
reserves for black ownership and occupation while prohibiting the black population
from owning land outside of them (Ogura, 1996). Further legislation in 1923 and
1937 compelled the black population to live in certain areas and prohibited the black
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population, born outside of cities, from spending more than 14 days (and, later, three
days) in cities to seek work.2 Despite these restrictions, the black population in cities
grew, especially with the increased demand for labour from the rapidly developing
manufacturing industry around the time of the Second World War (Christopher,
2001).
Restrictions on migration became much stricter after 1948 when the Afrikaner Na-
tional Party (NP) came to power and implemented its programme of Grand Apartheid
(’apart-ness’ in Afrikaans), which aimed at compete social and spatial segregation
and was supported by significant government resources. Grand Apartheid aimed
at moving a large proportion of the black population - all who were not needed as
labourers in white urban areas - to native reserves. To this effect, it has been estim-
ated that 3.5 million black people (equivalent to a fifth of the black population in
1980) were forcibly relocated from ‘white’ areas. These reserves were overcrowded,
had extremely high poverty rates, were reliant on meagre subsidies from the national
government and had limited industry. Living conditions and the provision of public
services in resettlement camps were dismal (Desmond, 1971; Horrell, 1973). Small-
holder farming was one of the only activities that could be undertaken but even this
was limited by the poor quality of the agricultural land.
A number of important laws were passed. The Group Areas Act of 1950 established
residential areas for black people (which would later become ‘townships’) in metro-
politan areas and smaller cities and was meant to strengthen controls on the flows of
blacks into cities (Ogura, 1996). The Population Registration Act (1950) assigned a
population group to each citizen, which determined their political and social rights.
The Pass Laws Act (1952) forced every black African to carry a passbook (similar to
a passport) at all times documenting their permission to be in certain areas, without
which they were subject to arrest. In 1959, the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government
Act formalised the system of homelands, one for each ‘ethnic’ group.3
2The relevant laws were the Native (Urban Areas) Act (1923), the Native Laws Amendment Act
1937 and the Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1945).
3By the time they were reincorporated in 1994, South Africa’s homelands - their land mass con-
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After 1948, the control of migrant labour became much extensive and bureaucratic
(Hepple, 1969; Wilse-Samson, 2013). The employment of blacks was subject to the
authority of the central labour bureau in Pretoria, which oversaw and controlled the
numerous local bureaux. Blacks could not be employed in white areas without the
permission of the local labour bureau. Furthermore, no black person could leave
a homeland to work or seek work without the authority of the homeland bureaux,
which would pool all workseekers in their respective areas. Since there was often a
shortage of agricultural labour,4 blacks were only allowed to leave rural areas if labour
supply in the agriculture industry was deemed sufficient (Wilse-Samson, 2013). It
was also government policy that each reserve would send the majority of its workers
to one specific industry (Leys, 1975; Mariotti, 2015). For example, the Chamber of
Mines in South Africa recruited from four out of ten homelands, and predominantly
from just one (Mariotti, 2015). This centralised allocation process was independent
of the preferences and economic characteristics of the migrants (ibid.). Mobility
restrictions in South Africa were very strict, and hundreds of thousands of arrests
were made every year under the pass laws.5
Also relevant were the significant efforts to decentralise industry from the late 1950s.
These included policies both to promote industrialisation in selected white areas
bordering homelands (‘carrots’) and to restrict industrial expansion in metropol-
itan centres (‘sticks’). While ostensibly designed to alleviate diseconomies of scale
in metropolitan areas, the main goal was to support the state’s system of influx
control by providing alternative employment opportunities in areas near Bantustans
(Wellings and Black, 1986). Under one scheme, white industrialists were encouraged
to locate their factories in white towns near homelands, with black labourers being
housed either in satellite townships or in new towns within the reserves. Some 80
stituting 13% of the country’s land mass - were home to approximately 20 million black South
Africans.
4As a share of the economically active black population in 1970, about 40% of blacks were employed
in agriculture, forestry and fishing (2.26m people). Involvement in other sectors was as follows:
11% in mining and quarrying (610,000 people); 9% manufacturing (514,000 people); 18% in the
services sector (1.1m people) (Lombard and Stadler (1980) quoted in Wilse-Samson (2013)).
5One estimate suggests that between 1916 and 1984, some 17.7 million Blacks were arrested, pro-
secuted, and relocated from White areas under the pass laws (Savage, 1986).
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select ‘growth points’ were established where manufacturing enterprises benefited
from infrastructural developments as well as some of the most generous location
incentives available anywhere in the world - including subsidised transport, water
and power; reduced taxation and controls on wages for black employees (Best, 1971;
Rogerson, 1998). Most growth points were located where ‘positional, infrastructural
and agglomeration advantages were negligible’ (Wellings and Black, 1986). Location
decisions were instead driven by the need to allocate several to each of the homelands
as well as a need to satisfy the demands of influential white constituencies eager to
achieve growth point status (Dewar et al., 1984; MacCarthy, 1982). Under the Phys-
ical (later Environment) Planning Act, introduced in 1967, controls on the number
of black labour intensive strategies were put in place in the metropolitan centers
of Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV), Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage, Bloem-
fontein and Cape Town. The expansion of industrial land and the establishment
of industries with a higher than officially approved black-white employee ratio was
prohibited in large swathes of these metropolitan areas (Geyer, 1989). This policy
as well as the ‘border industries’ policy were widely criticised for being economically
irrational (Wellings and Black, 1986).
As a consequence of all of the above, and importantly for the identification strategy in
this paper, black migrants from homelands during Apartheid were not free to choose
where to migrate to on the basis of market-based economic incentives (Feinstein
et al., 2005; Mariotti, 2015). To a large extent, they could only move to areas where
the government decided their labour was needed, and these decisions were usually
made on political rather than economic grounds. While it was not the case then
that workers were forced to migrate to particular areas in South Africa, their choice
set was severely limited: they either had to accept an offer to work in a particular
industry in a particular place or they could remain in homelands and try to get by
on subsistence farming or remittances from family members. Those who decided to
take up job offers would often have to relocate to specially demarcated areas on the
periphery of white areas. Often these areas were more than a day’s travel from their
homeland of origin, and they might only have been able to visit their families on
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one or two occasions a year (Ogura, 1996). The result was the formation of migrant
enclaves across the country.
Also important for this paper were the conditions around female black migration
in the pre-1994 period. There were few employment opportunities for black women
in cities and towns. Sometimes they could find work as domestic helpers or in
factories but the Apartheid regime was mostly interested in employing male migrant
labour. Furthermore, to a large extent, the Pass Laws prevented the spouses or
children of pass book holders from accompanying them to the urban areas they were
employed in (Healy-Clancy, 2017; Von Fintel and Moses, 2017). The majority of
black migrant men lived in single sex compounds near the work-sites and were not
allowed to have visitors of the opposite sex staying overnight. Following the end of
migration restrictions, female migration from homelands dramatically increased (as I
explore in the following section). Many women would have followed in the footsteps
of their male partners who had been migrants while the migration restrictions were
in place (Von Fintel and Moses, 2017). In support of this thesis, in the 2001-2002
HSRC National Migration Survey the main reason cited by female respondents for
having migrated between magisterial districts was ‘getting married or moving in with
a partner’ or ‘getting separated or divorced’ (13% together of respondents) (Wentzel
et al., 2006). ‘Moving closer to relatives’ was ranked as the third most important
reason for moving by (8% of) female respondents, and ‘having to move with a spouse’
was another common reason cited by (7% of) female respondents (ibid.).67
While the Apartheid regime officially ended in 1991, the most important migration
restrictions were withdrawn in 1986 - with the Abolition of the Influx Control Act.
With this act, the pass system was dropped and black people were allowed to pur-
6‘Looking for work’ ranked second highest (11%) as the most important reason for moving for
female migrants. For male migrants, on the other hand, this was by far the most important reason
for moving (23%) (Wentzel et al., 2006, pg.189).
7In general migration networks seem to be an important determinant of internal migration in
South Africa. In an econometric analysis based on the 2002 HSRC National Migration Study, it
was found that the presence of a migrant network in a possible destination area was by far the
most important predictor of whether a respondent chose to migrate in the five years before the
survey (Wentzel et al., 2006, pg.195).
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chase land and housing outside of the homelands. This resulted in a spike in the rate
of internal, largely supply-driven migration. Simultaneously, from the early 1990s,
tough international sanctions were loosened and then repealed, and the economy was
opened up with dramatic consequences in terms of the spatial distribution of eco-
nomic activity (Imbs, 2013). While the South African economy experienced negative
economic growth in the decade before 1994, in the following decade it experienced
positive economic growth (Aron et al., 2009). Rapid regional economic divergence
in the post-Apartheid period has also been documented (Bosker and Krugell, 2008).
Relatedly, Imbs (2013) studies rapid structural transformation in the post-Apartheid
period in South Africa, finding that as South Africa opened to international trade,
manufacturing and extractive industries waned and services took over, substantially
altering the spatial economic landscape of the country.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Unit of geography
The main geographic unit of observation in this paper is the magisterial district.
There are 354 magisterial districts in South Africa with an average territory of 3447.5
km2.8 In 1996, these had an average working age population size of approximately
100,000. Magisterial districts are administrative units but closely approximate labour
markets and have been used as such in several recent well-published papers (e.g.
Magruder (2010), Magruder (2012)). Each magisterial district corresponds to the
jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court, the lowest level of the South African court system,
and contains at least one sizeable town or city. While regional boundaries in South
Africa are known to change quite regularly in recent times, they were remarkably
stable during and in the decade after Apartheid.
Since I am focusing on migration from areas classified as homelands during Apartheid
(within which black people could move freely) to the rest of South Africa (where black
8While magisterial districts still exist, there were replaced by local municipalities as an adminis-
trative layer in the census and most surveys after 2001.
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Figure 1.1: South African homelands and magisterial districts
people could not move freely when the pass laws were in place), I exclude magisterial
districts from my sample of receiving districts that overlapped with homeland areas
in the Apartheid period. This leaves a sample of over 200 receiving districts. In
the case of most homelands, there was a clear continuation between former home-
land boundaries and current magisterial districts. In the case of a few homelands
(Kwazulu in particular), some work is required to determine which magisterial dis-
tricts should be considered as part of former homeland areas. I have used EOG
DMSP nighttime light data from 1991 and 2010 to identify population clusters and
to determine whether roughly at least 20% of the population of a magisterial district
in 1991 was settled on an area within a former homeland area - in which case, I
consider this as a ‘homeland magisterial district’.9
1.3.2 Migration & regional controls
Contemporary migration data come from the 10% sample of the 1996 and 2001
censuses, which cover 3.6 million and 3.7 million individuals respectively. These
censuses contain questions on the duration of time at current residence and the
9The number of magisterial districts is higher in 1996 than in 1985 but this was mostly just due to
some cases where adjacent magisterial districts were combined. Moreover, four homelands were
considered independent in 1985 and only after 1994 were new magisterial districts boundaries
drawn for these areas.
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place of previous residence. Focusing only on migration from former homelands, I
calculate migrant stocks in receiving districts in 1996 and 2001.10 The large size
of the samples means that I can create an accurate measure of internal migration
at a relatively fine spatial scale. For the construction of the historical pathways
instrument, I use data from the full-count 1985 census, which provides information
on the place of birth of individuals.11
1.3.3 Labour market outcomes & individual characteristics
For the main analysis, I use South African labour force surveys available (annually,
biannually or quarterly, depending on the period) from 1996 to 2017 and includ-
ing on average approximately 25,000 households per wave. These contain much
more detailed and consistent information than the census on labour force charac-
teristics (including exact wages earned and more detailed occupation and industry
information). While most of these surveys do not provide data on migration, several
waves spread throughout the series do include this information, which allows non-
migrants to be distinguished from migrants. This is important so that I can exclude
in-migrants from the sample. My estimates can then be interpreted as a treatment
effect of migration on the non-migrant labour force instead of a compositional change
in the labour force with a migrant influx. I pool data from LFS 1996 and LFS 199712
to merge with migration data from the 1996 Census and I merge the September 2003
wave of the LFS with the 2001 Census.
I restrict my analysis to individuals between 18 and 64 years old and exclude re-
10The 1996 Census provides information on migration at any time during a person’s life (the ques-
tions were ‘What was your district of previous residence?’ and ‘Which year did you move?’).The
2001 Census only provides information on migration in the past 5 years (the questions were
’Did you move from another district in the last 5 years?’ ‘Where from?’ ‘Which year did you
move?’). I calculate the (imperfect) migration stock in 2001 by adding together the 1996 stock
and 1996-2001 flow.
11In fact, information is only provided on whether people were born in a homeland (with the
particular homeland listed) or whether they were born in (the rest of) South Africa. However,
this is sufficient information for my identification strategy.
12Actually these survey waves were part of the October Household Survey series but they function
as a labour force surveys since they contain detailed information on labour force characteristics,
which is directly comparable to that in later surveys. I pool data from two waves here because
earlier waves surveyed fewer people. In Section 6, I show that just using data from LFS 1997
does not substantially change my results.
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 18





Age 33.5 12.0 31.4 9.4 30.1 9.1
Avg. years of educ. 4.8 3.8 7.5 4.1 9.0 3.8
Gr. 12 or higher (%) 3.3 17.7 19.1 39.3 37.2 48.3
Female (%) 32.7 46.9 41.6 49.3 46.8 49.9
Female/male employ. 0.68 0.74
Non-migrants
SD SD SD
Age 33.0 13.1 36.2 11.1 35.8 10.9
Avg. years of educ. 7.3 4.1 8.1 4.1 8.5 4.1
Gr. 12 or higher (%) 20.3 40.2 23.9 42.6 33.0 47.0
Female (%) 49.7 50.0 45.0 49.8 46.0 49.8




Age 33.2 12.7 31.3 9.2 30.0 8.8
Avg. years of educ. 5.0 3.9 7.6 4.1 9.1 3.8
Gr. 12 or higher (%) 4.2 20.0 19.0 39.1 38.2 48.6
Non-migrants
SD SD SD
Age 33.0 13.2 35.4 10.9 35.0 10.7
Avg. years of educ. 7.3 4.0 8.3 4.1 8.6 4.0
Gr. 12 or higher (%) 19.2 39.4 24.9 43.2 34.5 47.5
Data from Census 1985, Census 1996 & Census 2001
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tired and disabled individuals, and individuals in full-time education. I refer to this
group as the ‘working age population’. I convert all hours worked and earnings to a
monthly amount. If a worker reports working more than 84 hours a week, I recode
hours worked as missing. I drop 8 outliers13 and workers earning less than the first
percentile of the wage distribution as I am concerned about under-reporting. In
terms of relevant controls, educational attainment is defined for the following five
categories: No education, primary education, incomplete secondary education, com-
plete secondary education and tertiary education. I also include controls for age,
age squared and race. I define three skill groups for non-migrants: the low-skilled
category includes individuals that have at most completed Grade 9 of high school;
the middle-skilled category includes individuals who have completed Grade 10 or
Grade 11; and the high-skilled category includes individuals that have completed at
least Grade 12 (including those with tertiary education qualifications). High school
graduation rates are relatively poor in South Africa and completing Grade 12 (the
final year of school) gives a substantial advantage in the labour force. Many high
school students drop out in Grade 10 or Grade 11, after which they are still eligible
to enter state-sponsored technical colleges.
For my summary statistics, I have used South African census data, which contain
information on labour market outcomes and individual characteristics.14
1.3.4 Summary statistics & discussion
Table 1.1 shows some summary statistics for (recent) migrants and non-migrants
for 1985, 1996 and 2001. For the purpose of this descriptive analysis, for 1996 and
2001, migrants are defined as working age individuals who moved from homelands
- or former homelands - to the rest of South Africa in the five years prior to the
census. Non-migrants are defined as working age individuals in migrant-receiving
districts who did not move in the five years prior to the census. I have also included
13As suggested by the authors of the Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series, which standardises all
waves of the labour force survey (including the October Household Survey).
14I prefer not to use this data for my main analysis since employment is not defined consistently
across waves and there is only information on income categories.
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information from 1985 for comparative purposes, however here ‘migrant’ is defined as
a working age individual who was born in a former homeland area but is now living
in a non-homeland area and ‘non-migrant’ is defined as a working age individual who
was born in a non-homeland area.15
The average age of the migrant population was 4-6 years lower than that of the
non-migrant population in 1996 and 2001 with the gap seeming to widen over time.
During Apartheid, migrants had much lower levels of education than non-migrants.
However, by 1996, migrants had dramatically closed this gap. In 1996, for both
men and women, the difference in average years of education between migrants and
non-migrants was less than one year, even if the proportion of migrants that had
completed at least high school (Grade 12) was still 4-5 p.p. lower than that for non-
migrants. By 2001, however, migrants had on average an extra 0.5 years of education
than non-migrants and a higher proportion of them had completed high school. Re-
markably, the proportion of female migrants that had completed at least Grade 12
more than doubled between 1996 and 2001 (with a similar increase for males). While
the fact that migrants from rural homelands were more educated than non-migrants
by 2001 may seem surprising at first, it is important to put this finding into context.
The migrant population from homelands/former homelands was made up entirely of
black people who were systematically provided with less (and poorer quality) educa-
tion than their white counterparts during Apartheid. Education reform towards the
end of Apartheid dramatically improved educational opportunities for black youth.
Thus, the fact, as discussed above, that the migrant population is much younger
than the non-migrant population goes a long way towards explaining how it could
be that that migrating population from rural homelands in 2001 was more educated
than the non-migrant population.16
15The 1985 census data file only provides detailed information on place of birth of South Africans
for those born in homelands. Aside from this, I have information only on whether a person was
born in South Africa or not. This is sufficient information for constructing my instrument even
if it is not ideal for this descriptive analysis.
16While not directly comparable because they have focused on migrants from both rural and urban
areas, other studies on migration in developing countries have also found that migrants are slightly
more educated than non-migrants (Kleemans and Magruder, 2018; Strobl and Valfort, 2015).
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In 1985, before the end of migration controls, the female share of migrants from
homeland areas was very low at 33%. By 1996, this share had gone up dramatically
to 42% of the migrant population and by 2001 women made up 47% of the migrant
population. Also interesting is that while the ratio of female to male employment
increased marginally for non-migrants between 1996 and 2001, there was a much
larger increase in this ratio (from a lower base) for migrants from former homelands
over the same period.
Between 1996 and 2001, female migrant concentration - i.e. the share of the female
labour force (migrant and non-migrant, employed and unemployed, foreign-born and
nationals) in non-homeland districts who were black female migrants from homeland
areas - went from 5.5% to 7.4% (an increase of 35%). I am particularly interested
in the nature and implications of this surge in female migration after the end of
migration restrictions. If skill level is defined by level of education, then it appears
that by 2001, female migrants from rural South Africa were relatively highly-skilled.
However, one also needs to consider that these female migrants had little or no work
experience before they migrated. According to data on previous work experience in
the 1996 Census, of the female migrants in labour force in 1996, only 16% had ever
worked before. Of those who had been employed before, 60% had been domestic
workers.
Table 1.2 compares the occupational involvement of male and female migrants from
homelands in 1996. A standout finding is that female migrants were twice as likely
as male migrants to work in elementary occupations. This was driven by the fact
that a large proportion (44.16%) of female migrants worked as domestic helpers.
Women were also much more likely than men to work as teaching professionals and
as clerks. On the hand, men were much more likely than women to work as service
workers and as labourers in mining, construction and manufacturing. The fact that
female migrants were involved in a completely different set of occupations to their
male counterparts suggests that the effects of their arrival on local labour markets
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 22
Table 1.2: Female and male migrant occupations in 1996
1996 1996
Fem. migrants Male migrants
Occ 1-digit
3 Technicians and associate professionals 4.1 3.2
4 Clerks 7.0 3.1
5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers 7.9 12.9
9 Elementary occupations 58.6 29.1
Occ 2-digit
23 Teaching professionals 7.0 2.1
24 Business and admin professionals 0.7 3.1
32 Health associate professionals 0.3 3.8
41 General and keyboard clerks 3.3 1.4
91 Cleaners and helpers 48.5 10.4
92 Agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers 6.3 7.9
93 Labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing 4.4 10.8
Occ 3-digit
223 Nursing 3.0 0.2
913 Domestic and related helpers, cleaners 44.2 5.3
Data from Census 1996. Focusing on select occupation groups where there is a notable difference in rates of
participation between male and female migrants.
were likely to have been very different too. The analysis above also suggests that
there was some educational downgrading among the female migrant population.
1.4 Empirical strategy
1.4.1 Baseline estimation
My analysis focuses on the effects of female in-migration on the probability of em-
ployment and wages of non-migrants (where a non-migrant is defined as a respondent
who has not moved from a different district in the 5 years before the survey) in des-
tination districts. My analysis is run at the individual level using:
yidt = βfdt + λXidt + γt + δd + εidt (1.1)
where yidt is the outcome of interest for non-migrant i in district d at time t. Employ-
ment is a binary variable equal to 1 if a person is employed or equal to 0 if a person is
unemployed, unable to find work or a house-wife/house-husband.17 Monthly wages
17Rather than working with a narrow definition of unemployment, in many developing countries it
makes more sense to work with a broad definition of unemployment which also includes discour-
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 23
(adjusted for inflation with the base period being December 2017) are calculated for
all workers. In some specifications, I examine effects on hours worked i.e. monthly
hours.18 I follow Card (2001) and Card (2007) in standardising female migration
inflows by the population of receiving districts since the average and standard de-
viation of the change in migration may be proportional to the total population of
the district, potentially inducing a spurious correlation between labour market out-
comes and migration (cf. Peri and Sparber (2011)).19 The natural logarithm of





where mfemdt is the working-age female migrant stock from former homeland areas at
time t and pgendt is the total working-age population of the gender group in question at
time t. The vector Xidt includes individual controls for gender, age (and its square),
education levels and race. I include district fixed effects and year fixed effects.20 β is
the parameter of interest, which estimates the impact of the share of female migrants
at time t − 1 on the outcome of interest at time t. This coefficient estimates the
aged job-seekers, since official definitions of job-seeking may be inappropriate in contexts where
there are high rates of informality (ILO, 1982). In the South African case, it has been argued that
the StatsSA definition of ‘searching for employment’ is too restrictive and it has been shown that
there is very little to distinguish the ‘searching unemployed’ from the ‘non-searching unemployed’
(Posel et al., 2014).
18I suspect hours worked may be measured with some error so I do not include this outcome measure
in my main estimations.
19I have also experimented with using migration levels as the variable of interest and adding district
population size as a control. The results are substantially unchanged.
20My fixed effects estimation with two periods is equivalent to a first-differences estimation i.e.
∆yd = β∆pd + λXd + εd
with district weights equal to the number of observations in each district (multiplied by the
cross entropy weights described in the text). Because I include regional and time fixed effects,
changes in migrant share between 1996 and 2001 should be interpreted as flows of migrants in
this period. My ‘non-migrant population’ includes some people who would have migrated at
some point in their lives but not in the past five years. Using district fixed effects avoids any
bias resulting from the fact that levels of migrant shares and levels of labour market outcomes
may be spatially correlated because of common fixed influences, which could lead to a positive or
negative statistical correlation between migration and economic outcomes, even if there are no
real effects of migration.
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total effects of migration, taking into account the indirect effects of migration through
complementarities across skill groups and across capital and labour (Dustmann et al.,
2016).21 Errors are clustered at the district level to allow for correlation between
individuals within district-level labour markets. For all estimations, I have used the
recommended Statistics South Africa cross-entropy weights, which make all waves
within the Post-Apartheid Labour Market 1994-2017 Series directly comparable to
one another by producing a consistent set of totals for each wave (Branson and
Wittenberg, 2011).22
1.4.2 IV approach
The number of migrants a receiving district receives may be correlated with the
economic conditions of that district i.e. the number of internal migrantsmdt could be
correlated with ε. OLS estimates may have an upward bias if female migrants choose
to move to districts experiencing positive labour market shocks. However, if female
migrants choose to stay away from cities with a high cost of living, OLS estimates
may have a downward bias. Measurement error will also push OLS coefficients
towards zero. I try to overcome these possible sources of bias by making use of a
2SLS approach.
My instrument uses the tendency of new female migrants to follow in the footsteps
of earlier male migrants from the same sending region. As much research has shown,
migrant networks are an important consideration in the location choices of prospect-
ive migrants since these networks assist with the job search process and assimilation
into the new environment (Munshi, 2003). The instrument uses the 1985 distribu-
tion of migrants from a given reserve to allocate the new wave of female migrants
from that same area in the post-Apartheid period. Formally, the instrument for the
change in female migration in district d during time period t can be written as:
21Note that the total but not the group-specific inflows of migrants can be considered quasi-random.
My specification has the added advantage that identification of β does not require the pre-
allocation of migrants to skill groups based on their observable characteristics, thus avoiding the
problem of misclassification when that arises when such observable characteristics are used to
assign migrants into skill groups in which they do not compete with natives because of migrant
downgrading (Dustmann et al., 2016).
22I have also run all my regressions without any weights and the results are substantially unchanged.











represents the proportion of all migrants from area r included in the
1985 census who were settled in receiving district d; and M femrt represents the total
number of female migrants from an area previously classified as a reserve r at time t
in the contemporary period. The instrument is therefore a weighted average of the
female migration rates from former homeland areas (the ‘shift’) with weights that
depend on the distribution of earlier male migrants in 1985 (the ‘shares’).
Table 1.3: First stage regression: impact of historical male migration on contempor-




District FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
Individual controls N Y
First stage K-P F-stat 52.1 52.4
Shea R2 0.24 0.24
Clusters 216 216
Observations 71,867 71,867
Analysis at individual level using labour
force survey data (1996 OHS, 1997 OHS
& Sept 2003 LFS) and census data (1985,
1996, 2001) on migration. Standard er-
rors clustered at the district level in par-
enthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and
year fixed effects. Column 2 includes indi-
vidual controls for age, education and race.
The key identifying assumption is that unobserved factors determining the distribu-
tion of migrants before the end of migration restrictions are unrelated to contem-
porary economic shocks (e.g. Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. (2018)). This assumption is
likely to hold for several reasons (for more information on these points, see Section
2):
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1. Black people who were born in homelands could not freely choose their migra-
tion paths to non-homeland areas. During the Apartheid era, due to a centralised
allocation process for black migrants and strict pass laws, black people in home-
lands could not choose where to move to. Their migration options were severely
constrained: they could either accept jobs to work in specific industries in specific
places or remain in homelands.
2. Centralised migrant allocation decisions were to a large extent made on political
grounds. It was South African government policy that each reserve would send
the majority of its workers to one specific industry. Furthermore, decentralisation
efforts brought black migrants to white areas near homelands that, were it not for
government incentives, would have had much less industry, and prevented many
migrants from moving to metropolitan areas because of the restrictions placed on
black labour intensive industries there.
3. Many locations where there was substantial migrant labour demand during Apartheid
did not have have substantial labour demand afterwards. The end of Apartheid con-
stituted a structural break in the economy of South Africa, and the distribution of
economic activity changed substantially between the Apartheid and post-Apartheid
periods. ‘Border industries’ that were established around homelands were dismantled
towards the end of Apartheid. With the opening up of the economy, extractive and
manufacturing industries waned and so the economies of locations specialised in these
industries suffered.
4. Migration pull factors are/were substantially different for men and for women. By
instrumenting female migration with historical male migration, I also add another
layer of exogeneity to my historical instrument and guard against the possibility of
serial correlation in migration flows (Barone and Mocetti, 2011). Female migrants
in the period under study were employed in a very different set of occupations and
industries as compared to male migrants during Apartheid.
If migrant allocation during Apartheid were completely orthogonal to labour market
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Table 1.4: The effects of female internal migration on the labour market outcomes
of all non-migrants (male & female) in receiving areas: OLS & 2SLS
Pr(emp) Ln(wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Ln(Migrant share) -0.010 -0.037 0.125*** 0.123
(0.019) (0.038) (0.043) (0.100)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 52.8 45.4
N 62,151 61,256 27,583 27,409
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data
(1996 OHS, 1997 OHS & Sept 2003 LFS) and census data
(1985, 1996, 2001) on migration. Standard errors clustered at
the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
conditions (at least those created by market forces) in receiving areas, then point (2)
above would be sufficient to make the instrument valid. Of course, migrant alloca-
tion did respond to labour market conditions to some extent, and so (3) is important
too. Share exogeneity is a sufficient condition for identification (Borusyak et al.,
2018; Jaeger et al., 2018), so it is not necessary to demonstrate shift exogeneity in
my setting. However, for the effects of female migration to be separately identified
from the effects of male migration, it is important that pull/push factors behind
migration differ for men and women in the post-Apartheid period. As shown in
Section 3, the distribution of female migrants across economic sectors is very dif-
ferent from that of male migrants in South Africa. I also provided evidence from
a nationally-representative migration study from 2001 showing that the ranking of
possible reasons for moving across district borders in terms of importance was very
different for men as compared to women.
The power of the instrument depends on how strong was the tendency of female
migrants from reserves in the post-Apartheid era to cluster in the enclaves generated
by Apartheid migration allocation processes. Table 1.3 reports first-stage regression
results. Column 2 reports results including individual controls. The correlation of
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the change in the instrument with the actual change in female migrant share in the
contemporary period exhibits a very significant coefficient and a large F-stat of 52.4,
showing that the instrument is strong.
1.5 Results
I first examine the effects of female internal migration on the total population of
non-migrants including both men and women. Table 1.4 shows the results of my
analysis using labour force data for non-migrant characteristics and labour market
outcomes.23 The OLS results show that female migrant share has an almost-zero and
non-significant association with the employment of non-migrants and a significant
positive association with monthly wages. With the IV, the coefficient for the em-
ployment effect remains non-significant though the (negative) coefficient is slightly
larger. Looking at the effect on wages, the positive coefficient on the female migrant
share variable remains similar in magnitude but becomes non-significant with the in-
clusion of the instrument. For the estimations in this table, and for all those below,
the first-stage F-statistics are always well above 10 (Stock and Yogo, 2005). The
non-significant effects on the overall non-migrant population in receiving districts
are in line with much of the existing migration literature (e.g. Card (1990)).
In Table 1.5, I split the sample into men and women. With the IV, the employment
effects of female migration are non-significant though the negative coefficient on the
variable of interest is larger for male than female non-migrants. With the IV, the
effect on wages of non-migrants is non-significant for both men and women.
Table 1.6 examines effects on female non-migrants of different skill groups.24 While
the hours worked variable is likely measured with some error, I include it here to
make my analysis more comparable to the earlier international studies examining
23All South African LFSs seem to survey more women than men, which is why the number of
observations for women is higher than those for men in the tables in this section (of course survey
weights will correct for this).
24When replicating this table for male non-migrants I find no significant effects. I thus choose to
focus the rest of my analysis on female non-migrants though in Section 7 I present results for
high-skilled non-migrant men in a discussion on channels.
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Table 1.5: The effects of female internal migration on the labour market outcomes
of male & female non-migrants in receiving areas: OLS & 2SLS
Male Female
Pr(emp) Ln(wages) Pr(emp) Ln(wages)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Ln(Migrant share) -0.046** -0.046 0.123*** 0.143 0.017 -0.031 0.107* -0.016
(0.023) (0.042) (0.046) (0.093) (0.023) (0.040) (0.057) (0.122)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 56.1 57.0 59.3 35.8
N 28,966 28,637 16,341 16,248 33,184 32,618 11,238 11,158
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (1996 OHS, 1997 OHS & Sept 2003 LFS)
and census data (1985, 1996, 2001) on migration. Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects,
and individual controls for age, education and race.
the effects of female migration. Turning to the 2SLS estimations in Panel 2, I find
a strong positive and significant effect on the employment of high-skilled women.
A 10% increase in female migrant share is associated with a 1.75 p.p. increase in
the employment of high-skilled women. I also find a strong effect on the intensive
margin: a 10% increase in female migrant share is associated with a 1.63 pp increase
in the hours worked of high-skilled women. Focusing on the effects on low-skilled
female non-migrants, I find that a 10% increase in female migrant share is associated
with a 1.6 p.p reduction in the employment of this subgroup. This suggests there
is some competition at the bottom of the economic ladder (Card, 2001). In Panel
3, I run the same 2SLS regressions as above on the sample of black and coloured
(i.e. historically disadvantaged) female non-migrants. The effect on employment for
the high-skilled section of this sub-group is even larger than for high-skilled female
non-migrants in general, though the effect on hours worked is non-significant and
smaller. Clearly, the positive effects of female migration are not limited to the white
population. Again all IV estimations in Table 1.6 yield non-significant wage effects
with very large standard errors.
There are several possible reasons for why I do not find a significant negative effect on
wages in the results above. First, wages in South Africa may have been downwardly
rigid due to high reservations wages (due in part to a generous social welfare system)
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Table 1.6: The effects of female internal migration on the labour market outcomes
of female non-migrants of different skill groups in receiving areas: OLS & 2SLS
High-skilled Medium-skilled Low-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent variable: Pr(emp) Ln(wages) Ln(hours) Pr(emp) Ln(wages) Ln(hours) Pr(emp) Ln(wages) Ln(hours)
Panel 1: OLS estimates
Ln(migrant share) 0.113*** 0.101 0.007 0.030 0.134 -0.024 -0.040 0.094 -0.038
(0.040) (0.066) (0.042) (0.046) (0.155) (0.047) (0.027) (0.077) (0.032)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 8,108 2,950 2,773 6,488 2,001 1,878 18,567 6,209 5,634
Panel 2: 2SLS estimates
Ln(migrant share) 0.175*** -0.123 0.163** 0.012 0.180 -0.045 -0.160*** 0.057 -0.103
(0.056) (0.177) (0.069) (0.074) (0.241) (0.115) (0.053) (0.166) (0.078)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 30.4 20.2 20.9 41.3 26.9 26.8 70.4 38.8 39.9
N 8,030 2,947 2,771 6,420 1,996 1,874 18,148 6,147 5,581
Panel 3: 2SLS estimates for the black & coloured population
Ln(migrant share) 0.253*** -0.233 0.070 -0.025 0.298 -0.059 -0.160*** 0.067 -0.104
(0.085) (0.161) (0.077) (0.098) (0.270) (0.104) (0.054) (0.167) (0.079)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 37.8 22.7 28.5 46.6 28.9 27.8 71.7 38.5 39.5
N 4,775 1,605 1,499 5,150 1,643 1,541 17,294 5,990 5,433
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (1996 OHS, 1997 OHS & Sept 2003 LFS) and census data (1985, 1996,
2001) on migration. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
With district and year fixed effects, and individual controls for age, education and race.
and a powerful trade union movement which keeps wages relatively high in the
formal sector.25 Another possibility is that at the end of Apartheid, the South
African economy had a high potential for growth. During the period of restricted
migration, firms in cities were short of labour. An improved allocation of factors
of production after Apartheid may have boosted productivity, thereby offsetting the
effects of migration on wages.
1.6 Robustness checks
1.6.1 Province-year fixed effects
As a robustness check, Panel 1 of Table 1.7 looks at the effects of female migration
on high-skilled and low-skilled female non-migrants but includes an additional set of
fixed effects for province-years to capture possible unobserved time-varying factors
25Boustan et al. (2010) also find no effect on non-migrant wages of internal migration in the US in
the early 1900s and put this down to wage rigidities.
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at the provincial level that could potentially bias results. Results are similar in
magnitude and retain statistical significance though the precision of the estimates
is sometimes reduced as this specification sacrifices a lot of cross-province variation.
The strength of the instrument is reduced with the additional fixed effects but is still
well above conventional thresholds.
Table 1.7: The effects of female internal migration on the labour market outcomes
of female non-migrants of different skill groups in receiving areas: robustness checks
for 2SLS estimates
High-skilled Low-skilled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Pr(emp) Ln(wages) Ln(hours) Pr(emp) Ln(wages) Ln(hours)
Panel 1: 2SLS estimates with province-year FEs
Ln(migrant share) 0.159** -0.058 0.260*** -0.170*** -0.025 -0.099
(0.074) (0.181) (0.091) (0.064) (0.199) (0.090)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 20.3 16.6 16.4 41.3 28.3 27.0
N 8,030 2,947 2,771 18,148 6,147 5,581
Panel 2: 2SLS estimates with (instrumented) control for male migrant share
Ln(migrant share) 0.339*** -0.597 0.190 -0.193* 0.333 -0.351*
(0.114) (0.509) (0.260) (0.112) (0.307) (0.192)
Ln(male migrant share) -0.168 0.476 -0.026 0.039 -0.313 0.261*
(0.109) (0.441) (0.218) (0.105) (0.259) (0.154)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 22.7 19.8 12.7 15.5 22.0 18.2
A-P F-stat for add. instr. 14.8 26.9 16.2 43.5 57.5 50.0
N 8,029 2,947 2,771 18,104 6,122 5,557
Panel 3: 2SLS estimates using sample without data from 1996
Ln(migrant share) 0.150** -0.044 0.158** -0.146*** 0.168 -0.105
(0.065) (0.164) (0.078) (0.055) (0.154) (0.085)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 27.7 19.0 19.2 16.4 28.7 30.7
N 6,762 2,437 2,310 14,656 4,878 4,549
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (1996 OHS, 1997 OHS & Sept 2003 LFS)
and census data (1985, 1996, 2001) on migration. Standard errors clustered at the district level in
parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects,
and individual controls for age, education and race.
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1.6.2 Controlling for male migrant share
One concern could be that my results are driven by male migration from former home-
land areas, which could be correlated with female migration. Panel 2 of Table 1.7
replicates the main 2SLS regressions from Table 1.6 but includes an additional con-
trol for male migrant share from former homeland areas. This control is instrumented
with a shift-share instrument analogous to the one used before but using male mi-
gration from former homeland areas as the shift part of the instrument. This control
is non-significant in most regressions. For the employment regressions, the coef-
ficients on female migrant share increase in magnitude. The significant effect on
hours worked for high-skilled female non-migrants becomes non-significant though
the coefficient on the variable of interest remains similar in magnitude.
Table 1.8: The effects of female migration on the size of the non-migrant labour
force: OLS & 2SLS
Ln(non-migrant LF share)
Male Female
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Ln(migrant share) 0.001 -0.007 0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006)
District FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 35.2 33.0
Observations 438 418 438 418
Analysis at district level using Census 1985, 1996 & 2001
data. Standard errors clustered at the district level in par-
enthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
With district and year fixed effects.
1.6.3 Using different data
In my main analysis, I have combined LFS waves in 1996 and 1997 to merge with
migration data from the 1996 census. In Panel 3 of Table 1.7, I check that my main
results hold if I drop the LFS 1996 wave and use only the 1997 wave. The results
for the employment and hours worked regressions are virtually unchanged, though,
as to be expected, the effects are slightly less precisely estimated.
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1.6.4 Potential serial correlation
In recent work, Jaeger et al. (2018) point out that if the spatial distribution of
migrant inflows is stable over time, historical migration instruments are likely cor-
related with ongoing responses to previous shocks. Focusing on the United States in
the post 1970s period, they show that the shift-share instrument might conflate the
long and the short run effects of immigration because there is a very high serial cor-
relation (between 0.95 and 0.99) in the sending-destination migration patterns over
time. Directly investigating the correlation between historical and post-Apartheid
migration shares for each district in my sample, I find that this number is in the
order of 0.56-0.57. According to Jaeger et al. (2018), this value is sufficiently low
for the shift-share instrument to be unlikely to conflate the long and the short run
effects of migration.26 These results also provide some evidence for the exclusion
restriction for my instrument.27
1.6.5 Potential relocation
An important source of potential bias in my paper is that workers may relocate from
high-migration to low-migration receiving districts. If this would happen, it would
bias upwards my estimates of the labour market effects of female migration (Borgas,
1999).
To determine the size of the relocation response - if any - I follow Card (2007) and
Peri and Sparber (2011) and estimate the following regression:
qdt = βfdt + γt + δd + εdt (1.4)
26This correlation coefficient is very low for the literature. Tabellini (2020) constructs a shift-share
instrument from immigration data in the US in 1900 to predict immigration between 1910 and
1930. He argues that since the correlation in immigration flows between sending and receiving
regions in the two periods was 0.7, there is no reason to be concerned about serial correlation.
27Ideally, I would test to see whether pre-trends in employment and hours worked in the period
before 1985 and the end of migrations restrictions were uncorrelated with female migration flows in
the contemporary period but, unfortunately, I do not have good data on labour market outcomes
prior to 1985.
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where the share of non-migrants is the share among the labour force (also including
migrants) who have not moved between districts in the last 5 years. Since this
regression is estimated with district fixed effects, it is a very demanding in terms
of controlling for pre-determined trends of non-migrant growth (Peri and Sparber,
2011). In this specification, the coefficient on female migrant share indicates the
elasticity between female migrant concentration in districts and the size of the non-
migrant labour force (i.e. a coefficient of zero on female migrant share indicates no
spillovers between districts).
Table 1.9: The effects of female internal migration on the labour market outcomes
of high-skilled male non-migrants in receiving areas: OLS & 2SLS
Pr(emp) Ln(hours)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Ln(Migrant share) -0.026 -0.039 -0.009 -0.033
(0.024) (0.045) (0.033) (0.044)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
K-P first stage F-stat 30.5 45.5
N 7,847 7,797 3,658 3,643
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data
(1996 OHS, 1997 OHS & Sept 2003 LFS) and census data
(1985, 1996, 2001) on migration. Standard errors clustered
at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed
effects, and individual controls for age, education, sex and
race.
In Table 1.8, I show results of the effects of female migration on the size of the
male and female labour force in receiving districts. The OLS results show that
female migrant share has a non-significant almost-zero association with the non-
migrant labour force for both men and women with a point estimate of 0.001 in both
regressions. With the inclusion of the IV, the point estimate becomes negative for
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male non-migrants but remains close to zero and non-significant. For non-migrant
women, the point estimate is exactly zero but non-significant. In summary, I find no
evidence that female migration led to the displacement of the labour force already
present in receiving districts.
1.7 Channels
I have found that female migration results in an increase in the labour supply of
high-skilled women. Given that many female migrants work as domestic helpers,
one hypothesis is that migrants are substituting for high-skilled women in domestic
activities (Barone and Mocetti, 2011; Cortes and Tessada, 2011), allowing the latter
to work more and spend more time at work. However, the impact of female migration
might also go through other channels. For example, migrants might be complement-
ary to high-skilled non-migrant women in the productive sector, thus increasing the
possibilities for employment for the latter. The increase in the number of migrant
women might, for example, expand the need for coordination and management activ-
ities in offices and factories (Barone and Mocetti, 2011). To investigate this further
I perform a couple of checks below.
In South Africa there is a very unequal distribution of domestic activities between
men and women. According to the nationally-representative Time Use Survey in
2000, women spent on average three times as much time as men on housework
(including cleaning, cooking, childcare, etc.) (Budlender et al., 2001). It is unlikely
then that an increase in supply of domestic workers would affect high-skilled men
as much high-skilled women. On the other hand, if the impact of female migration
were operating through interactions in the productive sector, a positive effect on
men’s employment and hours worked would be expected. Table 1.9 examines the
effects of female migration on the employment and hours worked of high-skilled male
non-migrants. With the IV, I find non-significant effects on employment and hours
worked which are negative in sign and small in magnitude. These results provide
strong evidence for the channel involving substitution in domestic work.
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Table 1.10: The effects of female migration on the hourly wages of female domestic




Ln(migrant share) 0.102** 0.097 0.109
(0.051) (0.104) (0.116)
Ln(migrant share)#domestic work -0.015 -0.113* -0.114*
(0.027) (0.065) (0.066)
Domestic work -0.744*** -1.103*** -1.106***
(0.115) (0.255) (0.259)
Individual FE Y Y Y
District FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y
Province-year FE N N Y
K-P first stage F-stat 5.4 5.3
A-P F-stat for add. instr. 11.1 10.7
Observations 10,063 9,994 9,994
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (1996 OHS,
1997 OHS & Sept 2003 LFS) and census data (1985, 1996, 2001) on mi-
gration. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis.
Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and
year fixed effects, and individual controls for age, education and race.
To further test my hypothesis, in Table 1.10, I examine the effects of female migration
on the wages of female domestic workers relative to female workers in other industries.
Domestic workers are identified on the basis of industry and occupation codes.28 I
include district fixed effects and year fixed effects. With the IV, I find that a 10%
increase in female migrant share reduces domestic worker wages by 1.1% relative to
wages in other sectors (significant at the 10% level). The result is robust to the
inclusion of region-year fixed effects.
1.8 Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of female internal migration on the labour market
outcomes of non-migrants in South Africa, exploiting substantial variation in the
28I use the ‘domestic work’ industry identifier in the Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series, which
was created on the basis of detailed industry and occupation codes to ensure consistency across
waves (PALMS, 2020).
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number of female migrants received by districts in the post-Apartheid period. I
argue that South Africa is one of the very few settings where an instrument using
historical migration pathways can plausibly capture exogenous variation in migra-
tion flows. Using the natural experimental setting created by Apartheid era policies,
I show that female internal migration in South Africa increased the employment and
hours worked of highly-educated women in the post-Apartheid period. I demon-
strate that this was due to the fact that female migrants found employment as
domestic workers, particularly in well-educated households, thereby freeing women
from household labour and allowing them to pursue employment or increase their
work hours. However, it was not the case that all subsections of the non-migrant
population benefited from this female in-migration and I have shown evidence that
low-skilled women experienced reduced employment. This suggests that female mi-
grants (who were relatively well-educated though lacking in experience) may have
substituted for low-skilled non-migrants in production.
I do not find any evidence that labour reallocation biased my results. I also have
shown that my results are robust to including region-year fixed effects and an instru-
mented control for male migration from homeland districts.
From a policy perspective, several effects of female migration are worth considering.
Female migrants are likely to improve the welfare of high-skilled non-migrant women
by providing affordable and flexible substitutes to household production (my analysis
also shows that historically disadvantaged groups also benefit from this). This paper
has also shown that female migration leads to a moderate decline in employment for
low-skilled women. With access to longitudinal data, future research could examine
the employment trajectories of low-skilled non-migrants who lose out on employment
to migrant women.
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 38
Bibliography
Ardington, C., Lam, D., Leibbrandt, M., and Welch, M. (2006). The Sensitivity to
Key Data Imputations of Recent Estimates of Income Poverty and Inequality in
South Africa. Economic Modelling, 23(5): 822–835.
Aron, J., Kahn, B., and Kingdon, G. (2009). South African Economic Policy Under
Democracy: Overview and Prospects. In South African Economic Policy under
Democracy, pp. 1–27.
Bakker, J. D., Parsons, C., and Rauch, F. (2020). Migration and urbanization in
post-apartheid South Africa. The World Bank Economic Review, 34(2): 509–532.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhy030.
Barone, G. and Mocetti, S. (2011). With a Little Help from Abroad: the Effect
of Low-Skilled Immigration on the Female Labour Supply. Labour Economics,
18(5): 664–675.
Best, A. C. (1971). South Africa’s Border Industries: The Tswana Example. Annals
of the Association of American Geographers, 61(2): 329–343.
Biavaschi, C., Facchini, G., Mayda, A. M., and Mendola, M. (2018). South–south
migration and the labor market: Evidence from South Africa. Journal of Economic
Geography, 18(4): 823–853.
Borgas, G. J. (1999). The Economic Analysis of Immigration. In Handbook of Labor
Economics, volume 3, pp. 1697–1760. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Borusyak, K., Hull, P., and Jaravel, X. (2018). Quasi-experimental shift-share re-
search designs. NBER Working Paper 24997.
Bosker, M. and Krugell, W. (2008). Regional income evolution in South Africa after
Apartheid. Journal of Regional Science, 48(3): 493–523.
Boustan, L. P., Fishback, P. V., and Kantor, S. (2010). The effect of internal migra-
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 39
tion on local labor markets: American cities during the Great Depression. Journal
of Labor Economics, 28(4): 719–746.
Branson, N. and Wittenberg, M. (2011). Re–weighting South African National
Household Survey Data to create a consistent series over time: A cross-entropy
estimation approach. SALDRU Working Paper No. 54.
Broussard, N. H. (2017). Immigration and the labor market outcomes of natives in
developing countries: A case study of South Africa. Economic Development and
Cultural Change, 65(3): 389–424.
Budlender, D., Chobokoane, N., and Mpetsheni, Y. (2001). A survey of time use:
How South African women and men spend their time. Pretoria: Statistics South
Africa.
Card, D. (1990). The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor Market.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43(2): 245–257.
Card, D. (2001). Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market
Impacts of Higher Immigration. Journal of Labor Economics, 19(1): 22–64.
Card, D. (2007). How Immigration affects U.S. Cities. Centre for Research and
Analysis of Migration Discussion Paper 11/07.
Christopher, A. J. (2001). The Atlas of Changing South Africa. London and New
York: Routledge.
Combes, P.-P., Démurger, S., and Li, S. (2015). Migration externalities in Chinese
cities. European Economic Review, 76: 152–167.
Cortes, P. and Tessada, J. (2011). Low-Skilled Immigration and the Labor Sup-
ply of Highly Skilled Women. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
3(3): 88–123.
Davis, B. and Winters, P. (2001). Gender, Networks and Mexico-US Migration.
Journal of Development Studies, 38(2): 1–26.
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 40
Desmond, C. (1971). The Discarded People. London: Penguin Press.
Dewar, D., Todes, A., and Watson, V. (1984). Industrial decentralization policy as
a mechanism for regional development in South Africa: Its premises and record.
Occasional Paper No 17, University of Cape Town Urban Problems Unit.
Dustmann, C., Schönberg, U., and Stuhler, J. (2016). The Impact of Immigration:
Why Do Studies Reach Such Different Results? Journal of Economic Perspectives,
30(4): 31–56.
Enchautegui, M. E. (1997). Welfare Payments and Other Economic Determinants
of Female Migration. Journal of Labor Economics, 15(3): 529–554.
Feinstein, C. H. et al. (2005). An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest,
Discrimination, and Development. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Geyer, H. S. (1989). Apartheid in South Africa and industrial deconcentration in
the PWV area. Planning Perspective, 4(3): 251–269.
Goldsmith-Pinkham, P., Sorkin, I., and Swift, H. (2018). Bartik Instruments: What,
When, Why, and How. NBER Working Paper No. 24408.
Healy-Clancy, M. (2017). Women & Apartheid. In Oxford Research Encyclopedia.
DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.013.184.
Hepple, A. (1969). Workers Under Apartheid. International Defence and Aid Fund,
London.
Horrell, M. (1973). The African Homelands of South Africa. Johannesburg: South
African Institute of Race Relations.
ILO (1982). Resolution Concerning Statistics of the Economically Active Population,
Employment, Unemployment and Underemployment. In Thirteenth International
Conference of Labour Statisticians.
Imbs, J. (2013). The Premature De–Industrialization of South Africa. The Industrial
Policy Revolution II: Africa in the 21st Century, Palgrave McMillan, pp. 529–540.
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 41
Jaeger, D. A., Ruist, J., and Stuhler, J. (2018). Shift-share instruments and the
impact of immigration. NBER Working Paper Series.
Kleemans, M. and Magruder, J. (2018). Labour market responses to immigra-
tion: Evidence from internal migration driven by weather shocks. The Economic
Journal, 128(613): 2032–2065.
Lall, S. V., Selod, H., and Shalizi, Z. (2006). Rural-urban migration in developing
countries: A survey of theoretical predictions and empirical findings. World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 3915. Washington, DC.
Leys, R. (1975). South African Gold Mining in 1974: ‘The Gold of Migrant Labour’.
African Affairs, 74(295): 196–208.
Lombard, J. A. and Stadler, J. J. (1980). The Role of Mining in the South African
Economy: A Study prepared for the Chamber of Mines of South Africa. Bureau of
Economic Policy and Analysis, University of Pretoria.
MacCarthy, C. (1982). Industrial decentralization: Reflections on the new initiatives.
South African Journal of Economics, 50(3): 238–252.
Magruder, J. R. (2010). Intergenerational Networks, Unemployment, and Persistent
Inequality in South Africa. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics,
2(1): 62–85.
Magruder, J. R. (2012). High Unemployment Yet Few Small Firms: The Role of
Centralized Bargaining in South Africa. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics, 4(3): 138–66.
Mariotti, M. (2015). Fathers’ Employment and Sons’ Stature: The Long-Run Ef-
fects of a Positive Regional Employment Shock in South Africa’s Mining Industry.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 63(3): 485–514.
Munshi, K. (2003). Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the US
Labor Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2): 549–599.
Naidoo, N., Leibbrandt, M., and Dorrington, R. (2008). Magnitudes, Personal Char-
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 42
acteristics and Activities of Eastern Cape Migrants: A Comparison with Other
Migrants and with Non-migrants using Data from the 1996 and 2001 Censuses.
Southern African Journal of Demography, pp. 3–38.
Ogura, M. (1996). Urbanization and Apartheid in South Africa: Influx Controls and
Their Abolition. The Developing Economies, 34(4): 402–423.
Oosthuizen, M. and Naidoo, P. (2004). Internal Migration to the Gauteng Province.
Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper 04/88. University of Cape
Town.
PALMS (2020). South Africa - Post Apartheid Labour Market Series 1993-2019.
https://doi.org/10.25828/gtr1-8r20.
Peri, G. and Sparber, C. (2011). Assessing inherent model bias: An application
to native displacement in response to immigration. Journal of Urban Economics,
69(1): 82–91.
Pfeiffer, L., Richter, S., Fletcher, P., and Taylor, J. E. (2007). Gender in Economic
Research on International Migration and Its Impacts: A Critical Review. In Mor-
rison, A., Schiff, M. & Sjöblom, M. (eds.), International Migration. New York:
Palgrave Press.
Posel, D., Casale, D., and Vermaak, C. (2014). Job Search and the Measurement of
Unemployment in South Africa. South African Journal of Economics, 82(1): 66–
80.
Rogan, M., Lebani, L., and Nzimande, N. (2008). Internal Migration and Poverty in
Kwazulu-Natal: Findings from Censuses, Labour Force Surveys and Panel Data.
South African Labour and Development Research Unit Working Paper No 30. Cape
Town, SALDRU, University of Cape Town.
Rogerson, C. M. (1998). Restructuring the post-Aapartheid space economy. Regional
Studies, 32(2): 187.
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 43
Savage, M. (1986). The Imposition of Pass Laws on the African Population in South
Africa 1916-1984. African Affairs, 85(339): 181–205.
Stock, J. H. and Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear IV
Regression, Ch. 5. in J.H. Stock and D.W.K. Andrews (eds.), Identification and
Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas J. Rothenberg.
Technical report.
Strobl, E. and Valfort, M.-A. (2015). The Effect of Weather-Induced Migration on
Local Labor Markets. Evidence from Uganda. The World Bank Economic Review,
29(2): 385–412.
Tabellini, M. (2020). Gifts of the Immigrants, Woes of the Natives: Lessons from
the Age of Mass Migration. Review of Economic Studies, 87(1): 454–486.
Turok, I. (2012). Urbanisation and development in South Africa: Economic imper-
atives, spatial distortions and strategic responses. London, England: International
Institute for Environment and Development.
Von Fintel, D. and Moses, E. (2017). Migration and gender in South Africa: Follow-
ing bright lights and the fortunes of others? Regional Science Policy & Practice,
9(4): 251–268.
Wellings, P. and Black, A. (1986). Industrial Decentralization under Apartheid:
The Relocation of Industry to the South African Periphery. World Development,
14(1): 1 – 38.
Wentzel, M., Viljoen, J., and Kok, P. (2006). Contemporary South African migration
patterns and intentions, In P. Kok, D. Gelderblom, J. Oucho, & J. van Zyl (eds.),.
Migration in South and Southern Africa. Dynamics and determinants. Cape Town:
HSRC Press.
Wilse-Samson, L. H. (2013). Structural change and democratization: Evidence from
rural Apartheid. Mimeo, Columbia University, New York City. Available online:
http://www. columbia.edu/ lhw2110/wilsesamsonapartheid.pdf.
The labour market impacts of female internal migration: Evidence from the end of Apartheid 44
Chapter 2
How does minimum wage legisla-
tion influence the labour market im-
pacts of productivity shocks?
2.1 Introduction
Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to weather shocks affecting agricul-
tural productivity, due to a large share of their labour forces working in this sector
and the important role that agricultural production plays for the economic lives of
the poor. With climate change increasing the frequency of these shocks, numerous
studies have tried to measure their impacts on labour markets (Henderson et al.,
2017; Jayachandran, 2006; Jessoe et al., 2018; Townsend, 1994). Separately, there
has been much recent interest in the effects of minimum wage legislation in devel-
oping country labour markets (Bhorat et al., 2014; Dinkelman and Ranchhod, 2012;
Gindling and Terrell, 2007; Neumark et al., 2006). It has been theorised that these
laws may have stronger effects than in developed countries due in part to larger
instituted wage increases for low-skilled workers and to weaker employment protec-
tion laws. However, these two strands of research have not been brought together,
and there is a missing perspective on how minimum wage legislation could affect
resilience to productivity shocks.
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Agriculture has historically accounted for a substantial share of employment of low-
skilled workers in South Africa. However, there has been a trend towards commer-
cialisation and mechanisation in the last three decades, during which time over one
million agricultural jobs have been shed (Liebenberg and Johann, 2013). Agricul-
tural employment is also highly variable due to currency and, in particular, weather
fluctuations (BFAP, 2016). There is anecdotal and descriptive evidence of droughts
causing massive destruction in the agricultural economy (BFAP, 2016; Vogel and
Drummond, 1993). However, to date, no studies of this phenomenon have been
undertaken.
In 2003 a national agricultural minimum wage was adopted in South Africa. This was
set at the 70th percentile of the prevailing wage distribution, leading to a substantial
increase in the median wage. Several papers have studied the impacts of this law
(Bhorat et al., 2014; Conradie, 2004; Murray and Van Walbeek, 2007), though most
have been small-scale case studies. In the single national study, (Bhorat et al., 2014)
find evidence of a positive effect on the income of agricultural workers but a negative
effect on their employment (with no significant effect on hours worked). The authors
also note the possibility of an increase in the employment of casual workers in place
of permanent employees.
In this paper I focus on the interaction between this law and the effects of weather-
induced productivity shocks on agricultural labour market outcomes in the short
term. It is not a priori clear how the introduction of a minimum wage, assuming
this results in a substantial increase in agricultural wages, should affect the relation-
ship between productivity shocks and agricultural employment. One possibility is
that if the minimum wage causes an immediate scaling back of employment on farms
and perhaps the substitution of low-wage labour with capital, a consolidated agri-
cultural labour force might become more resilient to negative shocks in the post-law
period. On the other hand, by making the wage bill less affordable for employers
and/or reducing the flexibility of employers to adjust wages to shocks (Franklin and
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Labonne, 2019), the minimum wage could increase the susceptibility of agricultural
employment to negative shocks.
My empirical approach makes use of a difference-in-differences strategy to statist-
ically test for the labour market effects of the interaction between the agricultural
minimum wage law and weather shocks. I exploit before-after variation in the ap-
plication of the law and pre-existing cross-sectional variation related to the intensity
of the law, together with weather variation across time and space. I match a high
resolution moisture index called the Standardised Precipitation Evapotranspiration
Index (SPEI) - which considers the joint effects of precipitation, potential evapor-
ation and temperature, and when calculated on short time-scales is closely related
to soil moisture - to district boundaries and compute rainy season SPEI Z-scores
based on long-run district patterns. I use 13 waves of a biannual labour force survey
(LFS) from September 2001 to September 2007 to capture reported employment,
wages and hours of work over time at a relatively high frequency, and also match
these data to districts. I then examine the relationship between individual labour
market outcomes in a particular district and wave and localised SPEI Z-scores in
the previous rainy season controlling for individual characteristics, district and time
fixed effects and district-specific linear time trends. I focus on these short-run effects
since the data are well suited to this and because doing so means there is little time
for workers to relocate across districts (Franklin and Labonne, 2019).
Whereas weather shocks have no significant effect on agricultural employment in the
pre-law period, in the post-law period, holding the pre-law wage gap at its mean level,
a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in rainy season SPEI relative to the local
mean results in a 7.1% increase (decrease) in agricultural employment relative to its
mean level among the total labour force within six months. When I focus only on
the effects of below-average SPEI (recoding above-average SPEI values as zero) on
agricultural employment, it is clear that the effects of negative weather shocks are
driving the effects that I find when I look at the interaction between my continuous
weather measure and the minimum wage law. This shows that the minimum wage
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substantially weakens the resilience of agricultural employment to reduced rainy
season moisture in the short term.1 I find evidence that after negative shocks occur,
some of the displaced agricultural workers transition into unemployment while others
transition into employment in other industries. Negative weather shocks also appear
to lead to a small increase in hours worked in agriculture wage labour after the
minimum wage is introduced (there is no significant effect before), most likely because
employers are making their remaining workers work more to compensate for the
retrenchments. I do not detect substantive effects of weather shocks on wages either
before or after the minimum wage, although when I only focus on negative weather
shocks, I find some evidence of a small negative effect on wages in some areas in
the pre-period. Lastly, once the minimum wage is in place, negative weather shocks
appear to lead to the casualisation of the agricultural labour force. The overall
picture suggests then that the agricultural minimum wage, by substantially reducing
the affordability of the wage bill of employers in the industry and therefore making
it more difficult for them to absorb shocks, leads employers to retrench formally
employed workers in the wake of negative productivity shocks.
This paper contributes to the literature on economic and other impacts of negative
environmental shocks in developing countries (Dell et al., 2014; Henderson et al.,
2017; Jessoe et al., 2018). In South Africa, studies have looked at the effects of
droughts on long-term health outcomes (Dinkelman, 2017) and on internal migra-
tion over the long run (Mastrorillo et al., 2016), but surprisingly there has been no
attempt to measure the economic impacts of droughts (or dry shocks). More specific-
ally, my paper contributes to work on the impact of agricultural productivity shocks
on local economic activity. Some recent papers have focused on short term impacts
of these shocks, looking at the effect of agricultural productivity shock-induced real-
location on industrial outcomes in the Indian context (Colmer, 2018; Santangelo,
2019), whereas older work has tended to focus on long-run changes in agricultural
productivity (Bustos et al., 2016; Henderson et al., 2017; Hornbeck, 2012).
1Below-normal rainy season SPEI (moisture) can result in droughts depending on the size of the
deviation, the institutional capacity and the topography of the district (Sekhri and Storeygard,
2014).
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My paper also contributes to the literature on the labour market effects of minimum
wages (Card and Krueger, 1994). It adds to the relatively small literature on the
effects of minimum wages in developing countries (Bhorat et al., 2014; Dinkelman
and Ranchhod, 2012; Gindling and Terrell, 2007; Neumark et al., 2006). For several
reasons effects are expected to be different in developing countries. Typically the
size of the wage increase is larger in developing countries and there are more low-
income workers who stand to be affected. These workers are likely to have much
weaker employment protection and they may have limited alternatives in other sec-
tors. Laws may not apply to workers in the informal sector and even in the formal
sector, compliance and enforcement of laws might be expected to be more relaxed in
developing countries (Neumark et al., 2007). My paper highlights an unexplored and
important channel for minimum wage laws having a negative impact on employment
in developing countries - that is, they may reduce the ability of employers to absorb
economic shocks.
Lastly, my paper also contributes to the literature on labour market policy and local
productivity shocks in developing countries. Adhvaryu et al. (2013) and Chaurey
(2015) examine employment responses to local demand shocks using state-level vari-
ation in firing costs in India. Colmer (2018) uses the same variation in labour reg-
ulations to test the extent to which labour reallocation mitigates the consequences
of temperature-driven reductions in the demand for agricultural labour. Santangelo
(2019) examines whether the introduction of a large-scale rural workfare programme
affects the response of local economies to agricultural productivity. No papers have,
however, focused on the influence of minimum wage legislation on the effects of
productivity shocks.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the agricultural industry
in South Africa and the characteristics of the new law introduced in 2003. After
describing the data and presenting summary statistics in Section 3, I discuss results
in Section 4. In this section, I examine the wage, earnings, employment and hours of
work effects of weather shocks and then consider effects of weather shocks interacting
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with the minimum wage law using difference-in-differences regressions. In Section 5,
I consider heterogeneous impacts on workers.
2.2 Context
2.2.1 The agricultural sector
As in many other developing countries, until the 1990s industrial agriculture in
South Africa was heavily subsidised and protected. After the end of Apartheid, the
government quickly deregulated and liberalised the sector. Over the last 30 years,
a substantial share of smallholder farms in the commercial sector have consolidated
into larger farms, many of which are oriented towards the export market. At the
same time, subsistence farming continues to take place, mostly notably in former
Apartheid homelands (‘Bantustans’).
Despite the agriculture sector’s relatively small contribution to GDP - it contributed
only 2.33-3.88% of annual GDP between 2001 and 2007 (World Bank, 2020) - and
the fact that industrialisation of the sector has resulted in a downward trend in
agricultural employment, the sector still employs a substantial number of mostly low-
skilled workers.2 During my period of study, 2001-2007, just over one million people
were employed in the agricultural sector as their primary activity, the vast majority
of whom had not completed high school. However, the sector also indirectly benefits
or involves a wider group of people. According to the 2011 Census, in addition to
workers who counted agriculture as their primary activity, an additional one million
people were casually involved in agriculture at the time of the census (Liebenberg
and Johann, 2013). Historically many agricultural workers have lived on the farms
where they are employed with their extended families. A recent study showed that
close to 600 000 households with over 2 million people lived on farms in 2015 (Ferrer
and Visser, 2015). Furthermore, a large number of jobs are created in industries
with backward and forward linkages to the sector.
2During my period of study, 2001-2007, agricultural workers represented approximately 19% of the
workforce with fewer than ten years of education.
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2.2.2 Drought trends & impacts
Droughts are important for agricultural output in South Africa (Baudoin et al.,
2017).3 While all areas of production are affected by droughts, field crop production
is particularly volatile due its greater share of dry-land production (BFAP, 2016). For
example, maize, the country’s staple crop, is rain-fed and limited water availability
reduces maize output by interrupting growth at several points in the growing season
(Le Roux et al. (2009), cited in Dinkelman (2017)). Since the 1960s, the frequency
of extreme heat events has accelerated in South Africa (Kruger and Sekele, 2013).
Over the same period, interannual rainfall variability has increased and droughts
have become more intense and widespread in South Africa (Fauchereau et al., 2003).
This pattern is likely to continue into the future if global emissions are not reduced
(Flatø et al., 2017).
2.2.3 The 2003 agricultural minimum wage
The agricultural minimum wage was officially introduced in March 2003. Until this
time the agricultural sector had been barely unionised and reported the lowest wages
of any sector in the country (Bhorat et al., 2014). In addition to setting a legal
wage floor, the new law also defined conditions of employment for the agriculture
sector that included maximum working hours and the establishment of a written
employment contract for employees. According to Sectoral Determination No. 75
of 1997, the law was to apply to ‘the employment of farmworkers in all farming
activities in South Africa’. The law was intentionally vague about what was entailed
by ‘farming activities’.4
Importantly, the minimum wage set for the agriculture industry in South Africa
resulted in changes to low-skilled worker wages that are several times greater those
3There is some anecdotal evidence that severe flooding may affect agriculture in South Africa, but
this seems to be much less important than droughts (Dinkelman, 2017).
4The exact wording was: ‘Without limiting its meaning, ‘farming activities’ includes primary
and secondary agriculture, mixed farming, horticulture, aqua farming and the farming of animal
products or field crops excluding the Forestry Sector.’
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brought about by minimum wages in developed country contexts. The median dis-
trict experienced a 43% increase in agricultural monthly wages for full-time workers
after the minimum wage was implemented. Two separate wage levels were prescribed
for workers according to how urbanised their region was. In 2003 over 80% of farm
workers were earning less than the urban minimum, and over 60% were earning less
than the rural minimum (Bhorat et al., 2014). To support implementation of the new
legislation, labour inspectors were tasked with enforcement activities, visiting farms,
reviewing worker contracts and interviewing a sample of workers. However, the fact
that some farms were very remote made this task quite difficult and so compliance
was not perfect.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Labour market data
The labour market data for this study are drawn from 13 waves of the South
African Labor Force Survey (LFS) conducted between September 2001 and Septem-
ber 2007. These LFS surveys are biannual rotating panel surveys, conducted in
February/March and September each year and include detailed data on work and un-
employment experiences of 60,000 to 70,000 working-age individuals living in 30,000
households. In each wave, 20% of households interviewed in the previous wave are
rotated out of the survey entirely.5 The chosen sample includes four waves prior
to and including the legislation’s effective date (March 2003) and nine afterwards.
While there are three earlier waves of data going back to March 2000, the baseline
sample was redrawn for the September 2001 round and so I start my analysis with
data from this round (following Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012)).6 All 13 waves
are pooled and treated as repeated cross sections over time.
5There is a panel data component of the LFS survey, but this is not well maintained (and also not
made publicly available), and, following others, I choose not to use it because of serious concerns
about the representativeness and quality of the panel data set of workers (cf. Dinkelman and
Ranchhod (2012) for a longer discussion).
6Results are substantially unchanged when I include the other waves but to ensure the most accurate
estimates, I choose to work without them.
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The sample of workers includes all urban and rural employed and unemployed men
and women aged 18 to 64. I identify agricultural workers in each wave of the LFS
using the the South African Standard Classification of Occupations (SASCO) codes,
as well as the three-digit International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) in-
dustry codes. In addition to using the full sample of labour force participants, for my
agricultural employment analysis I also use a restricted labour force sample including
only people who have similar demographic characteristics to agricultural workers i.e.
they are aged between 20 and 50 and have ten or fewer years of education. Since it is
very possible that some agricultural workers may work without pay (for example, as
unpaid family members), I do not exclude workers without pay from my employed
sample.
The labour force surveys give geographic information only for provinces, of which
there are nine in the country. It is possible to work out magisterial districts (an
administrative layer) for the period September 2001 to January 2003 based on the
unique identification codes for respondents. However, for the period September 2003
to September 2007, the unique identification codes give information only about local
municipalities, which were not defined in the earlier period. District municipalities
were constant over the period of study and both magisterial districts and local muni-
cipalities fit neatly into district councils. These are therefore used as my geographic
units of analysis is this paper.7
2.3.2 Weather measures
While most economic studies of weather shocks have tended to focus only on pre-
cipitation, the importance of taking temperature into account is increasingly being
7While it is possible that some of the larger district councils could be seen as including more than
one local labour market, district councils have been used as the geographic unit of analysis in
several well-published papers (e.g. Bhorat et al. (2014)) and it is even quite common for papers
to use provincial units, which is the highest administrative layer in the country (e.g. Dinkelman
and Ranchhod (2012); Magruder (2010)). For my particular analysis, larger geographic units may
be preferable since the effects of weather shocks may not be captured at high resolutions because
a drought in a limited area may not have enough of an impact on local labour market outcomes
when there is smoothing across agricultural markets (Harari and Ferrara, 2018).
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recognised (Challinor et al., 2014; Colmer, 2018; Henderson et al., 2017). The impact
of rainfall on the growing cycle of a plant depends also on the capacity of the soil
to retain water. Indeed drought is usually characterised by a combination of ab-
normally low or failing rainfall and abnormally high temperature causing unusually
high evaporation.
I use the Standardised Precipitation Evapotranspiration Index (SPEI), which has
been shown to track dry and wet conditions better than traditional indices like the
Standardised Precipitation Index (SPI) or Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI)
(Vicente-Serrano et al., 2010, 2012). The SPEI is based on a monthly climatic
water balance (precipitation minus potential evapotranspiration, called PET) and is
expressed as a standardised Gaussian variate with a mean of zero and a standard
deviation of one.8 The index uses the monthly difference between precipitation and
PET. However, unlike other water balance-based drought indices such as the Palmer
Drought Severity Index, the SPEI does not rely on the water balance of a specific
soil system (ibid.). On short time-scales, the SPEI is closely related to soil moisture,
while at longer time-scales, the SPEI can be related to groundwater and reservoir
storage (ibid.).
I use the Centre for Environmental Data Analysis High Resolution SPEI Dataset for
Africa (Peng et al., 2020a) for the period 1981-2016, which has a 0.05◦ resolution.
This is calculated based on precipitation estimates from the satellite-based Climate
Hazards group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data (CHIRPS) and potential
evaporation estimates by the Global Land Evaporation AmsterdamModel (GLEAM)
(Peng et al., 2020b). I match this gridded dataset to district council boundaries and
calculate mean SPEI values for each district for every month from 1981 to 2016.
Following Harari and Ferrara (2018), I use cumulative monthly SPEI during the
rainy season as these are the months in which rain-fed agriculture is most heavily
8The method to calculate SPEI is based on the original Standardised Precipitation Index (SPI)
calculation procedure. The SPI is calculated using monthly (or weekly) precipitation as the input
data whereas the SPEI uses the monthly (or weekly) difference between precipitation and PET.
This represents a simple climatic water balance which is calculated at different time scales (Vicente-
Serrano et al., 2010).
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Figure 2.1: Variation of Rainy Season SPEI Deviation and variation of Negative
Rainy Season SPEI Deviation across district municipalities
(a) Average Rainy Season SPEI Deviation over
whole period
(b) Average Negative Rainy Season SPEI Devi-
ation over whole period
Rainy Season SPEI Deviation refers to rainy season SPEI z-scores and Negative Rainy Season SPEI
Deviation refers to the transformed rainy season SPEI z-score variable focusing only on negative
values across district municipalities. Data from CEDA High Resolution SPEI Dataset for Africa
for the period September 2001 to September 2007.
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impacted by variations in weather in South Africa (Mastrorillo et al., 2016). The
rainy season lasts from November to March in most of the country, except for districts
located in the Western Cape province where it runs from May to August (Botai et al.,
2016).
My key weather indicator, called Rainy Season SPEI Deviation, is the standardised
total monthly SPEI for each rainy season in a particular district i.e. the deviation
of total rainy season monthly SPEI from the long-term district average, normal-
ising it by the district-specific standard deviation (Jayachandran, 2006; Santangelo,
2019). Standardising the rainy season SPEI by the district-specific standard devi-
ation controls for the fact that some districts might have very high SPEI standard
deviations and thus are more likely in each period to experience large deviations
from the average.
From the available evidence, above-normal SPEI does not hurt agricultural pro-
ductivity in South Africa (Dinkelman, 2017). Therefore higher values of Rainy Sea-
son SPEI Deviation correspond to more favourable conditions for agriculture. While
I am mostly interested in deviations of rainy season SPEI below the local mean, I
use the full distribution of the Z-score variable to increase power. As long as dry
SPEI shocks and wet SPEI shocks have symmetrical effects, this approach is most
efficient.9 However, as a check, in the appendix I reproduce all tables using an altern-
ative one-sided (low) SPEI variable Negative Rainy Season SPEI Deviation where
I recode positive values as zero and take absolute values of the negative values (cf.
Dinkelman (2017); Mastrorillo et al. (2016)). I generally only refer to these tables
in any detail when the results diverge from those when Rainy Season SPEI Devi-
ation is used. Figure 2.1 shows variation in average rainy season weather measure
values across district municipalities over the period September 2001 to September
2007, and Figure 2.2 shows variation in rainy season weather measure values across
district municipalities at a time when South Africa was experiencing a drought.
9This approach is also widely used (e.g. Jayachandran (2006)).
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Figure 2.2: Variation of Rainy Season SPEI Deviation and variation of Negative
Rainy Season SPEI Deviation across district municipalities during a drought
(a) Rainy Season SPEI Deviation in the rainy
season prior to March 2007
(b) Negative Rainy Season SPEI Deviation in the
rainy season prior to March 2007
Rainy Season SPEI Deviation refers to rainy season SPEI z-scores and Negative Rainy Season SPEI
Deviation refers to the transformed rainy season SPEI z-score variable focusing only on negative
values. Data from CEDA High Resolution SPEI Dataset for Africa for the rainy season prior to
the labour force survey wave of March 2007.
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2.3.3 Minimum wage data
The minimum wage law was promulgated in December 2002 and came into effect on
the 1st of March 2003. In line with earlier studies (Bhorat et al., 2014), September
2003 is treated as the first wave where the direct impacts of the law should be-
come evident. Two separate wage levels were prescribed for full-time farm workers,
according to geographic location: a higher minimum wage (R800 per month) for
those working within urbanised municipal areas classified as Area A, and a lower
wage (R650 per month) for predominantly rural areas classified as Area B.10 To
evaluate which minimum wage applied to each individual, I assigned individuals to
geographic areas by matching geographic information available in the LFS to areas
A and B listed in the sectoral minimum wage schedules.
2.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for various samples before and after the in-
troduction of the minimum wage during my period of study from September 2001
to September 2007. The agricultural industry in South Africa employed around 9%
of the total labour force (including employed and unemployed) in the period before
the minimum wage and about 7% of the labour force in the period of study. This
reduction in agricultural employment occurred even as the overall employment rate
increased. Around 68% of agricultural workers were employees, while the rest were
self-employed - a ratio which is constant over my period of study. As expected, there
is a significant increase (of almost 30%) in agricultural real wages between the pre-
and post-law periods. Likely as a direct result of the law, the share of agricultural
workers with written contracts went up significantly between the pre and post-law
periods from 37% to 54%. The fact that agricultural hours worked dropped slightly
in the post-law period might also be indicative of the effects of increased regulation
in the sector. Employers may have reduced demand at the intensive margin to com-
10The equivalent US dollar values today are around USD 134 and USD 110. In 2015 rands, the
values are R1570 and R1276.
How does minimum wage legislation influence the labour market impacts of productivity shocks? 58
ply with the 45 hours per week maximum set out in the minimum wage schedule, or
simply to afford the higher wage.
Agricultural workers are not highly educated: during my period of study, the average
worker had six years of education. Approximately two-thirds of workers were male,
and 76% were African. Their mean age was 38.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N Pre-lawmean (SD)
Post-law
mean (SD) Post-pre diff.
P value of
the diff.
1. Conditional on being in the labour force:
Employed at all 395,212 0.67 0.71 0.05 0.00
(0.49) (0.44)
Employed as an agricultural worker 395,212 0.09 0.07 -0.02 0.01
(0.29) (0.25)
2. Conditional on being in the restricted
labour force:
Employed at all 188,028 0.66 0.70 0.04 0.00
(0.48) (0.45)
Employed as an agricultural worker 188,028 0.12 0.11 -0.01 0.02
(0.33) (0.30)
3. Conditional on being an agricultural
worker:
In wage employment 47,465 0.67 0.68 0.01 0.78
(0.44) (0.48)
Hours worked per month (total) 47,465 171.23 167.48 -3.74 0.41
(73.35) (79.05)
Hours worked per month in wage jobs 33,520 201.3 194.65 -6.7 0.00
(50.75) (54.52)
Real wages (ZAR) 33,520 1377.79 1779.91 402.12 0.00
(855.28) (1036.56)
Full-time worker 33,520 0.96 0.95 -0.00 0.36
(0.19) (0.21)
Proportion with a job contract 33,520 0.37 0.54 0.17 0.00
(0.46) (0.51)
4. Characteristics of agricultural workers:
Female 47,465 0.37 0.36 -0.01 0.72
(0.45) (0.49)
Years of education 47,465 5.70 6.37 0.66 0.00
(3.87) (4.35)
Age 47,465 38.15 38.21 0.06 0.81
(11.55) (12.65)
African 47,453 0.76 0.76 -0.01 0.74
(0.39) (0.44)
Data from labour force surveys (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). Panel 1 includes the entire labour force; Panel 2 is restricted
to the labour force between the ages of 20-50 and with 10 or fewer years of education; Panel 3 and 4 are restricted to
agricultural workers. All statistics are weighted and the standard errors of differences and p-values are calculated taking
those weights and district-level clustering into account. The pre-law period includes all waves between September 2001
and March 2003 and the post-law period includes all waves between September 2003 and September 2007. A full-time
worker is someone who reports at least 27 hours of work a week. Real wages are obtained from deflating nominal wages
to 2015 Rands using the CPI. Note that rows may not add up due to rounding.
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of (log) agricultural wages
Note: The vertical line is the level of the full-time minimum wage in 2003. Focusing on the period
Sept 2001 - Sept 2007.
2.5 Empirical strategy
My analysis proceeds in two parts. I first exploit exogenous variation in productivity
due to rainy season SPEI realisations across districts and over time to look at the
relationship between labour market outcomes and local weather shocks over my
period of study. The second part examines heterogeneous effects before and after the
agricultural minimum wage and across areas where the minimum wage had varying
levels of effective intensity.
I examine the local labour market effects of deviations of rainy season SPEI from
the local mean using the following:
yidt = β1Cdt−1 +Xidt + δd + γt + θdt + εdt (2.1)
where yidt is the outcome of interest for individual i in district d at time t and Cdt−1
is the total rainy season SPEI Z-score in the previous rainy season. Xidt includes
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individual controls for gender, education, age and race to tackle the possibility that
district composition changes. I include district fixed effects (δd) to capture any time-
invariant district characteristics that could affect my outcomes. Wave fixed effects
(γt) remove biannual shocks common to all districts.11 I also include linear time
trends, to allow dependent variables to trend differently across districts. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level to capture serial correlation. I use the sugges-
ted Post-Apartheid Labour Market Series (PALMS) weights, ensuring comparability
of waves over time.12
I estimate the effects on (i) employment, (ii) (log) hours worked, and (iii) (log) wages.
I examine effects in the agricultural sector as well as across all sectors (including
agriculture). The latter results allow me to check whether the effects of weather
shocks and of weather shocks interacting with the agricultural minimum wage are
limited to the agriculture sector or whether these shocks impact more broadly.13
When considering agricultural employment, I carry out estimations using the full
labour force sample as well as a restricted labour force sample where I consider only
workers and unemployed people with similar demographics to agricultural workers
(see Section 3.1 for more information).14 I also look to separate out transitions
between agricultural employment and unemployment, and agricultural employment
and employment in other sectors. Details of all dependent variables used in my
analysis can be found in Table 2.A.1 in the appendix.
The second part of the analysis tests heterogeneous effects of the agricultural min-
imum wage. The first step is to use the same empirical specification above but with
an interaction term Cdt−1#POSTt where POSTt is a time dummy for before and
after the minimum wage is introduced.15 This will correctly identify the effects of
11I also experiment with year fixed effects and the results are substantially unchanged. I prefer to
use wave fixed effects to minimise the likelihood of migration across districts between periods.
12Results are almost identical without weights.
13Since stronger effects are expected in the agriculture sector, if I do not find this to be the case,
this could also be seen as a sign of endogeneity.
14The latter approach is commonly used in papers examining employment effects on low-skilled
workers in developing countries (e.g. Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012)) since it is unrealistic that
someone could transition between agricultural work and, for example, high-skilled office work.
15Note that the main effect of POSTt will drop out because of the time fixed effects.
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the minimum wage if there were no idiosyncratic shocks in addition to the law that
affected agricultural workers in the post period. However, since employment, wage
and hours worked variables tend to fluctuate with general economic conditions, it
seems likely that other time-varying factors could influence some of these outcomes
post-law, thereby confounding the effects of the law. For this reason, in the second
step, I go beyond the simple pre-post comparison and investigate whether there are
larger changes in my outcomes in places where the new wage floor is more binding.
Using variation in the ‘bite’ of the minimum wage across districts will also increase
the precision of my estimates. I therefore estimate the following:
yidt = β1Cdt−1 + β2(Cdt−1 × POSTt) + β3(Cdt−1 ×WGd,0) + β4(WGd,0 × POSTt)+
β5(Cdt−1 ×WGd,0 × POSTt) +Xidt + δd + γt + θdt + εidt
(2.2)
where WGd,0 is a constructed variable identifying the cross-sectional variation in the
wage gap between district councils in the pre-law period.16 Following (Lee, 1999), I
define the district-level wage gap as:
WGd,0 = log[min(Wd∗)] − log[median(W ′d)] (2.3)
where Wd∗ is the initial minimum wage for workers working at least 35 hours a week
in district d and W ′d is the median real agricultural wage in the pre-wage period for
workers working at least 35 hours a week.1718
Under the assumption that the wage gap measure (and therefore the difference-in-
differences term) is orthogonal to the error in (2),19 the following holds: Parameter
16Note that the main effects of POSTt and WGd,0 drop out because of the district and time fixed
effects.
17I use all waves in the pre-period instead of just the wave before to improve the accuracy of the
estimates of median agricultural wages.
18Sectoral Determination No. 75 of 1997 specified that full-time workers working at least 35 hours
a week should receive the minimum monthly wages discussed in Section 3.3.
19Based on a review of the Department of Labour documentation on setting the agricultural min-
imum wage, it appears that the potential impact of the wage on employment had minimal if
any role in the policy decision. For example, in DoL (2001) it states that ‘...a minimum wage
cannot be opposed purely on grounds of its adverse effect on employment’ (cited in Garbers et al.
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β1 represents the average effects of Rainy Season SPEI Deviation across all districts
across my period of study. Parameter β2 represents the average difference in out-
comes between pre and post-law periods as a result of the effects of my weather
measure. Parameter β3 represents the average effect of my weather measure in areas
with larger than average wage gaps across my entire period. Parameter β4 repres-
ents the average difference in outcomes between pre-law and post-law periods for
my sample in areas with larger than average wage gaps across the entire period.
Lastly, parameter β5 represents the average difference in outcomes as a result of the
interaction between my weather measure and the law for my sample in areas with
larger than average wage gaps across the entire period. To show the overall effects
of Rainy Season SPEI Deviation in different scenarios, I estimate average marginal
effects for my weather measure for high and low wage gap areas in pre and post-law
periods.
Lastly, I turn to heterogeneous effects of the interaction between the agricultural
minimum wage and weather shocks. I re-estimate (2) for the following dependent
variables: (i) the probability of being an employee conditional on working; and (ii)
the probability of having a written contract conditional on being an employee (see
Table 2.A.1 in the appendix for more details on these variables).
2.6 Results
Table 2.2 presents the results of Equation 1, looking at the effects of Rainy Season
SPEI Deviation on the probability of employment. From Column 2, I estimate that a
one standard deviation increase (decrease) in rainy season SPEI from the local mean
is associated with a 3.3% increase (decrease) in agricultural employment relative to
its mean level in the labour force (the effect on overall employment is non-significant).
The effect is 80.0% stronger when considering a restricted labour force sample with
demographics similar to those of agricultural workers in Column 3. From Columns
(2015)). This gives credence to the assumption that the size of the wage gaps used in this study
are exogenous.
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4 and 5, an increase (decrease) in rainy season SPEI is associated with movement
from (into) unemployment and movement from (into) other employment sectors into
(from) agriculture, though movement from (into) the former category is stronger.
Table 2.A.6 in the appendix replicates Table 2.2 but focuses only on Negative Rainy
Season SPEI Deviation. I do not find a significant effect of my weather measure
on agricultural employment in Column 2 but I do when I restrict the labour force
sample in Column 3. This may however just be due to a lack of power. The coef-
ficients on NegSPEI RS Devt−1 in Column 2 and 3 are either equal to or only
slightly larger than the coefficients on the continuous weather measure indicating
that both positive and negative shocks are important for the relationship between
my continuous weather measure and agricultural employment.
Table 2.2: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of em-
ployment











SPEI RS Dev 0.0033 0.0024** 0.0063** 0.0141*** 0.0073***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0638 0.0638 0.0450 0.0166 0.0596
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9640 0.9640 0.9418 0.9211 0.9545
Observations 394,858 394,858 187,909 89,428 128,573
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised by
its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
Table 2.3 replicates Table 2.2 but uses hours worked and wages as the dependent
variables. Standardised rainy season SPEI has a weak negative association with
hours worked in agricultural wage employment in Column 3. In the corresponding
table focusing only on Negative Rainy Season SPEI Deviation (Table 2.A.7 in the
appendix), in Column 3 this variable has a positive coefficient of approximately the
same magnitude and is also significant at the 10% level. Reduced soil moisture is
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Table 2.3: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours worked
and wages






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
SPEI RS Dev -0.0035 -0.0128 -0.0106* -0.0040 0.0062
(0.0025) (0.009) (0.0053) (0.0052) (0.0091)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0778 -0.0138 -0.0757 0.0892 -0.0786
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9802 0.8922 0.9079 0.9771 0.9063
Observations 262,769 45,447 33,439 160,973 30,356
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised
by its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance
levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period
time trends, and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
therefore positively associated with hours worked in agricultural wage employment.
An intuitive explanation for this would be that as agricultural employers let go of
some workers in the wake of dry shocks, they look to compensate for this by getting
their other workers to work longer hours. In both Table 2.3 and Table 2.A.7, the
effects on total hours worked in all sectors, total agricultural hours worked, wages
earned in all sectors and agricultural wages are non-significant.
Table 2.A.2 (focusing on employment) and Table 2.A.4 (focusing on hours worked
and wages) in the appendix show the results of estimating Equation 1 with the
interaction between POSTt and SPEI RS Devt−1 included as an additional term.
Across all estimations the coefficient on the interaction term is non-significant. To
check if this is just due to insufficient power, Table 2.A.3 and Table 2.A.5 calculate
corresponding average marginal effects of my weather measure before and after the
minimum wage. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.A.3, it can be seen that deviations
in rainy season SPEI above (below) the local mean are associated with a stronger
increase (decrease) in agricultural employment in the post-law period. Column 2 of
Table 2.A.5 shows that deviations in rainy season SPEI above (below) the local mean
are associated with a larger and more precisely estimated decrease (increase) in total
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agriculture hours worked (including those worked by employees and the self-employed
in agriculture) in the pre-law period compared to the post-law period in Column 2.
However, as discussed in Section 5, there could be several other time-varying factors
that could influence these variables over my period of study independent of the law.
The corresponding results for Negative Rainy Season SPEI Deviation are in the
appendix.20
Table 2.4: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of em-
ployment after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage
gap











SPEI RS Dev 0.0030 0.0010 0.0026 0.0022 -0.0008
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.016) (0.011)
SPEI RS Dev#POST -0.0067 -0.0095 -0.0138 -0.0126 -0.0223
(0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.020) (0.014)
SPEI RS Dev#WG -0.0036 0.0053 0.0072 0.0143 0.0051
(0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)
POST#WG -0.0119 -0.0246 -0.0167 -0.0337 -0.0143
(0.026) (0.020) (0.021) (0.038) (0.030)
POST#SPEI RS Dev#WG 0.0078 0.0173** 0.0275** 0.0256 0.0451**
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.022) (0.017)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean wage gap 0.7505 0.7505 0.7688 0.7744 0.7630
SD wage gap 0.2699 0.2699 0.2807 0.2874 0.2875
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0638 0.0638 0.0450 0.0166 0.0596
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9640 0.9640 0.9418 0.9211 0.9545
Observations 394,858 394,858 187,909 89,428 128,573
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the district
rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised by its standard
deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and individual controls
for age, education, sex and race.
Table 2.4 shows the results of estimating Equation 2 focusing on employment as the
dependent variable with a three-way interaction term including POSTt, SPEI RS Devt−1
and the pre-law agricultural sector wage gap together with an interaction between
20Due to potential endogeneity issues, I do not comment on these tables in depth. Table 2.A.8
and Table 2.A.10 in the appendix replicate Table 2.A.3 and Table 2.A.5, respectively, but using
Negative Rainy Season SPEI Deviation. Again all interaction terms are non-significant. Table
Table 2.A.9 and Table 2.A.11 show corresponding average marginal effects results. The results are
more or less in line with those obtained for the continuous weather measure, though sometimes
weaker.
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Table 2.5: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of em-
ployment after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage
gap











Avg. marginal effect of
SPEI RS Dev when:
WG = low & POST = 0 0.0059 0.0007 0.0020 0.0091 0.0016
(0.0073) (0.0049) (0.0056 (0.0107) (0.0075)
WG = low & POST = 1 0.0029 -0.0004 0.0017 0.0090 0.0008
(0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0027) (0.0047) (0.0035)
WG = med. & POST = 0 0.0049 0.0022 0.0040 0.0132 0.0031
(0.0067) (0.0043) (0.0047) (0.0088) (0.0061)
WG = med. & POST = 1 0.0040 0.0057** 0.0114*** 0.0204*** 0.0152***
(0.0032) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0061) (0.0041)
WG = high & POST = 0 0.0039 0.0036 0.0060 0.0173 0.0046
(0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0083) (0.0056)
WG = high & POST = 1 0.0052 0.0118*** 0.0212*** 0.0319*** 0.0296***
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0056) (0.0099) (0.0069)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean wage gap 0.7505 0.7505 0.7688 0.7744 0.7630
SD wage gap 0.2699 0.2699 0.2807 0.2874 0.2875
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0638 0.0638 0.0450 0.0166 0.0596
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9640 0.9640 0.9418 0.9211 0.9545
Observations 385,177 385,177 184,718 88,436 126,347
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised by
its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and
individual controls for age, education, sex and race. Low wage gap = mean wage gap - 1 SD; med. wage gap
= mean wage gap; high wage gap = mean wage gap + 1 SD. After running the regression in Equation 2,
average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata with the dydx() option specified
to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with the option vce(unconditional) specified
to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
SPEI RS Devt−1 and POSTt, and interaction between SPEI RS Devt−1 and the
wage gap, and an interaction between POSTt and the wage gap. Since this spe-
cification includes multiple interaction effects, it is very demanding and so it is
unsurprising that some of the effects are non-significant (even if the marginal ef-
fects calculated in the next step are highly significant). Though non-significant, the
positive coefficient on SPEI RS Devt−1 in most specifications implies that above
(below) mean SPEI deviations on average increase (decrease) the probability of em-
ployment during my period of study. The negative coefficient on the interaction term
SPEI RS Devt−1#POSTt implies that in the post-law period, the positive (neg-
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Table 2.6: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours worked
and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage
gap






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
SPEI RS Dev 0.0066 -0.0164 0.0111 0.0184 0.0626
(0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.043)
SPEI RS Dev#POST -0.0043 -0.0111 -0.0182 -0.0404 -0.0661
(0.018) (0.033) (0.027) (0.028) (0.050)
SPEI RS Dev#WG -0.0212 -0.0231 -0.0312 -0.0190 -0.1085*
(0.019) (0.024) (0.033) (0.027) (0.062)
POST#WG 0.0537** 0.2729*** 0.0310 0.1119* 0.2396***
(0.026) (0.079) (0.050) (0.059) (0.054)
POST#SPEI RS Dev#WG 0.0114 0.0335 0.0193 0.0411 0.1023
(0.024) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.064)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean wage gap 0.7364 0.7670 0.6926 0.7377 0.6993
SD wage gap 0.2744 0.3401 0.3128 0.2631 0.3129
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0778 -0.0138 -0.0757 0.0892 -0.0786
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9802 0.8922 0.9079 0.9771 0.9063
Observations 255,887 45,386 33,395 157,185 30,320
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised by
its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and
individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
ative) effect of above (below) mean SPEI deviations is smaller than in the pre-law
period. This could be the result of areas becoming increasingly resilient to negative
weather shocks over time. The positive coefficient on SPEI RS Devt−1#WGd,0 in
all columns (except Column 1 where the probability of overall employment is the
dependent variable) suggests that the average effect of above (below) mean SPEI
deviations was to increase (decrease) employment in areas with higher than average
wage gaps. The negative coefficient on the interaction term POSTt#WGd,0 implies
that the minimum wage law coincided with decreased (agricultural) employment in
areas with larger than average wage gaps. Lastly, in most regressions looking at
agricultural employment, the three-way interaction is positive and significant, sug-
gesting that for districts where the minimum wage had substantial bite, there is a
significant increase (decrease) in employment as a result of the interaction between
above (below) mean deviations and the law.
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Table 2.7: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours worked
and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage
gap






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
Avg. marginal effect of
SPEI RS Dev when:
WG = low & POST = 0 -0.0032 -0.0263 -0.001 0.0095 0.206
(0.007) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.023)
WG = high & POST = 1 -0.0022 -0.0231* -0.012* -0.0114* -0.006
(0.004) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014)
WG = med & POST = 0 -0.0090* -0.0342*** -0.0105 0.0044 -0.0133
(0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017)
WG = med & POST = 1 -0.0049* -0.0195* -0.0153** -0.0056 -0.0079
(0.003) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)
WG = high & POST = 0 -0.0149 -0.0420*** -0.0203 -0.0005 -0.0472
(0.008) (0.013) (0.016) (0.011) (0.028)
WG = high & POST = 1 -0.0076** -0.1560 -0.0190* 0.0003 -0.0098
(0.004) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean wage gap 0.7364 0.7670 0.6926 0.7377 0.6993
SD wage gap 0.2744 0.3401 0.3128 0.2631 0.3129
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0778 -0.0138 -0.0757 0.0892 -0.0786
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9802 0.8922 0.9079 0.9771 0.9063
Observations 255,887 45,386 33,395 157,185 30,320
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised by
its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race. Low wage gap = mean wage gap - 1 SD; med. wage
gap = mean wage gap; high wage gap = mean wage gap + 1 SD. After running the regression in Equation 2,
average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata with the dydx() option specified
to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with the option vce(unconditional) specified
to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
Table 2.A.12 in the appendix replicates Table 2.4 using Negative Rainy Season SPEI
Deviation. Comparing the results in the two tables, it is noticeable that coefficients
on the significant three-way interaction terms in all columns in Table 2.A.12 are
larger (and, as expected, of opposite sign) than those in Table 2.4. This shows that
the interaction between the minimum wage and weather shocks matters more in the
case of negative weather shocks.
Table 2.5 shows the average marginal effects (corresponding to the regressions un-
dertaken to create Table 2.4) of standardised rainy season SPEI in the pre-law and
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post-law periods on employment holding the wage gap variable at high, medium and
low levels (see table footnotes for more information). In columns 2 and 3, it can be
seen that SPEI RS Devt−1 has no significant effect on agricultural employment in
the pre-law period. However, in the post-law period, SPEI RS Devt−1 has a strong
and significant effect on agricultural employment in areas where the minimum wage
had substantial bite. Holding the wage gap at its mean level, a one standard deviation
increase (decrease) in rainy season SPEI relative to the local mean results in a 7.1%
increase (decrease) in agricultural employment relative to its mean level among the
total labour force.21 This effect is 37.1% larger when considering a restricted version
of the labour force in Column 3.
Table 2.A.13 replicates Table 2.5 but focusing on Negative Rainy Season SPEI De-
viation. As expected, the pattern of marginal effects is the same as in Table 2.5 but
the significant coefficients on the marginal effects across all specifications for the post
period where the wage gap is either set at its average level or at one standard devi-
ation above its average level, are larger and more precisely estimated. Holding the
wage gap at its mean level, a one standard deviation increase in Negative Rainy Sea-
son SPEI Deviation (really, one standard deviation decrease in rainy season SPEI)
relative to the local mean results in a 7.1% decrease in agricultural employment
relative to its mean level among the total labour force.22
As before, columns 4 and 5 in Table 2.5 and Table 2.A.13 look to break down
effects of above (below) mean SPEI deviations on the probability of agricultural
employment into transitions from (into) unemployment and transitions from (into)
employment in other sectors. In Table 2.5 it appears that both channels are at play
21This is calculated using the numbers available in Column 2 of Table 2.5 i.e.
0.0057÷0.0771×0.9640×100=7.1268.
22In results not shown, positive weather shocks (using SPEI RS Devt−1 and recoding negative
values as zero) have a weaker but still significant effect (in the opposite direction) on agricultural
employment in the post-law period i.e. holding the wage gap at its mean level, a one standard
deviation increase in rainy season SPEI relative to the local mean results in a 4.7% increase in
agricultural employment relative to its mean level among the total labour force. If the minimum
wage (gradually) leads to a more consolidated agriculture workforce during times where there
are no weather shocks, it should be expected that hiring would increase in response to positive
shocks relative to the situation in the pre-law period.
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but the effect is slightly larger in Column 5 than Column 4, suggesting that above
(below) mean rainy season SPEI interacting with the agricultural minimum wage
is more likely to result in agricultural workers moving (from) into other industries
than moving (from) into unemployment. Focusing on Negative Rainy Season SPEI
Deviation in Table 2.A.13, the effect sizes in Column 4 are larger than in Column 5,
especially when holding the wage gap at its mean level. As before, then, there seems
to be an asymmetry: negative shocks are more likely to lead to a movement out
of agricultural employment and into unemployment than into employment in other
industries (which may be, in any case, purely survivalist), whereas positive shocks
are more likely to lead to a movement of workers from non-agricultural industries
into agriculture than a movement of unemployed people into agriculture.
Table 2.6 replicates Table 2.4 but considers hours worked and wages as the dependent
variables. Again many of the terms, including, in this case, the three-way interac-
tion terms, are non-significant. This could be either because there are no statistically
meaningful relationships between hours worked and wages, the minimum wage law
and my weather measure, or because there is not enough power. Though non-
significant, the positive coefficient on SPEI RS Devt−1 in most specifications (ex-
cept where total agricultural hours is the dependent variable) implies that above (be-
low) mean rainy season SPEI deviations on average increase (decrease) hours worked
and wages during my period of study. The (non-significant) negative coefficient on
the interaction term SPEI RS Devt−1#POSTt in all columns implies that in the
post-law period, the (negative) positive effect of (negative) SPEI RS Devt−1 on
hours worked and wages is smaller than in the pre-law period. The (non-significant)
negative coefficient on SPEI RS Devt−1#WGd,0 in all columns (except the first)
shows that the average effect of above (below) mean SPEI deviations was to decrease
(increase) hours worked and wages in areas with higher than average wage gaps. The
positive (and significant in most specifications) coefficient on the interaction term
POSTt#WGd,0 implies that the minimum wage law coincided with increased hours
worked and wages in areas with larger than average wage gaps. Lastly, in all es-
timations, the three-way interaction is positive (though non-significant), implying
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that for districts where the minimum wage had substantial bite, there is an increase
(decrease) in hours worked and wages as a result of the interaction between above
(below) mean SPEI deviations and the law.
Table 2.A.14 replicates Table 2.6 but focuses on the effects of Negative Rainy Season
SPEI Deviation. The most notable difference is that the coefficients in Column 5 are
larger and are more precisely estimated indicating a stronger relationship between
agricultural wages and the interaction between agricultural weather shocks and the
minimum wage legislation in the case of negative weather shocks.
Table 2.8: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of wage
employment and wage employment with a contract after vs. before the minimum
wage law considering the size of the wage gap













SPEI RS Dev 0.0142 -0.0097 0.0394 0.0325
(0.009) (0.022) (0.030) (0.036)
SPEI RS Dev#POST -0.0021 0.0255 -0.0257 -0.0440
(0.010) (0.024) (0.035) (0.039)
SPEI RS Dev#WG -0.0214** -0.0116 -0.0284 -0.0122
(0.009) (0.020) (0.030) (0.026)
POST#WG 0.0242 0.0970* -0.0009 0.0151
(0.030) (0.056) (0.053) (0.049)
POST#SPEI RS Dev#WG 0.0062 -0.0274 0.0234 0.0539
(0.011) (0.025) (0.036) (0.033)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.7762 0.6750 0.6250 0.3230
Mean wage gap 0.7391 0.7753 0.7181 0.7753
SD wage gap 0.2759 0.3424 0.2653 0.3424
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0715 -0.0113 0.0751 -0.0113
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9738 0.8902 0.9794 0.8902
Observations 263,513 47,388 203,866 47,388
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev
is the district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean
normalised by its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis.
Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear
district-period time trends, and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
Table 2.7 shows the average marginal effects of SPEI RS Devt−1 on hours worked
and wages corresponding to the regressions in Table 2.6. The main result is the effect
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of the minimum wage on the relationship between SPEI RS Devt−1 and hours
worked in agricultural wage employment relative to their mean level in Column 3.
Whereas there is no distinguishable effect of SPEI RS Devt−1 on hours worked
of wage employees in agriculture in the pre-law period, in the post-law period it
appears that above (below) mean SPEI deviations lead to a decrease (increase) in
hours worked for these workers. Holding the wage gap at its mean level, a one
standard deviation increase (decrease) in rainy season SPEI relative to the local
mean results in a 2.0% increase (decrease) in wage agriculture hours worked. In
the case of SPEI deviations below the local mean, the positive effect on wage hours
worked is probably the result of employers making their remaining workforce work
harder after letting go of some workers. This effect increases in strength with the size
of the wage gap. In columns 1 and 2, I also find that rainy season SPEI Z-scores have
a significant negative effect on hours worked in all sectors and in total agricultural
hours worked (including both employees and self-employed) in some areas in the
pre-law or post-law period but there is no distinct pattern and so it not clear that
the minimum wage has any effect. Lastly, in columns 4 and 5, I find that in general
rainy season SPEI has no discernible effects on agricultural wages or wages in all
industries.
Table 2.A.15 in the appendix replicates Table 2.7 for Negative Rainy Season SPEI
Deviation. The most notable difference is that in Column 5 it appears that in
some areas agricultural wages were negatively affected by below average rainy season
moisture in the pre-law period. Specifically, in low wage gap areas (i.e. where the
wage gap is held at one standard deviation below its mean level), a one standard
deviation decrease in rainy season SPEI relative to the local mean results in a 0.7%
decrease in agricultural wages relative to their mean level. In the post-law period,
in these same areas, the coefficient on the marginal effect becomes positive and
non-significant. This finding suggests that in certain parts of the country prior to
the minimum wage law, agricultural wages were adjusted downwards in the wake of
negative shocks. In the post-period, there is no adjustment, probably due to the fact
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that employers have less room to adjust wages once the law is in place (assuming
they are observing it).
2.7 Heterogeneous effects
I now turn to heterogeneous effects on employment of the interaction between the
agricultural minimum wage and weather shocks.
Table 2.8 replicates Table 2.4 but examines the probability of wage employment con-
ditional on employment and the probability of having a written contract conditional
on having wage employment in the agriculture sector and across all sectors. Most
terms are non-significant and coefficients have almost all the same signs in columns
1, 3 and 4 where the probability of wage employment across all industries, the prob-
ability of having a contract as a wage employee in all industries and the probability
of having a contract as a wage employee in the agricultural sector are the respective
dependent variables. Column 2 with agricultural wage employment as the dependent
variable displays quite different results.
Though non-significant, the positive coefficient on SPEI RS Devt−1 in most spe-
cifications in Table 2.8 (except where agriculture wage employment is the dependent
variable in Column 2 where the coefficient is negative and non-significant) implies
that above (below) mean rainy season SPEI on average increases (decreases) the
probability of wage employment (except in agriculture) and the probability of having
a written contract during my period of study. The (non-significant) negative coeffi-
cient on the interaction term SPEI RS Devt−1#POSTt (except where agriculture
wage employment is the dependent variable where the coefficient is positive and non-
significant) implies that in the post-law period, the positive (negative) effect of above
(below) mean rainy season SPEI is smaller than in the pre-law period. As before, this
could be related to the fact that areas tend to become increasingly resilient to negat-
ive weather shocks over time. The negative coefficient on SPEI RS Devt−1#WGd,0
in all columns (which is non-significant except for in Column 1 where the probabil-
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ity of wage employment across all industries is the dependent variable) shows that
the average effect of above (below) mean rainy season SPEI was to decrease (in-
crease) the probability of having wage employment and a written contract in areas
with higher than average wage gaps. The positive but non-significant coefficient on
the interaction term POSTt#WGd,0 in all columns except Column 3 (where it is
negative but practically very small and non-significant) implies that the minimum
wage law generally coincided with an increased probability of wage employment and
employment with a contract in areas with larger than average wage gaps. Lastly, in
most estimations the three-way interaction is positive and non-significant (except for
in Column 2 where agricultural wage employment is the dependent variable where
the coefficient is negative and non-significant), implying that for districts where the
minimum wage had substantial bite, there is an increase (decrease) in the likelihood
of wage employment and of having a wage contract as a result of the interaction
between above (below) mean SPEI deviations and the law.
Table 2.A.16 in the Appendix replicates Table 2.8 but focuses on Negative Rainy Sea-
son SPEI Deviation. One important difference is that in Column 2 the coefficient
on the three-way interaction term is considerably larger suggesting that the relation-
ship between the probability of agricultural wage employment and the interaction
between weather shocks and the minimum wage law is stronger when considering
negative weather shocks.
Table 2.9 shows the corresponding average marginal effects for rainy season SPEI
in the pre-law and post-law periods. In Column 2, holding the wage gap at a high
level (at one standard deviation above the mean), it appears that above (below)
mean rainy season SPEI deviations reduce (increase) the probability of wage em-
ployment Vis-à-vis self-employment among agricultural workers after the minimum
wage law is introduced (holding the wage gap at its mean, there is no effect). In
many developing country contexts one might expect to find negative employment
effects of lower-than-normal soil moisture for agricultural wage workers only, and
perhaps some movement from wage agriculture into self-employed/subsistence agri-
How does minimum wage legislation influence the labour market impacts of productivity shocks? 75
Table 2.9: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of wage
employment and wage employment with a contract after vs. before the minimum
wage law considering the size of the wage gap













Average marginal effect of
SPEI RS Dev when:
WG = low & POST = 0 0.0043 -0.0147 0.0265 0.0272
(0.006) (0.016) (0.018) (0.026)
WG = low & POST = 1 0.0051** -0.0010 0.0115** 0.0066
(0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)
WG = med. & POST = 0 -0.0017 -0.0187 0.0190 0.0231
(0.005) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019)
WG = med. & POST = 1 0.0009 -0.0144 0.0102** 0.0209**
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
WG = high & POST = 0 -0.0076* -0.0227 0.0115 0.0189
(0.004) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
WG = high & POST = 1 -0.0033 -0.0278** 0.0089 0.0352***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.013)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.7762 0.6750 0.6250 0.3230
Mean wage gap 0.7391 0.7753 0.7181 0.7753
SD wage gap 0.2759 0.3424 0.2653 0.3424
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0715 -0.0113 0.0751 -0.0113
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9738 0.8902 0.9794 0.8902
Observations 263,513 47,388 203,866 47,388
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised
by its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance
levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time
trends, and individual controls for age, education, sex and race. Low wage gap = mean wage gap - 1
SD; med. wage gap = mean wage gap; high wage gap = mean wage gap + 1 SD. After running the
regression in Equation 2, average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata
with the dydx() option specified to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with
the option vce(unconditional) specified to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
culture. However, as detailed in Section 2.1, South Africa is an unusual case where
a large proportion of agricultural workers live on farms with their extended families.
Since the extended family members are often involved in self-employed agriculture,
when the wage worker loses his or her job and the household is forced to move off
the farm, many self-employed agricultural workers may lose their employment too.
In the special case of South Africa then, the agricultural minimum wage may have
negative effects that spill over to self-employed workers.
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In the corresponding marginal effects table for Negative Rainy Season SPEI Devi-
ation (see Table 2.A.17 in the appendix), it can be seen that the coefficients on the
marginal effects in Column 2 are larger and more precisely estimated showing that
negative shocks are driving the patterns seen in the previous table.23
In Column 4 of Table 2.8, it can be seen that above (below) mean rainy season
SPEI deviations increase (reduce) the probability of an agricultural worker having a
written contract in the post-law period. This is a notable finding since, in general,
the proportion of agricultural wage workers with written contracts went up in the
post law period. It seems that the interaction between the agricultural minimum
wage and lower-than-normal soil moisture led to the casualisation of the agricultural
labour force in the post-law period. Holding the minimum wage gap at its mean level,
I estimate that a one standard deviation increase (decrease) in rainy season SPEI
relative to the local mean results in a 5.7% increase (decrease) in the probability
that an agricultural employee has a written contract relative to the mean level of
this dependent variable. It can be deduced from Table 2.A.17 and results not shown
where I focus only on the effects of positive shocks that both positive and negative
shocks are driving this relationship.
2.8 Conclusion
This paper examines how the introduction of a sectoral minimum wage affects resili-
ence to productivity shocks in a developing country context by looking at the inter-
action between an agricultural minimum wage and agricultural productivity shocks
in South Africa. Exploiting substantial variation across districts in pre-law median
agricultural wages and variation in weather across districts and over time, I determ-
ine that the minimum wage increases the susceptibility of agricultural employment
to low soil moisture i.e. rainy season SPEI deviations below the local mean. I do
not find effects on agricultural wages and only find marginal effects on hours worked
23In results not shown, when I focus only on positive shocks, there is no significant effect of this
weather measure in the post-period on the probability of wage agricultural employment.
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in the agricultural sector. The evidence best supports a story where the dramatic
increase in the agricultural wage bill as a result of the law makes it less affordable for
employers to keep on their workforces in the wake of negative productivity shocks,
which results in retrenchments.
There are strong arguments to be made that the agricultural minimum wage in South
Africa was long overdue and there was a very real need to improve workers’ conditions
in this sector. However, it also seems that the minimum wage was set at a very
high level in relation to the prior wage distribution of agricultural workers and it is
unsurprising that there could have been some negative implications for employment.
This paper highlights one important mechanism for how agricultural minimum wages
can have negative employment effects. As policymakers are increasingly concerned
about how to increase resilience in developing countries in the face of climate change,
the paper also shows that they should be aware that agricultural minimum wages
interacting with negative weather shocks may lead to many vulnerable workers losing
their jobs and to incentives changing around the provision of permanent contracts.
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Table 2.A.2: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
employment after vs. before the minimum wage law











SPEI RS Dev 0.0030 0.0010 0.0026 0.0122 0.0007
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006)
SPEI RS Dev#POST 0.0004 0.0017 0.0046 0.0025 0.0082
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.008)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0638 0.0638 0.0450 0.0166 0.0596
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9640 0.9640 0.9418 0.9211 0.9545
Observations 394,858 394,858 187,909 89,428 128,573
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised by
its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
Table 2.A.3: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on the probability of
employment after vs. before the minimum wage law











Avg. marginal effect of
SPEI RS Dev when:
POST = 0 0.0030 0.0012 0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0160
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012)
POST = 1 0.0033 0.0027* 0.0072*** 0.0027 0.0002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0638 0.0638 0.0450 0.0166 0.0596
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9640 0.9640 0.9418 0.9211 0.9545
Observations 394,858 394,858 187,909 89,428 128,573
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised by
its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race. After running the regression in Equation 1 with
the extra interaction term, average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata with
the dydx() option specified to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with the option
vce(unconditional) specified to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
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Table 2.A.4: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours worked
and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
SPEI RS Dev -0.0096 -0.0266** -0.0105 0.0062 -0.0081
(0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.023)
SPEI RS Dev#POST 0.0074 0.0189 -0.0001 -0.0123 0.0186
(0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.026)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0778 -0.0138 -0.0757 0.0892 -0.0786
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9802 0.8922 0.9079 0.9771 0.9063
Observations 262,769 45,447 33,439 160,973 30,356
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised
by its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance
levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period
time trends, and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
Table 2.A.5: The effects of standardised rainy season SPEI on monthly hours worked
and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
Avg. marginal effect of
SPEI RS Dev when:
POST = 0 -0.0096 -0.0266** -0.0105 0.0062 -0.0081
(0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.023)
POST = 1 -0.0023 -0.0077 -0.0106* -0.0061 0.0106
(0.003) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean SPEI RS Dev 0.0778 -0.0138 -0.0757 0.0892 -0.0786
SD SPEI RS Dev 0.9802 0.8922 0.9079 0.9771 0.9063
Observations 262,769 45,447 33,439 160,973 30,356
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). SPEI RS Dev is the
district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised by
its standard deviation. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race. After running the regression in Equation 1 with
the extra interaction term, average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata
with the dydx() option specified to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with the
option vce(unconditional) specified to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
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Table 2.A.6: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the probab-
ility of employment











NegSPEI RS Dev -0.0043 -0.0024 -0.0070** -0.0182*** -0.0077
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3593 0.3593 0.3591 0.3651 0.3582
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5218 0.5218 0.5217 0.5253 0.5222
Observations 394,858 394,858 187,909 89,428 128,573
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is
the transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean
normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are
taken of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
Table 2.A.7: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on monthly
hours worked and wages






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
NegSPEI RS Dev -0.0003 0.0031 0.0099* -0.0026 -0.0179
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009) (0.015)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3607 0.3639 0.4006 0.3568 0.4016
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5221 0.5603 0.5796 0.5099 0.5796
Observations 262,769 45,447 33,439 160,973 30,356
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev
is the transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local
mean normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values
are taken of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance
levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time
trends, and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
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Table 2.A.8: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the probab-
ility of employment after vs. before the minimum wage law











NegSPEI RS Dev -0.0050 0.0044 0.0041 -0.0043 0.0091
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
NegSPEI RS Dev#POST 0.0014 -0.0086 -0.0143 -0.0184 -0.0213
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.017) (0.016)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3593 0.3593 0.3591 0.3651 0.3582
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5218 0.5218 0.5217 0.5253 0.5222
Observations 394,858 394,858 187,909 89,428 128,573
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is
the transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean
normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are
taken of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and
individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
Table 2.A.9: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the probab-
ility of employment











Avg. marginal effect of
NegSPEI RS Dev when:
POST = 0 -0.0050 0.0044 0.0041 -0.0029 -0.0079
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017)
POST = 1 -0.0036 -0.0042 -0.0102* -0.0027 0.0014
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3593 0.3593 0.3591 0.3651 0.3582
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5218 0.5218 0.5217 0.5253 0.5222
Observations 394,858 394,858 187,909 89,428 128,573
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is
the transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean
normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are taken
of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and individual
controls for age, education, sex and race. After running the regression in Equation 1 with the extra interaction
term, average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata with the dydx() option
specified to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with the option vce(unconditional)
specified to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
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Table 2.A.10: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on monthly
hours worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
NegSPEI RS Dev -0.0014 -0.0010 -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0177
(0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033)
NegSPEI RS Dev#POST 0.0013 0.0055 0.0168 0.0004 -0.0002
(0.013) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.037)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3607 0.3639 0.4006 0.3568 0.4016
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5221 0.5603 0.5796 0.5099 0.5796
Observations 262,769 45,447 33,439 160,973 30,356
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is
the transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean
normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are
taken of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
Table 2.A.11: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on monthly
hours worked and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
Avg. marginal effect of
NegSPEI RS Dev when:
POST = 0 -0.0014 -0.001 -0.0038 -0.0029 -0.0199
(0.010) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029)
POST = 1 -0.0000 0.0045 0.0134* -0.0025 0.0158
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3607 0.3639 0.4006 0.3568 0.4016
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5221 0.5603 0.5796 0.5099 0.5796
Observations 262,769 45,447 33,439 160,973 30,356
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is the
transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean
normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are
taken of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends,
and individual controls for age, education, sex and race. After running the regression in Equation 1 with
the extra interaction term, average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata with
the dydx() option specified to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with the option
vce(unconditional) specified to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
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Table 2.A.12: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of employment after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size
of the wage gap











NegSPEI RS Dev -0.0255* -0.0104 -0.0064 -0.0098 -0.0113
(0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.032) (0.024)
NegSPEI RS Dev#POST 0.0213 0.0322* 0.0338 0.0219 0.0540*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.039) (0.028)
NegSPEI RS Dev#WG 0.0160 0.0100 0.0039 -0.0039 0.0117
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.034) (0.029)
POST#WG -0.0139 -0.0022 0.0088 -0.0226 0.0276
(0.027) (0.019) (0.022) 0.039 (0.030)
POST#NegSPEI RS Dev#WG -0.0163 -0.0530** -0.0638** -0.0561 -0.1002***
(0.021) (0.023) (0.030) (0.047) (0.036)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean wage gap 0.7505 0.7505 0.7688 0.7744 0.7630
SD wage gap 0.2699 0.2699 0.2807 0.2874 0.2875
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3593 0.3593 0.3591 0.3651 0.3582
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5218 0.5218 0.5217 0.5253 0.5222
Observations 394,858 394,858 187,909 89,428 128,573
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is the
transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised
by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are taken of negative values.
Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and individual controls for age, education,
sex and race.
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Table 2.A.13: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of employment after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size
of the wage gap











Avg. marginal effect of
NegSPEI RS Dev when:
WG = low & POST = 0 -0.0178 -0.0055 -0.0045 -0.0117 -0.0057
(0.0090) (0.0011) (0.0092) (0.0176) (0.0122)
WG = low & POST = 1 -0.0044 0.0113 -0.0018 -0.0171 0.0007
(0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0068) (0.0066)
WG = med. & POST = 0 -0.1350* -0.0028 -0.0034 -0.0128 -0.0023
(0.0071) (0.0044) (0.0056) (0.0114) (0.0077)
WG = med. & POST = 1 -0.0045 -0.0105*** -0.0187*** -0.0343*** -0.0247***
(0.0058) (0.0039) (0.0047) (0.0091) (0.0055)
WG = high & POST = 0 -0.0092 -0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0139 0.0011
(0.0072) (0.0047) (0.0072) (0.0118) (0.0104
WG = high & POST = 1 -0.0045 -0.0221*** -0.0355*** -0.0516*** -0.0501***
(0.0085) (0.0058) (0.0068) (0.0144) (0.0077)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.6997 0.0771 0.1099 0.2578 0.1608
Mean wage gap 0.7505 0.7505 0.7688 0.7744 0.7630
SD wage gap 0.2699 0.2699 0.2807 0.2874 0.2875
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3593 0.3593 0.3591 0.3651 0.3582
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5218 0.5218 0.5217 0.5253 0.5222
Observations 385,177 385,177 184,718 88,436 126,347
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is
the transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean
normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are taken
of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and individual
controls for age, education, sex and race. Low wage gap = mean wage gap - 1 SD; med. wage gap = mean
wage gap; high wage gap = mean wage gap + 1 SD. After running the regression in Equation 2, average
marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata with the dydx() option specified to obtain
the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with the option vce(unconditional) specified to ensure
the correct clustering of standard errors.
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Table 2.A.14: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on hours worked
and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage
gap






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
NegSPEI RS Dev -0.0236 -0.0329 -0.0491 -0.0079 0.1694**
(0.029) (0.041) (0.050) (0.047) (0.076)
NegSPEI RS Dev#POST 0.296 0.0713 0.0592 0.0249 0.1726*
(0.039) (0.061) (0.058) (0.054) (0.088)
NegSPEI RS Dev#WG 0.0294 0.0576 0.0608 0.0195 0.2138**
(0.034) (0.042) (0.066) (0.051) (0.097)
POST#WG 0.0722 0.2927*** 0.0404 0.1147 0.2897***
(0.045) (0.104) (0.071) (0.073) (0.084)
POST#NegSPEI RS Dev#WG -0.0327 -0.0743 -0.0442 -0.0440 -0.1958*
(0.051) (0.067) (0.075) (0.066) (0.100)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean wage gap 0.7364 0.7670 0.6926 0.7377 0.6993
SD wage gap 0.2744 0.3401 0.3128 0.2631 0.3128
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3607 0.3639 0.4006 0.3568 0.4016
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5221 0.5603 0.5796 0.5099 0.5796
Observations 255,887 45,386 33,395 157,185 30,320
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is the
transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean normalised
by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are taken of negative
values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05,
***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and individual controls for
age, education, sex and race. Low wage gap = mean wage gap - 1 SD; med. wage gap = mean wage gap; high
wage gap = mean wage gap + 1 SD.
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Table 2.A.15: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on hours worked
and wages after vs. before the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage
gap






wage emp.) Log (wages) Log (ag. wages)
Avg. marginal effect of
NegSPEI RS Dev when:
WG = low & POST = 0 -0.0100 -0.0084 -0.0260 0.0014 -0.0868**
(0.146) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.043)
WG = high & POST = 1 0.0045 0.0312** 0.0164* 0.0055 0.0101
(0.007) (0.015) (0.009) (0.011) (0.023)
WG = med & POST = 0 -0.0019 0.0112 -0.0070 0.0065 -0.0199
(0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.027)
WG = med & POST = 1 0.0036 0.0256** 0.0216** -0.0009 0.0158
(0.0059) (0.012) (0.008) (0.013) (0.016)
WG = high & POST = 0 0.0061 0.0308* 0.0120 0.0117 0.0470
(0.011) (0.016) (0.026) (0.017) (0.037)
WG = high & POST = 1 0.0026 0.0199 0.0268** -0.0074 0.0214
(0.0099) (0.017) (0.012) (0.020) (0.017)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 5.1381 5.0626 5.2625 8.1133 7.2439
Mean wage gap 0.7364 0.7670 0.6926 0.7377 0.6993
SD wage gap 0.2744 0.3401 0.3128 0.2631 0.3128
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3607 0.3639 0.4006 0.3568 0.4016
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5221 0.5603 0.5796 0.5099 0.5796
Observations 255,887 45,386 33,395 157,185 30,320
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev is the
transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local mean
normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values are
taken of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance levels:
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time trends, and
individual controls for age, education, sex and race. Low wage gap = mean wage gap - 1 SD; med. wage gap
= mean wage gap; high wage gap = mean wage gap + 1 SD. After running the regression in Equation 2,
average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata with the dydx() option specified
to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with the option vce(unconditional) specified
to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
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Table 2.A.16: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of wage employment and wage employment with a contract after vs. before
the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage gap













NegSPEI RS Dev 0.0143 -0.0024 -0.0585 -0.0280
(0.019) (0.035) (0.046) (0.060)
NegSPEI RS Dev#POST -0.0065 -0.0252 0.0627 0.0644
(0.021) (0.040) (0.055) (0.069)
NegSPEI RS Dev#WG 0.0192 0.0094 0.0285 -0.0026
(0.018) (0.032) (0.048) (0.042)
POST#WG 0.0182 0.0671 0.0342 0.0576
(0.033) (0.065) (0.076) (0.065)
POST#NegSPEI RS Dev#WG 0.0061 0.0559 -0.0458 -0.0720
(0.022) (0.041) (0.062) (0.055)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.7762 0.6750 0.6250 0.3230
Mean wage gap 0.7391 0.7753 0.7181 0.7753
SD wage gap 0.2759 0.3424 0.2653 0.3424
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3587 0.3616 0.3589 0.3616
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5273 0.5604 0.5270 0.5604
Observations 263,513 47,388 203,866 47,388
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev
is the transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local
mean normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values
are taken of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance
levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time
trends, and individual controls for age, education, sex and race.
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Table 2.A.17: The effects of negative deviations of rainy season SPEI on the prob-
ability of wage employment and wage employment with a contract after vs. before
the minimum wage law considering the size of the wage gap













Average marginal effect of
NegSPEI RS Dev when:
WG = low & POST = 0 -0.0053 0.0016 -0.0456* -0.0291
(0.012) (0.023) (0.027) (0.004)
WG = low & POST = 1 -0.0091** 0.0006 -0.0037 0.0041
(0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.016)
WG = med. & POST = 0 -0.0000 0.0049 -0.0380** -0.030
(0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.323)
WG = med. & POST = 1 -0.0021 0.0229** -0.0082 -0.0214*
(0.005) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
WG = high & POST = 0 0.0052 0.0081 -0.0304* 0.0309
(0.007) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)
WG = high & POST = 1 0.0049 0.0453*** -0.0128 -0.0469***
(0.008) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015)
Individual controls Y Y Y Y
District FEs Y Y Y Y
Period FEs Y Y Y Y
District-period trends Y Y Y Y
Mean dep. var. 0.7762 0.6750 0.6250 0.3230
Mean wage gap 0.7391 0.7753 0.7181 0.7753
SD wage gap 0.2759 0.3424 0.2653 0.3424
Mean NegSPEI RS Dev 0.3587 0.3616 0.3589 0.3616
SD NegSPEI RS Dev 0.5273 0.5604 0.5270 0.5604
Observations 263,513 47,388 203,866 47,388
Analysis at individual level using labour force survey data (Sept 2001-Sept 2007). NegSPEI RS Dev
is the transformed district rainy season SPEI deviation (in the previous period) from the long run local
mean normalised by its standard deviation where positive values are recoded as zero and absolute values
are taken of negative values. Standard errors clustered at the district level in parenthesis. Significance
levels: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. With district and year fixed effects and linear district-period time
trends, and individual controls for age, education, sex and race. Low wage gap = mean wage gap - 1
SD; med. wage gap = mean wage gap; high wage gap = mean wage gap + 1 SD. After running the
regression in Equation 2, average marginal effects are calculated using the margins command in Stata
with the dydx() option specified to obtain the derivative with respect to the weather measure and with
the option vce(unconditional) specified to ensure the correct clustering of standard errors.
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Chapter 3
Agglomeration economies in a
developing country: Evidence from
geo-coded micro-panel data in
South Africa
3.1 Introduction
Are agglomeration effects much higher in developing than developed countries or are
they just overestimated? The few studies on agglomeration in developing countries
have found agglomeration elasticities often of 8% to 20% (Chauvin et al., 2017;
Combes et al., 2017), considerably higher than the elasticities averaging 3% estimated
in rigorous developed country studies. In theory, underdeveloped factor markets in
developing countries may enhance the productivity benefits of cities relative to those
in advanced countries. However, due to data constraints, agglomeration studies
focused on developing country papers are not able to include all the endogeneity
controls used in the developed country papers and are often forced to work with
geographical units that are far removed from local labour markets. In this study, I
make use of a unique geo-coded panel micro-dataset for South Africa, which allows
me to rigorously investigate most of the first order issues addressed in the developed
country literature.
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As extensively theorised in urban economics, the productivity benefits of cities derive
from reduced transport costs, easier access to consumers and suppliers, technology
and knowledge spill-overs and improved matching between workers and firms (see
reviews in Ciccone and Hall (1996); Duranton and Puga (2004)). Since accord-
ing to neoclassical theory, in competitive labour markets, wages are equal to the
marginal product of labour, agglomeration economies should result in higher wages
in larger cities as compared to smaller urban areas or rural areas (Combes et al.,
2008; Glaeser and Mare, 2001).1 The identification challenge is that there are sev-
eral other reasons why wages might be higher in large cities (Combes et al., 2010).
Highly skilled workers may sort into larger cities because they are more specialised
in skill-intensive industries or because these workers stand to benefit more from ag-
glomeration economies. Another possibility is that favourable local endowments (in-
cluding geographical amenities, public capital or institutions) could facilitate greater
productivity, resulting in higher wages for workers and further agglomeration.2
Assuming all the endogeneity issues mentioned above were controlled for, why might
agglomeration elasticities still be higher in developing countries? One theory is that
the higher trade costs in developing countries means that the proximity to suppliers
of intermediate goods becomes more important (Duranton, 2014). Another related
theory is that large cities have a much higher level of connectivity to the outside world
relative to other parts of a developing country (Glaeser and Xiong, 2017). Technology
entering through cities may give firms there a productivity boost relative to those in
less well-connected places.
I examine the relationship between urban population and nominal wages in South
Africa for the period 2008-2016 using all five rounds of the National Income Dynamics
1While the first studies of agglomeration economies estimated production functions using cross-
sectional aggregate data, more recent studies tend to rather use micro-data, either at the firm or
worker level, to estimate production or wage functions. The advantages of micro-level data are
that they can better represent firm optimising behaviour posited in economic theory, they can
limit aggregation bias linked to unobserved heterogeneity and they can provide more variation
(Melo et al., 2009).
2There is also some evidence that firms have less monoposony power in cities, which could lead to
higher wages (Manning, 2010). This is, however, arguably related to there being thicker labour
markets in cities, which is a foundational tenet of agglomeration theory (Proost and Thisse, 2019).
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Survey, a nationally-representative panel study. I map individuals to a geographic
level that approximates local labour markets as closely as possible. To control for
possible bias caused by the sorting of workers of different skills, I first include a
battery of controls for observed ability. However, since I have access to an individual-
level panel of workers, my paper is able to go further than the other developing
country papers in controlling for unobserved characteristics that may be correlated
with location choices - a critical feature of the state-of-the-art empirical research on
agglomeration effects (Combes and Gobillon, 2015).3 I am effectively able to ‘follow’
workers across the country to observe how their wages change as the employment
activity around them changes. To control for simultaneity bias (or omitted variable
bias), I construct instruments from historical population data (specifically, from a
hard copy of the 1960 census) that have not been used before in the South African
literature. Owing to South Africa’s unique history of controlled migration and forced
reallocation of the population across space, there is a strong case to be made for the
exclusion restriction for this instrument.
My paper contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, there have been
few rigorous studies of agglomeration effects in developing countries, despite nu-
merous reviews having highlighted that it would be very useful to compare results
from developing countries to the robust results obtained for more developed coun-
tries (Duranton, 2014; Henderson, 2005; Overman and Venables, 2005). There have
been some attempts at measuring agglomeration elasticities in developing countries
with cross-sectional data. Combes et al. (2017) estimate agglomeration externalities
of 9 to 10% for China. In another paper, Chauvin et al. (2017) compare popula-
tion/population density elasticities between the US, Brazil, China and India. While
Brazil’s population elasticity is measured around 5% (similar to that in the US), the
3Note that I focus on measuring static agglomeration economies in South Africa. While panel data
has been used in advanced country studies to estimate dynamic agglomeration economies (i.e.
the effects of agglomeration on productivity growth) (e.g. Roca and Puga (2017)), my series is
unfortunately not long enough (and the dates between waves too close to one another) to precisely
estimate these effects (cf. Henderson and Kriticos (2018)).
Agglomeration economies in a developing country: Evidence from geo-coded micro-panel data in South Africa 98
authors find much higher elasticities for India and China (around 8%).4 They also
find an even higher density elasticity for India of 19%. In a related paper, Hering and
Poncet (2010) examine the relationship between individual wages and market access
in China, estimating an elasticity of 14%. In several of these papers, the authors
admit that they may be overestimating elasticities but are constrained by the data
available to them. In one particularly careful study, Duranton (2016) estimates an
elasticity of wages with respect to city population of about 5% for Colombia using
national household surveys, though this paper is also limited by the non-availability
of panel data.
Secondly, I contribute to the spatial economics literature on South Africa. Several
studies have looked at spatial inequality in South Africa at the regional level. Topics
have included the determinants of economic growth at the subnational level (Naudé
and Krugell, 2006) and the evolution of regional GDP (Msulwa and Turok, 2013).
More directly related to the topic at hand, in an attempt at a firm-level analysis of
agglomeration in South Africa, Krugell and Rankin (2012) use cross-sectional World
Bank Enterprise Survey data from 2003 and 2007. The paper is largely descriptive
and limited by the fact that the authors only have data for four South African cities
at the city level. Most of these previous studies have been carried out at the regional
or industry level and have resorted to using crude measures of output or regional
income generated by market research consultancies.
Thirdly, I contribute to the debate on spatial development in policy-making circles
in South Africa. For the most part, post-Apartheid policy economic policy has paid
little attention to subnational impacts and regional differentiation. What attention
has been paid to spatial aspects of development has been almost exclusively focused
on closing geographical disparities in output and employment (Robbins, 2015; Todes
and Turok, 2018). Knowing more about the benefits from and costs of cities in South
Africa is important, so that policy can be devised on the basis of systematic evidence.
4In Chauvin et al. (2017), China’s population elasticity is statistically insignificant, so this estimate
is only tentative.
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In my preferred specification including both individual fixed effects and a histor-
ical population instrument, I estimate an elasticity of wages to city population of
approximately 3%, which is robust to a large number of tests. I find that using
individual effects to control for sorting on unobservables reduces the estimated ag-
glomeration elasticity for South Africa by 18-37% (depending on the specification)
- in line with effect sizes in the developed country literature (Baum-Snow and Fer-
reira, 2015). I argue that these results provide suggestive evidence that the very high
agglomeration elasticities found for other developing countries may in part be due to
mismeasurement. Controlling for market access - the urban employment population
of surrounding cities - has little effect on the elasticities I estimate. Once I control
for individual fixed effects, I do not find evidence of heterogeneous effects for work-
ers based on skill level, participation in the informal/formal economy or gender. I
also examine the comparative effects of human capital externalities and agglomer-
ation externalities, finding that agglomeration externalities seem to be much more
important in predicting wages.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the spatial economy in South
Africa. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical approach. Section 4 presents
results with robustness checks and examines heterogeneous effects. Section 5 con-
cludes.
3.2 Context
South Africa is renowned as having one of the highest levels of inequality in the
world. Inequality has remained stubbornly high since the end of Apartheid in 1994
(Leibbrandt et al., 2016). In 2015, the Gini coefficient based on income was estimated
to be 0.68 and the Gini coefficient based on expenditure was estimated to be 0.64
(Statistics SA, 2017). The poorest 60% of the population earn about 10% of the
total income of the population (Leibbrandt et al., 2016). It is important to know
how much of these disparities in income can be explained by agglomeration effects.
While many of the previous studies on the spatial economy of South Africa have
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relied on questionable data, there is at least preliminary evidence that the country
has a very high level of spatial economic unevenness (Turok, 2012). It has been
estimated, for example, that 20% of cities and towns produce 82% of South Africa’s
GDP (Krugell and Naude, 2005).
Much of the regional inequality is probably driven by uneven spatial sorting of skills
and by agglomeration forces favouring localised growth poles. However, South Africa
also has an unusual history of restricted urbanisation (at least for the majority
black population) and spatial segregation along race lines with development being
deliberately focused on predominantly white urban centres.
From the discovery of diamonds and gold in South Africa in the 17th and 18th
century until the end of the 20th century, urbanisation of the black population was
restricted by pass laws (put in place by the whites-only national government), which
required that black mine workers carry a pass at all times and prevented them
from bringing their families to cities. Then with the 1913 Native Land Act, black
people were prevented from owning land outside rural ‘reserves’ in the former native
African states. The reserves (known as ‘Bantustans’) were mostly arid and without
resources, and they were far away from the main economic centres. After World
War II, Apartheid (Afrikaans for ‘separateness’) became official state policy and the
government increased influx controls. It forcibly relocated approximately 3.5 million
black people from white areas to Bantustans and hundreds of thousands of people
were arrested every year for disobeying pass laws (Ogura et al., 1996). The 1950
Group Areas Act prescribed the racial composition of every residential area, so that
black people who had formal jobs in cities were forced to live in informal settlements
(known as ‘townships’) on their outskirts (Christopher, 2001).
The end result of these policies was that there was considerable spatial divergence
between the economic centres of the country and the dense rural reserves, and within
cities between inner city areas and the surrounding informal settlements (Turok,
2012). While today, approximately two-thirds (65%) of South Africa’s total popu-
lation of 55 million live in urban areas (World Bank, 2019), the urbanisation level
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might have been much higher in the absence of Apartheid and the earlier system of
spatial segregation (Krugell and Naude, 2005). Under-urbanisation and high trans-
port costs are likely to have undermined agglomeration economies.
Restrictions on migration were abandoned in 1986 before the election of the first
democratic government in 1994, which hastened rural-urban migration. Interna-
tional sanctions were lifted, opening up the economy to globalisation forces. As
elsewhere, this has led to the growth of economic activities in areas connected to
international trade (i.e. major cities and harbours). These developments have put
added pressure on politicians to try to spread jobs and wealth to rural areas neglected
during Apartheid and now by global economic forces. A variety of rural development
schemes have or are in the process of being tried, including public works employ-
ment projects and industrial decentralisation initiatives (Todes and Turok, 2018).
While up until recently the national government seemed oblivious to market forces
favouring cities, it has recently acknowledged their significance, and the difficulty of
working against them (Farole and Sharp, 2017).
While there are some historical peculiarities in South Africa that have affected the
process of urbanisation, the country is still comparable to other developing countries
for which agglomeration externalities have been estimated. While this paper does
not aim to comprehensively compare the factor markets in South Africa against those
in China, India and Brazil, the markets would not seem to be very different. For
example, all four countries receive similar scores for the quality of their trade and
transport-related infrastructure.5 While per capita GDP in India is approximately
one-third of that in Brazil, per capita income levels in China, Colombia and South
Africa are very similar, half way between the two extremes.6
5In the World Development Indicators for 2012 (chosen because 2012 is the midpoint of my period
of study), South Africa received 3.79 for this indicator, while Brazil received 3.07, China received
3.59 and India received 3.08 (World Bank, 2019).
6In 2012, the official per capita GDP (constant 2011 PPP $) in Brazil was $15,215, in China was
$11,115, in Colombia was $11,996, in India was $4817, and in South Africa was $12,253.
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3.3 Data & econometric approach
3.3.1 Data
The paper makes use of the South African National Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS).
NIDS is South Africa’s first nationally representative panel study. The survey
provides detailed information on income, education and employment as well as many
other variables. There are approximately 7900 households per wave. The survey re-
visits the same households each wave and tracks household members even when they
migrate to other parts of the country.7
Due to the so-called ‘modifiable unit area problem’, the choice of geographic level can
affect statistical results (e.g. Briant et al. (2010)). It is therefore preferable to work
with regions that closely approximate local labour markets.8 The secure version of
NIDs provides the exact geo-coordinates of households, which can then be matched
to local municipalities.910 Local municipalities are the contemporary equivalent of
magisterial districts (phased out as administrative units in 2001), which have been
used in several papers (focusing on earlier periods) to approximate local labour
markets (e.g. Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2012); Magruder (2012)). In 2011 South
African municipalities covered on average 4669 square kilometres and the average
population of local municipalities was 221,241.
Local municipality boundaries from the 2011 census were used, since this was the last
7In terms of attrition, 78% of the individuals who were interviewed in Wave 1 were successfully
interviewed in Wave 4. This is a relatively low attrition rate, especially when compared to similar
panel surveys in developing countries. Survey refusal is just as likely as non-contact as a cause
of attrition (Brophy et al., 2018). Since my main specification (with individual fixed effects) gets
identification from movers, this means that attrition in NIDS is less of a problem for my paper
than it would otherwise be.
8One potential disadvantage of the NIDS dataset is that it only provides information on where
people live, rather than where they work, yet much of the existing agglomeration literature is
concerned with the link from work place size to wages. In practice, this should not be a major
problem, since local municipalities are large enough such that places where people live are also
likely to be places where people work.
9In order to preserve anonymity, the publicly available version of NIDs provides limited information
on the geographic location of respondents – down to the district municipality level.
10This was carried out using the ‘gpsbound’ command using the 2011 Census shape-files.
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Figure 3.1: Variation of urban employment population and market potential across
local municipalities in 2011.
(a) Urban employment population
(b) Urban employment market potential
The market potential measure is calculated as the inverse-weighted sum of urban employment
population over all municipalities other than the municipality in question (Harris, 1954). Data
from Census 2011.
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time a full national census was carried out. This ensures that population information
and other regional information are as accurate as is possible. There were 234 local
municipalities in the 2011 geographic frame. Eight of these were classified as met-
ropolitan municipalities: City of Johannesburg, City of Tshwane (Pretoria), City
of Cape Town, Ekurhuleni (East Rand), Nelson Mandela Metro (Port Elizabeth),
Ethekweni Metro (Durban), Manguang Metropolitan Municipality and Buffalo City
(East London). Metropolitan municipalities include the largest cities in South Africa
as well as surrounding towns. There were also 226 non-metropolitan local municip-
alities, which encompass (sometimes multiple) smaller cities and towns as well as
rural areas.
I focus for the most part on the urban portion of local municipalities as defined
in the 2011 Census, though, for comparison, I also present results where the main
variable of interest is based on total municipal population including that in rural
areas. Since agglomeration benefits are most likely to come from being surrounded
by people who are economically active, my main specifications focus on the employed
population.11 Two possible candidates for my main measure of agglomeration then
include urban municipal employment population and urban municipal population
density. As explained in Chauvin et al. (2017), both measures are useful. If there is
much arbitrary variation in how tightly municipal borders are drawn around agglom-
erations, then population will be a better measure than density. On the other hand,
if local municipalities sometimes include multiple towns or cities, density may be the
preferred measure of agglomeration. As to be expected, given the high correlation
between population and density, I find that the results are very similar with the
two different specifications. For my main results, I use urban municipal employment
population together with a control for (log) municipal land area in keeping with the
specification in Duranton (2016). Summary statistics for local municipalities can be
found in Table 3.A.1 of the Appendix.
11The distinction between employed and unemployed is particularly important in South Africa,
where unemployment levels are very high (around 25-35% depending on the definition of unem-
ployment used.)
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This paper makes use of pre-tax monthly wages (deflated to a 2013 base year using
the South African CPI) that individual workers received from their primary occupa-
tions.12 Since there are some concerns over self-reported working hours, the analysis
mainly focuses on the total wage for workers who reported working fewer than 15
hours per week (though I also report results with hourly wages as the dependent vari-
able, which are never significantly different from my main results). I include both
men and women in my sample, though I also examine the separate effects on each
gender in Section 4.5. I include both wages in both the formal and informal sectors
so as to avoid the potential selection issues associated with only focusing on formal
sector employees and because it is important to consider informal sector employment
in developing countries like South Africa. Since the earnings of the informally em-
ployed may be differentially distorted across municipalities, I estimate agglomeration
elasticities separately for workers who are formally and informally employed in Sec-
tion 4.5. I drop individuals with no labour income and the 1% of workers with the
lowest and highest wages. I also drop public sector workers whose wages are not set
by market mechanisms. Individuals with missing values for age (16 observations) are
also dropped. These restrictions leave a base sample of 4518 workers contributing
12070 wage observations over the years 2008-2016 for empirical analysis. For the
fixed effects analysis (described below), identification is from movers - those workers
that moved across local municipality boundaries during the period in question, earn-
ing wages in both sending and receiving municipalities - which include 529 workers
contributing 1472 observations.
Table 3.1 shows descriptive statistics for the sample. Comparing the sample of non-
movers workers (Column 1) to the sample of movers (Column 4) shows that movers
tend to be slightly younger, better-educated and higher-earning (as has been found
to be the case in other countries cf. D’Costa and Overman (2014)), but that these
changes are not particularly large.13 Columns 2 and 3 also compare non-movers living
12I do not consider income from the self-employed (here I depart from Duranton (2016), whose
sample includes self-employed in both the formal and informal sectors) as I am concerned that
income may get confounded with profits.
13It is important to note here that this exercise only shows that movers and non-movers are similar
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for base sample
Non-movers (observed at least twice) Movers
Total High UEP munic. Low UEP munic Total
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Monthly gross wages 6737.6 7602.6 7874.0 8411.6 5812.4 6734.4 7669.8 8308.4
Female (%) 48.7 50.0 49.0 50.0 48.7 50.0 37.1 48.3
Avg. age 37.9 10.6 37.0 10.6 38.6 10.6 33.8 9.2
Age 16-29 (%) 26.3 44.1 30.0 45.8 23.4 42.4 37.8 48.5
Age 30-43 (%) 42.7 49.5 42.2 49.4 43.1 49.5 45.7 49.8
Age 44-57 (%) 26.9 44.3 23.9 42.7 29.2 45.5 14.9 35.7
Age 58-70 (%) 4.1 19.8 3.9 19.4 4.2 20.1 1.5 12.1
Black (%) 57.2 49.5 64.2 47.9 51.4 50.00 65.9 47.4
Coloured (%) 32.6 46.9 25.8 43.7 38.2 48.6 3.1 17.4
Asian/Indian (%) 6.0 23.7 4.1 19.7 7.5 26.3 3.1 17.4
White (%) 3.4 18.22 4.96 21.7 2.2 14.6 2.8 16.5
Avg. years of educ. 9.8 3.4 10.5 2.8 9.2 3.7 10.5 3.1
Grade 1-5 (%) 6.7 25.0 4.0 19.6 8.9 28.4 4.3 20.2
Grade 6-8 (%) 15.0 35.7 11.4 31.7 17.9 38.4 9.2 29.0
Grade 9-11 (%) 33.2 47.1 35.4 47.8 31.4 46.4 32.2 46.7
Grade 12 (%) 34.8 47.6 40.5 49.1 30.2 45.9 43.8 49.6
Technikon diploma (%) 0.5 7.3 0.6 7.7 0.5 7.0 0.3 5.2
University degree (%) 5.4 22.5 6.2 24.1 4.7 21.1 6.7 25.1
Trade union (%) 29.8 45.7 31.8 46.6 28.2 45.0 26.8 44.3
Informal (%) 26.8 44.3 23.6 42.5 29.3 45.5 28.2 45.0
Married (%) 33.7 47.3 33.5 47.2 33.9 47.3 24.6 43.1
Observations 12070 5387 6633 1472
Individuals 4518 2067 2451 529
in the 30 local municipalities with the highest urban employment population to those
living in other municipalities. Mean gross wages are 26.3% higher in the municipalit-
ies with highest urban employment population (R7874) as compared to those in the
other municipalities (R5812). To investigate the possible sources of this wage rate
differential, statistics are also reported on various other individual characteristics of
the workers in the sample. White and black workers make up a larger proportion of
the population in high urban employment population municipalities than in other
municipalities, whereas ‘coloured’ (mixed race) workers (a historically disadvantaged
group) and Asian/Indians are mostly found in lower urban employment population
municipalities. A higher proportion of workers in high urban employment population
municipalities have completed secondary school (Grade 12) and higher degrees than
in the other municipalities. Working in the informal sector is slightly more common
when it comes to observable characteristics. There may still be differences when it comes to
unobservable characteristics.
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amongst workers in lower urban employment population municipalities. This basic
comparison suggests that there are some systematic differences in workers’ charac-
teristics across space, which need to be accounted for in any analysis of regional
wages.
I also compare statistics between movers who are captured in the 30 highest urban
employment population municipalities versus movers in the rest (see Table 3.A.2 in
the Appendix). The patterns of differences between high and lower urban employ-
ment population locations for movers are very similar to those described above for
the sample of non-movers. This mitigates concerns about sample selection issues
between movers and non-movers (cf. D’Costa and Overman (2014)).
3.3.2 Econometric approach
I estimate variants of the following regression:
lnwit = β1 + lnEimtβ2 +Xitβ3 + γt + δd + εit (3.1)
The outcome variable of the Mincerian wage function is the natural logarithm of
worker i’s total wages from primary activities in a municipality m at time t. The
main variable of interest is lnEimt, the natural logarithm of the total number of
workers in each worker’s municipality of residence.14 The other explanatory variables
are as follows: Xit is a vector of individual characteristics (age, race, marital status,
education, whether the worker is in formal or informal employment and trade union
membership). γt is a time effect to control for macro level changes in wage rates that
are common to all individuals.
The first step of the approach is to run a basic pooled OLS estimation for the rela-
tionship between wage rates and the number of workers in municipalities of residence.
However, an immediate concern is that higher wages in large cities could then just
reflect a higher concentration of skilled workers. Typically industries demanding
14For the main analysis, population information is from the 2011 National Census.
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high skills - such as universities and multinational companies - locate in large cities.
Large cities also offer consumption amenities which may be particular attractive to
highly educated workers. It is therefore important to include controls for individual
worker characteristics that could affect both sorting and wages. While this provides
a decent first approximation of regional wage elasticity, it is not able to take into
account unobserved individual ability, which is unlikely to be distributed evenly and
is therefore likely to bias coefficients (Glaeser and Mare, 2001). To try to tackle this
issue an individual-level fixed effects estimation is carried out. This removes that
part of omitted ability which is worker-specific and time-invariant, and identification
then comes off movers.
While using fixed effects is seen as the best possible approach in the absence of
random allocation (D’Costa and Overman, 2014), there may be concerns with the
representativity of the population of movers (Combes et al., 2008). However, as
discussed in Section 3.1, I find no substantial differences between the mover sample
and my full sample. Another possible concern with focusing on movers is that there
may be endogeneity at the individual level when workers’ location choices are based
on the exact wage that they get in particular places, typically when they receive
job offers associated with known wages (Combes and Gobillon, 2015). However, in a
developing country like South Africa, it is much less likely than in developed countries
that people migrate in response to concrete wage offers. In support of this argument,
in the 2001-2002 HSRC National Migration Survey, the most important reason male
migrants cited for moving across districts was ‘looking for work’, whereas female
migrants moved mainly because of ‘getting married or moving in with a partner’ or
‘getting separated or divorced’ (Wentzel et al., 2006). Very few migrants reported
moving to take up a job.
The above concerns endogeneity at the individual level but there could also be en-
dogeneity at the local level. As mentioned, it could be the case that the presence of
certain endowments - better institutions and technology - in large cities could dir-
ectly facilitate greater productivity, resulting in higher wages for workers and further
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agglomeration (Combes et al., 2010). This could either be seen as a reverse causality
problem or an omitted variable problem - with the variable being the amenity that
determines both agglomeration and wages (Combes and Gobillon, 2015).15
The paper therefore uses an instrumental variable strategy examining the impact
of historical population levels in a two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation.16 In
order to control for potential simultaneity bias, an instrument should be able to pre-
dict worker population but should otherwise be uncorrelated with the productivity
differences in the model. Long lags of population or population density have been
used since Ciccone and Hall (1996). The rationale for this is that the factors which
determined population location in the past may be different from the factors de-
termining population location today (satisfying the exclusion restriction for a valid
instrument). At the same time, population patterns tend to be relatively persistent
over time partly as a result of the durability of infrastructure and housing (satisfying
the relevance condition for a valid instrument). This paper instruments municipal-
level urban employment populations with estimated municipal urban populations in
South Africa in 1960.
Information on the historical populations of towns and cities in South Africa was
obtained from the hardcopy of the 1960 national census. The geo-coordinates of these
towns and cities were used to map them to 2011 local municipality census boundaries.
Unfortunately, no information was available for 36 (mostly low urban employment
population) current-day municipalities in 1960, so the 2SLS estimations are run on
a slightly smaller sample of observations (11,440 instead of 12,070). Table 3.A.3 in
15Of course it is also possible that local amenities could bias estimates of regional wage elasti-
city downwards e.g. if consumption amenities make the price of land higher without increasing
productivity (Combes and Gobillon, 2015).
16To address endogeneity at the local level, another possible approach is to include time-invariant
local fixed effects in specifications estimated on panel data to deal with missing local variables that
are constant over time. However, apart from this requiring a long panel and much time-variation
in population/density over time, there are other drawbacks, including an inability to deal with
time-varying omitted variables as well as reverse causality (for further discussion cf. Combes
and Gobillon (2015)). Duranton (2016) tries to include regional fixed effects in his regressions
for Colombia, finding that while fixed effects estimates do not not contradict cross-sectional
estimates, they do not provide enough precision to be useful.
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Appendix replicates Table 3.1 focusing on this slightly reduced sample, finding very
similar descriptive statistics to those for the full sample.
While a historical population instrument is expected to be relevant, showing that it
passes the exclusion restriction is not quite as straightforward. However, the South
African economy over the 2008-2016 period was much changed from what it was in
1960, suggesting that the historical determinants of population location are not the
same as those during my period of study. As explained in the background section,
in 1960 separationist policies in South Africa were in full swing, and the major-
ity black population was restricted to certain areas of the countries and prevented
from participating properly in the economy. Whereas since the turn of the century,
South Africa has undergone rapid deindustrialisation after liberalising its economy,
the country was industrialising in the 1950s (Carmody, 2002). Furthermore, as is
the case in most other countries that have reached middle-income status, produc-
tion techniques used in manufacturing, agriculture and service industries today are
dramatically different from what they were in 1960.
Lastly, this paper also considers the effects of market access on productivity. Better
access to outside markets makes local firms more productive by allowing them to
access a broader variety of goods at a cheaper price and increasing the demand for
their output (Krugman and Venables, 1995). This can lead to an increase in the
marginal product of their labour and therefore local wages. This can be captured
by a market potential variable. This paper uses the Harris (1954) market potential
definition, which takes the inverse-distance weighted sum of employment population
over all municipalities other than the municipality in question.17
17Having data on trade between municipalities, as well as data on trade between municipalities and
foreign countries, would also be very useful (e.g. Fally et al. (2010)), but this is not currently
available for South Africa.
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3.4 Results
3.4.1 Baseline results
Table 3.2 presents basic pooled OLS regression results. In absence of any other
control, the specification in Column 1 shows an elasticity of 0.079 between wages
and urban employment population. This indicates that in the cross-section of South
African municipalities between 2008 and 2016, a doubling of urban employment
population is associated with 7.9% higher wages. Column 2 adds individual charac-
teristics. This reduces the coefficient on log urban employment population to 0.043,
implying that about 45% of the relationship between wages and urban employment
population is explained by observed worker characteristics. This elasticity is on the
extreme lower end of the range of estimates for regional wage elasticity in developing
countries. With the exact same specification, Duranton (2016) estimates an elasticity
of 0.054 between municipal urban population and wages for Columbia. This figure
is substantially lower than the population elasticities - around 0.08 - reported for
Chinese and Indian cities (Chauvin et al., 2017; Combes et al., 2017). Column 3 in-
cludes a control for (log) municipal land area. The coefficient on urban employment
population marginally decreases to 0.040. This is my preferred OLS specification.
The rest of the columns in this table are devoted to establishing the robustness of
this finding and to exploring possible heterogeneous effects.
In Column 4, after controlling for industries and occupations as well as the land area
control, the regional wage elasticity drops slightly to 0.038.18 Relative to the spe-
cification of Column 3, Column 5 adds market access, which reduces the coefficient
on (log) urban employment population to 0.032. This suggests that part of the rela-
tionship between wages and (log) urban employment population is explained by the
fact that municipalities with larger urban employment populations also have access
to larger markets. Column 6 duplicates Column 3 but uses total urban population
18Industries and occupations are arguably endogenous to municipal size, which is why they are not
included in the main regression.
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Table 3.2: The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: Pooled OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Only UEP Indiv. Area Ind.+occ. MA UP TP Non-lin. HW YOE
log UE pop. 0.079*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.032*** -0.028 0.040*** -0.059***
(0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.054) (0.007) (0.017)
log UE pop.2 0.003
(0.002)
log area -0.028** -0.034*** -0.004 -0.031** -0.030** -0.028** -0.036*** -0.028**
(0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
log MA 0.115***
(0.033)
log urban pop. 0.041***
(0.007)
log total pop. 0.049***
(0.010)




R-squared 0.109 0.580 0.580 0.639 0.584 0.580 0.581 0.581 0.572 0.539
Observations 12,070 12,070 12,070 11,507 12,070 12,070 12,253 12,070 11,672 11,979
Robust standard errors clustered at the local municipality level in parentheses. Columns 2-10 include individual controls for age, age
squared, educational attainment, marital status, trade union membership, etc. Columns 3-10 include a control for the (log) land area
of local municipalities. Year fixed effects included in all columns. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
as the measure of agglomeration. This also has very little effect on the elasticity.
Column 7 also duplicates Column 3 but uses total population (from both urban and
rural parts of municipalities) as the agglomeration measure. The coefficient on (log)
total population is 0.049 - a 23% increase in the size of the coefficient relative to
that obtained with my preferred specification in Column 3. Not having data on the
urban employed population, some of the other agglomeration economies studies use
total population as their measure of agglomeration. This analysis suggests that this
might account, in part, for the inflated elasticities they estimate. Column 8 adds a
quadratic term for urban employment population. The coefficients on (log) urban
employment population and its square are non-significant showing that linear form
does better in approximating the relationship between my agglomeration measure
and wages. Column 9 uses hourly wages instead of wages as the dependent vari-
able, which, reassuringly, has no effect on the coefficient on (log) urban employment
population. Column 10 includes an interaction between the education of individual
workers and (log) urban employment population. This interaction term is positive
and significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient on (log) urban employment pop-
ulation is negative (while remaining significant at the 1% level). This suggests that
there are higher returns to agglomeration for skilled workers and that very low-skilled
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workers experience negative returns to agglomeration. While Duranton (2016) did
not find that education made any difference to agglomeration externalities in Colom-
bia, the result here is in line with the literature on the US (cf. Bacolod et al. (2010);
Wheeler (2001)).
3.4.2 Individual fixed effects
Table 3.3 duplicates Table 3.2 but includes individual fixed effects to control for po-
tential sorting on unobservables. The inclusion of individual fixed effects reduces the
coefficient on urban employment population, or variants thereof, in all specifications.
Looking at the main result in Column 3, the coefficient on (log) urban employment
population is 0.033 - 18% lower than the corresponding OLS estimate. However,
the individual fixed effects have a larger effect (reducing the wage elasticity by 37%)
when total population is used as the measure of agglomeration. This suggests that
studies using total population as the measure of agglomeration but not individual
fixed effects might be substantially overestimating agglomeration elasticities. Using
hourly wages instead of gross wages as the dependent variable results in no signific-
ant change in the elasticities estimated. Lastly, with the inclusion of individual fixed
effects, the interaction between education and (log) urban employment population is
non-significant and the coefficient is 0.00 suggesting that there are no higher returns
to urban agglomeration for the highly educated once unobserved individual ability
is accounted for.
In international studies, including individual fixed effects typically reduces regional
wage elasticity by about 30-50%, suggesting that there is positive sorting of high
fixed effect (unobserved ability) individuals into more urbanised areas (Baum-Snow
and Ferreira, 2015). In South Africa, using my favoured specification (in Column
3), fixed effects reduces the coefficient on urban employment population by 18-37%
depending on the agglomeration measure used.
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Table 3.3: The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: Individual fixed
effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Only UEP Indiv. Area Ind.+occ. MA UP TP HW YOE
log UE pop. 0.043*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.027*** -0.038
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.034)
log UE pop. 2
log area -0.054 -0.057* -0.036 -0.054 -0.070** -0.052 -0.052
(0.033) (0.030) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.033)
log MA 0.084
(0.054)
log urban pop. 0.036***
(0.010)
log total pop. 0.031**
(0.013)




R-squared 0.431 0.453 0.453 0.466 0.453 0.453 0.453 0.426 0.453
Observations 12,048 12,048 12,048 11,262 12,048 12,048 12,253 11,475 11,918
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Columns 2-9 include individual controls for age,
age squared, educational attainment, marital status, trade union membership, etc. Columns 3-8 include a control for
the (log) land area of local municipalities. Year fixed effects included in all columns. Significance levels: *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.01
3.4.3 2SLS results
Table 3.4 duplicates Table 3.2 but instruments log municipal employment population
(or variants thereof) with historical urban population in 1960. In columns 1-6, it
can be seen that instrumenting with historical employment population marginally
decreases elasticity estimates. The ancillary tests show that the instruments are
strong i.e. the first-stage F-stat is over 1000.19 In Column 3, with individual and
area-level controls, the elasticity is reduced to 0.035 (which is significantly different
from the OLS estimate). In Column 6, the results are again little changed by using
urban population instead of urban employment population. In Column 7, the coef-
ficient on total municipal population is 0.050, which is substantially larger than the
coefficient obtained in Column 3. It appears that the inclusion of the instrument
(unlike the inclusion of individual fixed effects) has no effect on this coefficient. In
Column 8 the quadratic term remains non-significant and the (non-significant) coef-
ficient on (log) urban employment population increases substantially. In Column
19I do not report F-stats for each table in this paper but have checked to make sure that they are
all substantially higher than the traditional threshold of 10.
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9, using hourly wages instead of gross wages, the coefficient on urban employment
population is again unchanged. In Column 10, relative to the OLS specification, the
negative coefficient on (log) urban employment is slightly larger, while the coefficient
on the interaction with skill level is unchanged.
Table 3.4: The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Only UEP Indiv. Area Ind.+occ. MA UP TP Non-lin. HW YOE
log UE pop. 0.069*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 7.097 0.035*** -0.066***
(0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (22.182) (0.008) (0.022)
log UE pop.2 0.109
(0.463)
log area -0.035*** -0.040*** -0.012 -0.037*** -0.031** 0.109 -0.042*** -0.037**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.463) (0.013) (0.015)
log MA 0.113***
(0.035)
log urban pop. 0.037***
(0.008)
log total pop. 0.050***
(0.012)




R-squared 0.102 0.574 0.575 0.635 0.578 0.574 0.573 . 0.567 0.533
Observations 11,440 11,440 11,440 10,905 11,440 11,440 11,440 11,440 11,084 11,352
Robust standard errors clustered at the local municipality level in parentheses. Columns 2-10 include individual controls for age, age
squared, educational attainment, marital status, trade union membership, etc. Columns 3-10 include a control for the (log) land area
of local municipalities. Year fixed effects included in all columns. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
In line with findings from studies elsewhere, the 2SLS regional wage elasticity estim-
ates are lower than the corresponding OLS estimates, suggesting that there was some
simultaneity-/omitted variable bias in the relationship between agglomeration and
wages in South Africa. With my main specification (Column 3), the coefficient on
urban employment population drops by 12.5% with the inclusion of the instrument.
3.4.4 2SLS and individual fixed effects combined
Table 3.5 replicates Table 3.2 but includes both individual fixed effects and the his-
torical instrument. All the coefficients on (log) urban employment population, or
variants thereof, are smaller than in Table 3.3 or Table 3.4, except for the coeffi-
cient on (log) total population which increases relative to that in Table 3.3 but is
smaller than that in Table 3.4. In Column 3, my main specification yields a regional
wage elasticity of 0.031, significant at the 1% level. This is my preferred estimate
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of regional wage elasticity for the paper.20 In Column 4, the coefficient on (log)
market access remains significant at the 5% level but the coefficient on (log) urban
employment population is only slightly smaller showing that market access remains
a significant determinant of wages but not override the effect of local agglomeration.
Lastly in Column 9, the interaction between (log) urban employment and individual
education remains non-significant and close to zero. While this is not conclusive
evidence, it suggests that high-skilled workers do not enjoy higher agglomeration
benefits (in line with the findings from Duranton (2016)).
Table 3.5: The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: 2SLS and individual
fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Only UEP Indiv. Pr.+AC Ind.+occ. MA UP TP HW YOE
log UE pop. 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.028** 0.025** 0.018 -0.010
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.034)
log area -0.016 -0.024 0.005 -0.018 -0.016 -0.011 -0.019
(0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
log MA 0.104*
(0.055)
log urban pop. 0.032***
(0.012)
log total pop. 0.046***
(0.017)




R-squared 0.427 0.448 0.448 0.460 0.448 0.448 0.447 0.420 0.447
Observations 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,621 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,864 11,247
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Columns 2-9 include individual controls
for age, age squared, educational attainment, marital status, trade union membership, etc. Columns 3-9 include a
control for the (log) land area of local municipalities. Year fixed effects included in all columns. Significance levels:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
To summarise the empirical results thus far, looking at the relationship between
wages and urban employment population in South Africa, endogeneity at both the
individual (caused by sorting on observables and unobservables) and local levels
(caused by simultaneity bias/omitted variable bias) seems to be at play. Using
individual fixed effects, my preferred specification yields an elasticity of 0.033 (17.5%
below the corresponding OLS estimate). Including a historical instrument for urban
employed population, my preferred elasticity is 0.035 (12.5% below the corresponding
20My results are unchanged (and remain significant at the 5% level) when I use two-way clustering
at either the individual-year level or the municipality-year level.
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OLS estimate). Combining historical instruments and individual fixed effects in the
same specification yields a coefficient of 0.031 (22.5% below the corresponding OLS
estimate).
3.4.5 Further heterogeneous effects
This paper extends the examination of the possible heterogeneous effects of agglom-
eration, which has been a major preoccupation of the recent literature. I have already
tested if there are non-linearities in the effects of city size, finding no evidence for
this. I have also examined the differential effects of agglomeration on workers of
different skill groups, finding that larger effects for skilled workers obtained with the
OLS and 2SLS specifications disappear when I include individual fixed effects. I
now turn to examine the effects of participation in the formal/informal economy and
the effects of gender using my specification with both the historical instrument and
individual fixed effects.
In Panel 1 of Table 3.A.4 I examine the separate effects of workers either with
or without written contract by including an interaction between my measure of
agglomeration and a binary variable equal to 1 if a worker is informally employed
(without a contract) or 0 if formally employed. In all specifications, I find that
the coefficient on the interaction term is positive but non-significant. While my
results are inconclusive, higher returns to agglomeration in the informal sector have
been found in several other studies (Duranton, 2016; García, 2016). Businesses hiring
workers informally would also tend to be informal businesses, whose products are sold
locally and whose income is more directly related transportation and local housing
costs Duranton (2016).
In Panel 2 of Table 3.A.4 I examine the separate effects on workers of different
genders by including an interaction between my measure of agglomeration and a
binary variable equal to 1 if a worker is female or 0 if male. With my main specific-
ation in Column 3, I find a positive but non-significant coefficient on my interaction
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term. Like Duranton (2016), I find no statistically significant difference in the size
of agglomeration effects between men and women in Colombia.
3.4.6 Human capital externalities
As already mentioned, one theoretical mechanism behind agglomeration economies
is spillovers occur between people working in close proximity, thereby enhancing pro-
ductivity. This is obviously related to the theory that there are benefits to urban
workers from being located in more educated places (on top of the private benefits
of education). However, human capital externalities differ from the agglomeration
effects measured above because they relate to the skill composition of the work-
force/population rather than its absolute size. Two separate strands of literature
have emerged and there have been few attempts to compare the relative effects of
the two variables of interest (Duranton, 2016). In the regressions that follow I in-
clude both a measure of agglomeration and a measure of the share of more educated
workers.21 To measure municipal education, I experiment with two measures: first,
the share of workers with some university/technical college education, and second,
the share of workers that have completed Grade 10. The intention here is not to do
a full exploration of the effects of human capital externalities but mainly to assess
the robustness of earlier findings.
Table 3.A.5 duplicates Table 3.5 adding the share of population with tertiary edu-
cation. I run the regressions with individual fixed effects to control for the pos-
sibility that places with higher aggregate levels of education also have people with
higher levels of unobserved human capital. Adding this control marginally increases
the coefficient on urban employment population. Table 3.A.6 duplicates Table 3.5
adding the share of the population that have completed Grade 10.22 This again
21It is possible that some omitted explanatory variable both disproportionately attracts skilled
people to an area and increases wages, thus it would be good to have an instrument for area
education. One possible instrument is the number of schools per local municipality (cf. Moretti
(2004)) but I do not have good data for this in South Africa. Another possibility is to use the
lagged demographic structure of municipalities (cf. Moretti (2004)) but this would be difficult to
estimate given that local municipalities did not exist prior to 2001.
22Many high-school students drop out of school at Grade 10 level (as long as they have completed
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marginally increases the coefficient on urban employment population. In both cases,
the coefficient on municipal education is mostly non-significant (and negative). In
estimations that include both agglomeration and regional education, agglomeration
seems to be more important.
When the same regressions as in Table 3.A.5 and Table 3.A.6 are estimated without
a measure of agglomeration, interestingly, the coefficients on municipal education are
negative and statistically significant (see Table 3.A.7 for the results using the second
measure of regional education level).23
My results are similar to those found by Duranton (2016) for Colombia, who also
finds agglomeration externalities dominate human capital externalities. However,
they are very different to those obtained by Chauvin et al. (2017) for Brazil, China
and India. The latter paper finds large (elasticities of 3.0-6.7%) and significant
coefficients on their aggregate education measure (share of the population with uni-
versity education) even when they control for regional population. This leads them
to speculate that developing world city success may depend on education rather than
agglomeration. This argument does not seem to hold in the case of South Africa.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the size of agglomeration effects in South Africa applying rig-
orous econometric strategies to micro-level panel data from the National Income
Dynamics Survey. Previous related studies in South Africa had made use of ag-
gregated regional output measures of poor quality. In order to map respondents
to a geographic level that approximates local labour markets as closely as possible,
this paper works with the secure version of NIDS, which contains household geo-
coordinates.
this grade, they are eligible to enter state-sponsored technical colleges), so this is a good cut-off
to use.
23I also experiment with using the logged form of these municipal education measures but they
remain non-significant in most specifications.
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In addition to controlling for an extensive range of observable worker characterist-
ics that could affect wages, this paper exploits the panel nature of the dataset by
using individual fixed effects to control for sorting on unobservables. There are no
other studies of agglomeration economies in developing countries that have made use
of individual fixed effects. To control for potential reverse causality/omitted vari-
able bias in the relationship between municipal employment population and wages,
the paper makes use of a historical population instrument constructed from South
African census data in 1960. I argue that the historical population instrument is
more likely than in other settings to be exogenous due to the peculiar history of
separate development in South Africa.
Using an OLS specification, the raw regional wage elasticity in South Africa is estim-
ated to be 7.9%. My preferred specification, including both the instrumental variable
and individual fixed effects, yields a regional wage elasticity of 3.1%, which is con-
siderably lower than existing estimates for other developing countries. Including
fixed effects turns out to be important, reducing regional wage elasticity by 18-37%,
depending on the agglomeration measure used.
Using my full specification including both my historical instrument and individual
fixed effects, I do not find significant heterogeneous effects of agglomeration based
on gender, skill level or participation in the formal/informal economy. I do however
find some evidence that agglomeration externalities matter more than human capital
externalities in South Africa.
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3.A Additional Tables
Table 3.A.1: Summary statistics for municipalities
Total High UEP munic. Low UEP munic
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Total pop. 2011 221241.7 521223.5 944170.2 12222452 114928.7 98717.8
Urban pop. 2011 139100.7 504421.3 840035.7 1205709 36022.0 32891.5
Urban emp. pop. 2011 44272.5 179726.9 282546.1 437677.3 9232.2 9237.6
Urban emp. pop 2011 market access 37228.9 23272.7 48980.6 27440.5 27394.3 12349.2
Area (km2) 4669.6 4987.8 2882.4 1722.9 6124.7 6164.6
Est. urban pop. 1960 211924.3 348487.1 427507.5 403820 51744.5 36952.3
Est. black urban pop. 1960 95983.9 180346.9 194926.9 220889.6 12380.0 9146.4
% tertiary educated 4.0 2.2 7.3 2.4 3.4 1.7
% completed Grade 10 53.7 57.2 46.1 39.1 54.9 5.1
No. of municipalities 234 30 204
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Table 3.A.2: Descriptive statistics for movers in base sample
Movers
Total High EP munic. Low EP munic
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Monthly gross wages 7669.8 8308.4 8959.8 9022.0 6525.3 7440.4
Female (%) 37.1 48.3 37.7 48.5 36.5 48.2
Age 33.8 9.2 33.3 8.9 34.2 9.4
Age 16-29 (%) 37.8 48.5 40.2 49.1 35.7 48.0
Age 30-43 (%) 45.7 49.8 44.4 49.7 46.9 49.9
Age 44-57 (%) 14.9 35.7 13.3 35.0 15.5 36.2
Age 58-70 (%) 1.5 12.1 1.2 10.7 1.8 13.3
Black (%) 65.9 47.4 71.7 45.1 60.8 48.8
Coloured (%) 27.2 44.5 22.7 41.9 31.3 46.4
Asian/Indian (%) 3.1 17.4 1.45 11.9 4.6 21.0
White (%) 2.8 16.5 3.3 17.9 2.3 15.0
Avg. years of educ. 10.5 3.1 11.2 2.5 9.9 3.5
Grade 1-5 (%) 4.3 20.2 1.9 13.6 6.4 24.5
Grade 6-8 (%) 9.2 29.0 7.4 26.2 10.9 31.2
Grade 9-11 (%) 32.2 46.7 30.2 46.0 34.0 47.4
Grade 12 (%) 43.8 49.6 49.3 0.5 39.0 48.8
Technikon diploma (%) 0.3 5.2 0.43 6.6 0.1 3.6
University degree (%) 6.7 25.1 9.3 29.0 4.5 20.7
Trade union (%) 26.8 44.3 29.1 45.4 24.7 43.2
Informal (%) 28.2 45.0 23.1 42.2 32.7 46.9
Married (%) 24.6 43.0 25.2 43.4 24.1 42.8
Observations 1,472 692 780
Individuals 529 252 277
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Table 3.A.3: Descriptive statistics for base sample excluding districts where no his-
torical population information
Movers
Total High EP munic. Low EP munic
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Monthly gross wages 6833.3 7691.3 7874.0 8411.6 5870.0 6819.1
Female (%) 48.6 49.9 48.6 50.0 48.6 49.9
Age 37.8 10.7 37.0 10.6 38.6 10.7
Age 16-29 (%) 26.7 44.2 30.0 45.8 23.6 42.5
Age 30-43 (%) 42.6 49.5 42.2 49.4 43.0 49.5
Age 44-57 (%) 26.6 44.2 23.9 42.7 29.1 45.4
Age 58-70 (%) 4.1 19.9 3.9 19.4 4.3 20.3
Black (%) 55.9 49.7 64.2 47.9 48.2 50.0
Coloured (%) 33.2 47.1 25.8 43.7 40.1 49.0
Asian/Indian (%) 6.3 24.3 4.1 19.7 8.4 27.7
White (%) 3.7 18.8 49.6 21.7 2.5 15.5
Avg. years of educ. 9.9 3.2 10.5 2.76 9.3 3.5
Grade 1-5 (%) 6.5 24.6 4.0 19.56 8.8 28.4
Grade 6-8 (%) 15.1 35.8 11.3 31.7 18.5 38.9
Grade 9-11 (%) 33.9 47.3 35.4 47.8 32.6 46.9
Grade 12 (%) 34.8 47.6 40.5 49.0 29.6 45.7
Technikon diploma (%) 0.5 7.5 0.6 7.7 0.5 7.3
University degree (%) 5.4 22.6 6.2 24.1 4.7 21.1
Trade union (%) 29.9 45.8 31.8 46.6 28.2 45.0
Informal (%) 25.8 43.8 23.6 42.5 27.9 44.8
Married (%) 34.2 47.4 33.5 47.2 34.8 47.6
Observations 11,040 5,499 5,941
Individuals 4,212 2,037 2,175
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Table 3.A.4: The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages: 2SLS and indi-
vidual fixed effects with interactions
Panel 1: Effects of informal/formal employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Only UEP Indiv. Area Ind.+occ. MA UP TP HW
log UE pop. 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.027** 0.024** 0.018
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
log UE pop#informal 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.000





log urban pop. 0.031***
(0.012)
log urban pop.#informal 0.004
(0.007)
log total pop 0.044***
(0.017)
log total pop.#informal 0.005
(0.009)
log area -0.015 -0.023 0.005 -0.018 -0.016 -0.011
(0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
R-squared 0.434 0.448 0.448 0.460 0.448 0.448 0.447 0.420
Observations 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,621 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,864
Panel 2: Effects of gender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Only UEP Indiv. Area Ind.+occ. MA UP TP HW
log UE pop. 0.044*** 0.034** 0.033** 0.030** 0.024 0.025
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
log UE pop#female -0.013 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.015





log urban pop. 0.035**
(0.016)
log urban pop.#female -0.005
(0.024)
log total pop 0.049**
(0.023)
log total pop.#female -0.008
(0.034)
log area -0.015 -0.023 0.005 -0.017 -0.016 -0.008
(0.034) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
R-squared 0.427 0.448 0.448 0.460 0.448 0.448 0.447 0.421
Observations 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,621 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,864
Panel 1 includes an interaction between my agglomeration measure and a dummy variable = 1 if worker is
informally employed and 0 if formally employed. The main effect of informal drops out because of the individual
fixed effects. Panel 2 includes an interaction between my agglomeration measure and a dummy variable = 1 if
worker is female and 0 if male. The main effect of female drops out because of the individual fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the local municipality level in parentheses. Columns 2-8 include individual controls
for age, age squared, educational attainment, marital status, trade union membership, etc. Columns 3-8 include
a control for the (log) land area of local municipalities. Year fixed effects included in all columns. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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Table 3.A.5: The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages of workers: 2SLS
with individual fixed effects including a control for share of population with tertiary
education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Only UEP Indiv. Area Ind.+occ. MA UP TP HW
log UE pop. 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.030*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Prop. tert. edu. -0.860* -0.815* -0.806* -0.809 -0.680 -0.787* -1.114** -0.577
(0.506) (0.471) (0.470) (0.498) (0.471) (0.465) (0.552) (0.492)
log area -0.011 -0.019 0.006 -0.015 -0.011 -0.008
(0.033) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
log MA 0.090
(0.055)
log urban pop. 0.049***
(0.016)
log total pop. 0.079***
(0.026)
R-squared 0.427 0.448 0.448 0.461 0.449 0.448 0.448 0.421
Observations 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,621 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,864
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Columns 2-8 include individual con-
trols for age, age squared, educational attainment, marital status, trade union membership, etc. Columns
3-8 include a control for the (log) land area of local municipalities. All columns include a control for the
share of the population with tertiary education. Year fixed effects included in all columns. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
Table 3.A.6: The effects of agglomeration externalities on wages of workers: 2SLS
with individual fixed effects including a control for share of population with at least
Grade 10 education
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Only UEP Indiv. Area Ind.+occ. MA UP TP HW
log UE pop. 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.030** 0.021*
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Prop. Gr. 10 0.210* -0.207* -0.216** -0.205* -0.180* -0.224** -0.317** -0.162
(0.116) (0.108) (0.107) (0.110) (0.108) (0.108) (0.127) (0.111)
log area -0.023 -0.029 -0.006 -0.025 -0.027 -0.017
(0.033) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)
log MA 0.079
(0.057)
log urban pop. 0.036***
(0.013)
log total pop. dens. 0.054***
(0.019)
R-squared 0.427 0.448 0.448 0.461 0.449 0.448 0.448 0.421
Observations 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,621 11,372 11,372 11,372 10,864
Robust standard errors clustered at the local municipality level in parentheses. Columns 2-8 include individual
controls for age, age squared, educational attainment, marital status, trade union membership, etc. Columns
3-8 include a control for the (log) land area of local municipalities. All columns include a control for the share
of the population with at least Grade 10 education. Year fixed effects included in all columns. Significance
levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.01
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Table 3.A.7: The effects of human capital externalities on wages of workers: 2SLS
with individual fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Only UEP Indiv. Ind.+occ. HW
Prop. Gr. 10 -0.209*** -0.201*** -0.199*** -0.178***
(0.076) (0.070) (0.068) (0.077)
R-squared 0.431 0.453 0.466 0.425
Observations 12,253 12,253 11,454 11,668
Robust standard errors clustered at the local municipality level
in parentheses. Columns 2-4 include individual controls for age,
age squared, educational attainment, marital status, trade union
membership, etc. The variable of interest is the share of the pop-
ulation with at least Grade 10 education. Year fixed effects in-
cluded in all columns. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.01
Agglomeration economies in a developing country: Evidence from geo-coded micro-panel data in South Africa 132
